Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 22STCV30111, Date: 2024-02-26 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22STCV30111    Hearing Date: February 26, 2024    Dept: 58

Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki

Department 58


Hearing Date:              February 26, 2024

Case Name:                 Herrera v. Richards

Case No.:                    22STCV30111

Matter:                        Default Judgment prove-up

Moving Party:             Plaintiff Dario Herrera

Responding Party:      Unopposed


Tentative Ruling:      The request for default judgment is denied.




            This is an action arising from legal malpractice. The Complaint alleges a single cause of action for negligence.

 

            On November 8, 2023, the Court entered default against Defendant Richard Towne (Doe 1). Defendants Leslie Richards, the Law Office of Leslie Richards and Does 2-5 remain in this action and have not been dismissed.

 

            Plaintiff now moves for default judgment against Defendant Richard Towne. The request for entry of default judgment is denied.

 

Discussion

 

            Plaintiff seeks default judgment in the amount of $204,880 against Defendant Towne, which includes $4,880 in special damages and $200,000 in general damages.

 

            First, the Court declines to enter default judgment as to one party where other parties remain – especially where the co-Defendants appear to be jointly liable. (Nicholson v. Henderson (1944) 25 Cal.2d 375, 378 [“[A]s a general rule there can be only one final judgment in a single action.”].)

 

Further, the Complaint, arising from a personal injury action, properly does not specify the amount of damages sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10.) However, as result, Plaintiff was required to serve a Statement of Damages on Defendant Towne prior to the entry of default. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.11.) Further, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.11 provides that a statement of damages, when required, “shall be served in the same manner as a summons.” There is nothing to suggest compliance with this requirement; this noncompliance is fatal to the request for entry of default judgment.

 

Additionally, the requested damages are unsubstantiated.

 

A plaintiff is not required to prove damages in support of a default judgment by a preponderance of the evidence; rather, the evidence submitted by a plaintiff is sufficient if it establishes a prima facie case for the damages sought. (Harbour Vista, LLC v. HSBC Mortg. Services Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1503, fn. 6; Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361.) “[B]ut a prima facie case is not equivalent to ‘a matter of course.’ Prima facie evidence is still evidence and subject to some standards.” (Harbour Vista, LLC, supra, at p. 1503, fn. 6.)

 

Here, Plaintiff’s evidence supporting his request for damages in the amount of $200,000 is entirely conclusory and lacking in any evidentiary foundation. (Herrera Decl., ¶ 6.) Thus, the evidence is inadequate, and the Court cannot award damages in the amount requested, even if the procedural requirements for default judgment had been met. (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 288 [“‘Plaintiffs in a default judgment proceeding must prove they are entitled to the damages claimed.’”]; accord, Taliaferro v. Hoogs (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 559, 560 [default judgment can be entered only on proof to court of damage sustained, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 585].)

 

Indeed, arguably, the Complaint fails to state an adequate claim for negligence where the nature of the breach is unclear from the allegations. (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 282 [“[I]f the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint do not state any proper cause of action, the default judgment in the plaintiff's favor cannot stand.”].)

 

Accordingly, the request for entry of default judgment is denied.