Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 22STCV30111, Date: 2024-02-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV30111 Hearing Date: February 26, 2024 Dept: 58
Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki
Hearing
Date: February 26, 2024
Case
Name: Herrera v. Richards
Case
No.: 22STCV30111
Matter: Default Judgment
prove-up
Moving
Party: Plaintiff Dario
Herrera
Responding
Party: Unopposed
Tentative Ruling: The
request for default judgment is denied.
This
is an action arising from legal malpractice. The Complaint alleges a single
cause of action for negligence.
On
November 8, 2023, the Court entered default against Defendant Richard Towne
(Doe 1). Defendants Leslie Richards, the Law Office of Leslie Richards and Does
2-5 remain in this action and have not been dismissed.
Plaintiff
now moves for default judgment against Defendant Richard Towne. The request for
entry of default judgment is denied.
Discussion
Plaintiff
seeks default judgment in the amount of $204,880 against Defendant Towne, which
includes $4,880 in special damages and $200,000 in general damages.
First,
the Court declines to enter default judgment as to one party where other
parties remain – especially where the co-Defendants appear to be jointly
liable. (Nicholson v. Henderson (1944) 25 Cal.2d 375, 378 [“[A]s a general rule there can be only one
final judgment in a single action.”].)
Further, the Complaint,
arising from a personal injury action, properly does not specify the amount of damages
sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10.) However, as result, Plaintiff was required
to serve a Statement of Damages on Defendant Towne prior to the entry of
default. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.11.) Further, Code of Civil Procedure section
425.11 provides that a statement of damages, when required, “shall be served in
the same manner as a summons.” There is nothing to suggest compliance with this
requirement; this noncompliance is fatal to the request for entry of default
judgment.
Additionally, the
requested damages are unsubstantiated.
A plaintiff is not required to prove damages in support of a default
judgment by a preponderance of the evidence; rather, the evidence submitted by
a plaintiff is sufficient if it establishes a prima facie case for the damages
sought. (Harbour Vista, LLC v. HSBC Mortg. Services Inc. (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 1496, 1503, fn. 6; Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 357, 361.) “[B]ut a prima facie case is not equivalent to ‘a matter
of course.’ Prima facie evidence is still evidence and subject to some
standards.” (Harbour Vista, LLC, supra, at p. 1503, fn. 6.)
Here, Plaintiff’s
evidence supporting his request for damages in the amount of $200,000 is entirely
conclusory and lacking in any evidentiary foundation. (Herrera Decl., ¶ 6.) Thus,
the evidence is inadequate, and the Court cannot award damages in the amount requested,
even if the procedural requirements for default judgment had been met. (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 267, 288 [“‘Plaintiffs in a default judgment proceeding must prove
they are entitled to the damages claimed.’”]; accord, Taliaferro v. Hoogs
(1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 559, 560 [default judgment can be entered only on proof
to court of damage sustained, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 585].)
Indeed,
arguably, the Complaint fails to state an adequate claim for negligence where the
nature of the breach is unclear from the allegations. (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 267, 282 [“[I]f the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint do
not state any proper cause of action, the default judgment in the plaintiff's
favor cannot stand.”].)
Accordingly, the
request for entry of default judgment is denied.