Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 22STCV32106, Date: 2023-02-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV32106 Hearing Date: February 22, 2023 Dept: 58
Judge
Bruce G. Iwasaki
Hearing Date: February
22, 2023
Case Name: Juana Allende v. Simplified
Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc.
Case
No.: 22STCV32106
Motion: Motion
to Compel Arbitration
Moving
Party: Defendant
Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc.
Defendant Maersk,
Inc. dba Maersk (joinder)
Responding
Party: Plaintiff Juana Allende
Tentative Ruling: The
Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted.
Background
In this
employment action, Juana Allende (Plaintiff or Allende) sues Simplified Labor
Staffing Solutions, Inc. (Simplified), Maersk, Inc., Lupe Martin, Susana
Cisneros, and Stephanie Perez for eighteen causes of action including
discrimination, harassment, retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination,
failure to provide reasonable accommodation, whistleblower retaliation,
wrongful termination, various Labor Code violations, and declaratory relief. Plaintiff was a temporary employee hired by Simplified
to work for Maersk to unload boxes from trailer trucks.
Simplified filed
a petition to compel arbitration and Maersk joined. Plaintiff opposes the petition, primarily on
the grounds of unconscionability, and Defendants reiterated their arguments in
the Reply. The individual Defendants
(Lupe Martin, Susana Cisneros, Stephanie Perez) have not been served.[1]
In her opposition, Plaintiff
interposed evidentiary objections to the declaration of Sandra Senbol, the Vice
President of Operations at Simplified.
(Opposition, p. 5:9-18.) This is
improper and not formatted correctly.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b).) The Court overrules the objections on
procedural and substantive grounds. (Estate
of O’Connor (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th
159, 170 [“ ‘any “qualified witness” who is knowledgeable about the
documents may lay the foundation for introduction of business records–the
witness need not be the custodian or the person who created the record’ ”].)
The Court
finds that the agreement is not unconscionable and that there is a valid
agreement to arbitrate the labor dispute.
Legal Standard
Code of Civil
Procedure section 1281.2 authorizes the court to order arbitration of a
controversy if it finds the parties have agreed to arbitrate that dispute. Because the obligation to arbitrate arises
from contract, the court may compel arbitration only if the dispute in question
is one in which the parties have agreed to arbitrate. (Weeks v. Crow
(1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 350, 352.) Since
arbitration is a favored method of dispute resolution, arbitration agreements
should be liberally interpreted, and arbitration should be ordered unless the
agreement clearly does not apply to the dispute in question. (Id. at p. 353; Segal v. Silberstein
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 627, 633.) However,
there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies
which they have not agreed to arbitrate. (Weeks, supra, 113
Cal.App.3d at 353.)
Discussion
Preliminarily, Plaintiff argues that Simplified’s
service of the petition and notice of the hearing is defective because she did
not agree to accept electronic service.
However, because she filed a substantive opposition, the Court considers
the merits of the petition. (See Carlton
v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697.)
Federal Arbitration Act
The parties
argue between whether the Federal Arbitration Act applies. The “Arbitration Agreement and Class Action
Waiver” (Agreement) specifies that arbitration shall be held “pursuant to the
provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’).” Thus, the Court finds that the FAA applies,
but this distinction is immaterial because the analysis is the same under
either California or Federal law. (Nelson
v. Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 643, 655
[“[Defendant’s] insistence on the FAA’s application is puzzling because there
is no disagreement between California law and the FAA regarding arbitrability.
Under both, until shown otherwise, ‘courts presume that the parties intend
courts, not arbitrators, to decide . . . disputes about “arbitrability” ’ ”].)
Agreement to Arbitrate
Sandra Senbol,
Vice President of Operations at Simplified, attests to the Agreement’s
authenticity. (Senbol Decl., ¶ 7.) The Agreement states, in part, that
Simplified and any employees:
Agree that all controversy, dispute
or claim arising out of or relating to your employment or termination thereof
with SIMPLIFIED STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC. shall be subject to final and binding
arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).
(Senbol Decl., Ex. 1, p. 1.)
On the last
page, Plaintiff’s name is printed on the top and her handwritten signature
appears next to the date of “2-18-19.”
Evaluating a
petition to compel arbitration is a three-step process. “First, the moving party bears the burden of
producing ‘prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the
controversy.’ ” (Gamboa v. Northeast
Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165 (Gamboa).) In establishing the existence of an agreement
to arbitrate, it is generally sufficient for defendant to simply provide a copy
of the arbitration agreement. (Baker
v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC, 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160 (2017); Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) “For
purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the
normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood
Management Corp. (2001), 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC
(2017) 14 Cal. App. 5th 785, 793 (2017) (“unless there is a dispute over
authenticity, it is sufficient for a party moving to compel arbitration to recite
the terms of the governing provision.”). Accordingly, “a petitioner is not
required to authenticate an opposing party's signature on an arbitration
agreement as a preliminary matter in moving for arbitration or in the
event the authenticity of the signature is not challenged.” (Ruiz v. Moss
Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 846, original italics.)
Second, once
the moving party has met its initial prima facie burden, the “opposing party
bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the
agreement. [Citation.] The opposing
party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify
under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does
not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not
remember signing the agreement. [Citations.]”
(Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) Finally, in the third step, the burden shifts
back to the moving party to “establish with admissible evidence a valid
arbitration agreement between the parties . . . by a preponderance of the
evidence.” (Id. at pp. 165-166.)
In Gamboa,
the plaintiff averred that she “did not recall the agreement and would not have
signed it if she had been aware of it.”
(Id. at p. 167.) This was
held sufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden at the second step. (Id. at p. 168.) After defendant failed to file a supplemental
declaration, the trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. In affirming, the Court of Appeal found that
defendant “presented no evidence that [plaintiff] saw or signed the arbitration
agreement because the court sustained [plaintiff’s] objections to the
[defendant’s] proffered evidence.” (Ibid.)
Here, Allende
avers that she has “no recollection of ever receiving, seeing, reviewing or
signing the ‘Arbitration Agreement and Class Action Waiver.’ I did not agree to
any arbitration.” (Allende Decl., ¶ 15.) While this lack of recollection satisfies Gamboa,
another recent Court of Appeal decision disagreed that this was enough to
challenge a handwritten signature.
In Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 756 (Iyere),
the plaintiffs declared that they signed
“stack of documents,” but did not “ ‘recall ever reading or signing any
document entitled Binding Arbitration Agreement . . ..” The appellate court found that the
declarations “explicitly acknowledge that plaintiffs signed a ‘stack of
documents’ and do not deny that the stack included the agreement.” Thus, there was “no conflict between their
having signed a document on which their handwritten signature appears and, two
years later, being unable to recall doing so.”
(Ibid.)
The Gamboa
court held that whether a plaintiff’s signature was electronic or handwritten
was a “distinction without a legal difference” because “electronic and
handwritten signatures have the same legal effect and are equally
enforceable.” (Gamboa, supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at p. 168.) However, the Iyere
court disagreed with Gamboa.
It held that if confronted with a handwritten signature and the
party is unable to allege whether the signature was “inauthentic or forged,
[then] the fact that the person does not recall signing the agreement neither
creates a factual dispute as to the signature’s authenticity nor affords an
independent basis to find that a contract was not formed.” (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th
at p. 758.)
As in Iyere,
Plaintiff acknowledges to “signing documents [she] did not understand.” (Allende Decl., ¶ 8.) She does not dispute that the Agreement was among
them. (Iyere, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 756.) However, even if
it were assumed that Gamboa governs and Plaintiff sufficiently
challenged the authenticity of the Agreement, Simplified has provided a
supplemental declaration that meets its burden.
In her
initial declaration, Senbol averred that she oversees “all day-to-day
operations.” As part of her role, she maintains
and reviews employee personnel records in the ordinary course of her duties and
business. She also attests to being
“personally familiar with Simplified’s record-keeping practices with respect to
personnel and other employment-related records and [has] the authority to
certify those records.” (Senbol Decl., ¶
3.) In her supplemental declaration,
Senbol declared that she obtained a copy of Allende’s personnel file and
provides a copy. She avers that the file
contains “several examples of Ms. Allende’s signature that match the signature
on her Arbitration Agreement.” (Senbol
Supp. Decl., ¶ 4.) The Court concludes
this is sufficient for Simplified to meet its burden of establishing an
agreement to arbitrate. (See Iyere,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 759; cf. Gamboa, supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at p. 170.)
As to
Allende’s argument that there is no implied-in-fact agreement because she cannot
read English and only understands Spanish, this is unavailing. In Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los
Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 163, the plaintiff was charged with
signing a waiver and release despite being literate only in Greek. The appellate court noted that “ ‘in the
absence of fraud, overreaching or excusable neglect, that one who signs an
instrument may not avoid the impact of its terms on the ground that he failed
to read the instrument before signing it.’ ”
(Ibid.) Accordingly, even,
though Plaintiff may only be fluent in Spanish, there is no evidence of fraud
or bad faith. She admits that Defendant
allowed her to take home the application materials to have someone help her
with translation. (Allende Decl., ¶ 7.) And while she avers that she “had no idea if
[she] could ask anyone from the office to help [her]” and that nobody informed
her “if there were Spanish copies of the application,” there is no indication
that she requested assistance or Spanish copies.
Therefore, the
Court finds that Defendant has met its initial burden of establishing the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate.
The arbitration agreement is enforceable and complies with
Armendariz
Simplified argues that
unconscionability is for the arbitrator to decide, relying on Tiri v. Lucky
Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 238. But the Agreement does not appear to contain
a delegation clause. Thus, the Court
proceeds to evaluate these arguments.
The
California Supreme Court has mandated “five minimum requirements for the lawful
arbitration of such rights pursuant to a mandatory employment arbitration
agreement.” Such an agreement is lawful if it “(1) provides for neutral
arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a
written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would otherwise
be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay either
unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’ fees or expenses as a condition of
access to the arbitration forum. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 102.)
These
requirements are met here. (Senbol Decl., Ex. A.) The Agreement incorporates the “Employment
Arbitration Rules & Procedures” from the American Arbitration Association
(AAA). Under the Agreement and AAA’s Rules,
there will be a neutral arbitrator. (Senbol Decl., Ex. 1, ¶ 3; McLoughlin
Decl., Ex. 2, ¶ 12.) The Agreement
allows for “[a]ll discovery procedures authorized pursuant to the California
Rules or Civil Procedure.” (Senbol Dec.,
Ex. 1, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff is entitled to
recover any remedy she would have been entitled to in court and the arbitrator
will issue a written decision. (Id.
at ¶¶ 5-6.) Finally, Simplified agrees
to “pay all forum fees and all fees and expenses charged or incurred by the
arbitrator.” (Id. at ¶ 2.)
Despite these
provisions, Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is procedurally and
substantively unconscionable.
The arbitration agreement is not unconscionable.
Procedural unconscionability
“The
procedural element of the unconscionability analysis concerns the manner in
which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that
time. [Citation.] The element focuses on oppression or surprise. [Citation.]
‘Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power that results in no
real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice.’ [Citation.] Surprise is
defined as ‘“the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the
bargain are hidden in the prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to
enforce the disputed terms.”’ [Citation.]” (Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 571, 581.)
Allende
argues that there is a high degree of procedural unconscionability and relies
on OTO v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111 (OTO). There, our Supreme Court found substantial
procedural unconscionability when the agreement was a “paragon of prolixity,
only slightly more than a page long but written in an extremely small font,”
which contained “51 lines of text” that was “ ‘visually impenetrable’ and
challenge[d] the limits of legibility.’ ”
Moreover, the high court noted the “substance of the agreement [was]
similarly opaque. The sentences are complex, filled with statutory references
and legal jargon. The second sentence alone is 12 lines long.” (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p.
128.) Additionally, there were other
circumstances establishing “significant oppression,” including presenting the
agreement to plaintiff as a condition to maintain employment, inability to
negotiate terms, and the agreement was presented by a “low-level employee” with
no opportunities for further assistance.
Notably, because the plaintiff was on a ”piece-rate compensation system,
any time [plaintiff] spent reviewing the agreement would have reduced his
pay.” (Id. a pp. 127-128.)
The Court
disagrees that OTO is analogous.
Here, the Agreement is only four pages long and has at most 26 lines per
page. The sentences are not overly complex
and are, at most, five lines long. While
Plaintiff avers that she was “pressured [] to return the application quickly,”
she acknowledges that she was allowed to take the application home to review. (Allende Decl., ¶ 7.) Thus, the only pressure was Allende’s internal
desire to begin work earlier. (See Ibid.) This is insufficient to establish significant
unconscionability. (See Baltazar v.
Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245 [“The adhesive nature of the
employment contract requires us to be ‘particularly attuned’ to her claim of
unconscionability [citation], but we do not subject the contract to the same
degree of scrutiny as ‘[c]ontracts of adhesion that involve surprise or other
sharp practices’ ”].) Plaintiff offers
no evidence of surprise or fraud.
Plaintiff
also argues that the Agreement has no opt-out clause and was presented to her
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Since the arbitration
agreement is mandatory, the Court agrees there is some level of procedural
unconscionability here. (Mills v. Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 1035, 1051 [“It is undisputed the arbitration agreement is an
adhesive contract because it was imposed as a condition of employment”]; Ajamian
v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 796 [“The finding that the
arbitration provision was part of a nonnegotiated employment agreement
establishes, by itself, some degree of procedural unconscionability”].) But it is minimal. “ ‘[A]bsent unusual circumstances,
use of a contract of adhesion establishes a minimal degree of procedural
unconscionability notwithstanding the availability of market alternatives.’ ”
(Walnut Producers of California (2010) 187
Cal.App.4th 634, 646, original italics.) Plaintiff
offers no other reason as to why an adhesion contract alone establishes more
than minimal procedural unconscionability.
Substantive unconscionability
Plaintiff
contends that there is substantive unconscionability because there cannot be a
neutral arbitrator based on the “repeat player” effect, insufficient discovery, a forced waiver of
class action claims, and a lopsided venue term.
“ ‘A
provision is substantively unconscionable if it “involves contract terms that
are so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience,’ or that impose harsh or
oppressive terms.” [Citation.] The phrases ‘harsh,’ ‘oppressive,’ and ‘shock
the conscience’ are not synonymous with “unreasonable.” Basing an
unconscionability determination on the reasonableness of a contract provision
would inject an inappropriate level of judicial subjectivity into the analysis.
“With a concept as nebulous as ‘unconscionability’ it is important that courts
not be thrust in the paternalistic role of intervening to change contractual
terms that the parties have agreed to merely because the court believes the
terms are unreasonable. The terms must shock the conscience.” [Citations.]’ ” (Walnut Producers of California, supra,
187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 647-648.)
Plaintiff’s
first argument that Simplified’s “repeat player” status in arbitration taints
the neutrality of the arbitrator is without merit. Various statutes require
arbitrators to make disclosures to the parties, allow the parties to disqualify
arbitrators on that basis, and require arbitration companies to make certain
disclosures to the public. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1281.9, 1281.91, 1281.96.) The AAA rules also set forth how a neutral
arbitrator shall be selected.
(McLoughlin Decl., Ex. 2, ¶ 12.) This
factor does not weigh on substantive unconscionability. (See Mercuro v. Superior Court (2002)
96 Cal.App.4th 167, 178-179 [“While our Supreme Court has taken notice of the
‘repeat player effect,’ the court has never declared this factor renders the
arbitration agreement unconscionable per se”].)
Similarly,
Plaintiff’s argument on inadequate discovery is speculative. She asserts that discovery may be conditioned
on the “exclusive decision of the arbitrator” and by “making no provision for
propounding document requests, written interrogatories, or requests for
admission.” Contrary to her arguments,
numerous courts have found that the AAA rules for discovery are
sufficient. (Lagatree v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1130 n. 21 [finding
that the AAA rules provide “[t]he arbitrator shall have the authority to order
such discovery, by way of deposition, interrogatory, document production, or
otherwise, as the arbitrator considers necessary to a full and fair exploration
of the issues in dispute,” was “fair to claimants”]; Roman v. Superior Court,
172 Cal. App. 4th 1462, 1475-76 [finding no meaningful difference between AAA
rules for discovery and the discovery rules in the California Arbitration Act,
which were sufficient in Armendariz).
Third, the
Agreement does require waiver of “the
right to initiate or proceed on a class action basis or participate in a class
action in arbitration.” Plaintiff argues
this is unlawful and cites to Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) 36
Cal.4th 148, which has since been overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 56 U.S. 333, 356. (See Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los
Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 357, overruled on other
grounds in Viking
River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1906, 1924-1925].) Moreover, there is also a severability clause
that if any part of the Agreement is found to be “void or otherwise
unenforceable, in whole or in part, such adjudication shall not affect the
validity of the remainder of the Agreement and these portions of this agreement
shall remain in full force and effect, insofar as they are consistent with
existing law.” Even if the waiver were
invalid, it can be severed out.
Finally,
Plaintiff’s argument that the Agreement creates a “lopsided venue term” is
unpersuasive. The Agreement provides
that the arbitration will occur in California “at a location mutually agreed to
by the parties.” If the parties cannot
agree, the arbitrator shall select a “location of mutual convenience.” Plaintiff argues that because Simplified has
“locations across the country,” this unduly burdens her. An agreement of mutual convenience
means that it is convenient to both parties. Plaintiff offers no evidence that Defendant
has multiple locations around the United States and that an arbitrator may
select a location in the middle of California that may inconvenience her. Nevertheless, the Court accepts Simplified’s
representation that it would be unopposed to an order mandating that the
arbitration occur in Los Angeles County.
In sum, the
Court accepts that there is some modicum of procedural unconscionability
because of the adhesive contract. But
without any substantive unconscionability, there are no grounds to vitiate the
Agreement.
Inconsistent rulings
Plaintiff next argues that the motion
should be denied because there is a possibility of inconsistent rulings with
the non-signatory Defendants, Maersk and the individual supervisors. Because the Court is inclined to order a stay
of this proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision
(d), this argument fails.
Third parties
Plaintiff contends
that Defendant Maersk is not a signatory to the Agreement and cannot compel her
to arbitration.
Nonsignatories
sued as agents of a signatory may enforce an arbitration agreement. (Rowe v. Exline (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th
1276, 1284.) For example, in Dryer v.
Los Angeles Rams (1985) 40 Cal.3d 406, 418, the plaintiff sued the Rams and
various individuals “in their capacities as “ ‘owners, operators, managing
agents, and in control [sic] of’ ” the Rams for breach of contract. (Id.
at pp. 409–410, 418.) The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of
defendants’ petition to compel arbitration, holding that if “the individual
defendants, though not signatories, were acting as agents for the Rams, then
they are entitled to the benefit of the arbitration provisions.” (Id. at p. 418.)
This concept is evident in staffing
agency situations under an equitable estoppel theory. In Garcia v. Pexco, LLC (2017) 11
Cal.App.5th 782 (Garcia), plaintiff had an arbitration agreement with
his employer, Real Time Staffing Services. He sued Real Time and a
worksite employer, Pexco, for labor law violations. (Id. at pp.
784–785.) The appellate court affirmed the order compelling arbitration,
reasoning that even though Pexco was a nonsignatory, it could compel
arbitration because “all of [plaintiff’s] claims are intimately founded in and
intertwined with his employment relationship with Real Time,” with whom he
agreed to arbitrate “ ‘any dispute.’ ” (Id. at pp. 787, 784.) Thus, plaintiff could not “link Pexco to Real
Time to hold it liable for alleged wage and hour claims, while at the same time
arguing the arbitration provision only applies to Real Time and not
Pexco.” (Id. at p. 788.) As joint
employers, Pexco and Real Time were agents of each other in their dealings with
Garcia. (Ibid.)
Here, Plaintiff
acknowledges that she alleged that all Defendants “jointly employed her,” but
contends that Defendants “fail to offer evidence establishing that their
actions were so intertwined with each other or any relationship between
Simplified and non-Signatory Defendants.”
But she cites no legal authority for this proposition. The Complaint alleges that all Defendants “were
the agents and servants of and with each other” and Allende was employed by all
Defendants. (Complaint, ¶¶ 7, 68, 167.) Paragraphs 4 and 20 explicitly state that all
Defendants “acted as and constituted a ‘single employer’ or ‘joint employer’ of
Plaintiff in connection with all governing laws, statutes, and
regulations.” This is sufficient to
bring this case under Garcia. Plaintiff
offers no contrary legal authority as to why an arbitration agreement may not
be enforced against a party who is sued as an agent of the signatory. (Rowe v. Exline, supra, 153
Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.) Plaintiff’s claims
against the other nonsignatory co-Defendants are “rooted in [her] employment
relationship” with signatory Simplified. (Garcia, supra, 11
Cal.App.5th at p. 787.)
Plaintiff’s
reliance on Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
446 is misplaced. Barsegian pre-dated
Garcia and involved whether allegations in the complaint that “all
defendants are agents of one another” constituted a judicial admission for
purposes of determining whether defendants were “third parties” under Code of
Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c).
(215 Cal.App.4th at p. 448.) That
section allows a court to deny arbitration based on the possibility of
conflicting rulings resulting from litigation with third parties.
The issue here is not whether the
complaint’s allegations amount to a judicial admission against the defendant
for purposes of section 1281.2, subdivision (c). Rather, the inquiry is whether Maersk may
compel arbitration in the first instance as a non-signatory defendant under
agency principles.
Furthermore, Garcia distinguished
Barsegian because the complaint at issue “was not merely boilerplate
language” and included allegations of “workplace violations against [staffing
agency] and [employer] as joint employers, referred to both employers
collectively as ‘defendants’ without any distinction, and alleged identical
claims and conduct regarding unlawful and improper acts.” (Garcia, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th
at p. 788.) As in Garcia, the
Complaint here also alleges that Simplified and Maersk are joint employers,
referred to both corporations as “entity defendants,” and, except for three
causes of action for Labor Code violations, alleges the same causes of action
against both.
Accordingly,
the Court finds that the arbitration agreement is also applicable to Defendant
Maersk. The petition to compel
arbitration is granted and the case is stayed until the conclusion of the
arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2,
subd. (d).)