Department 58

Hearing Date: January 18, 2023

Case Name: Aladdin Dinaali v. Bridge Property Management LC et al.

Case No.: 22STCV32840

Matter: Demurrer

Moving Party: Defendants Bridge Property Management, LC; James E. Murphy

Responding Party: Plaintiff Aladdin Dinaali

Tentative Ruling: The demurrer is sustained in its entirety without leave to amend.

Aladdin Dinaali (Plaintiff) sues Bridge Property Management, LC (Bridge), Nevada Attorney General, and James E. Murphy (Murphy) for unfair business practices, conspiracy, fraud, intrusion into private affairs, slander per se, intentional interference with a contract, gross negligence, intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, and injunction.

The basis of this lawsuit is that in April 2022, Bridge, through its counsel, Murphy, sued Plaintiff in Nevada for defamation and business disparagement. In the Nevada case, Bridge alleged that Plaintiff damaged its reputation by creating two websites that falsely stated that criminals resided in Bridge’s property and that the company is racist. Plaintiff allegedly sent e-mails to Bridge’s employees directing them to visit the websites.

In October 2022, six months later, Plaintiff brought this lawsuit. He argues that he was wrongfully sued in Nevada, Bridge allegedly filed a false police report against him for criminal prosecution, Bridge conspired with its attorney and employees to falsely accuse him of violating various statutes, and that his website constitutes protected activities.

On January 12, 2023, the Court granted Bridge and Murphy’s motion to strike and dismissed Plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth causes of action.

Bridge and Murphy (Defendants) now demur to the remaining two causes of action for intentional interference with a contract and gross negligence. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendant reiterated its arguments in reply.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the complaint filed in Clark County, Nevada and Case Information Statement of that case is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).)

Defendants’ counsel’s declaration indicates that the parties did not meaningfully meet-and-confer, but this “shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4); Johansson Decl., ¶ 2.) Accordingly, the Court reaches the merits and sustains the demurrer.

Legal Standard

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “‘“treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . . .”’” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.)

Discussion

Seventh cause of action - intentional interference with a contract

“‘The elements which a plaintiff must plead to state the cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations are (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.’” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege a valid contract, breach of that contract, and damages. Plaintiff recites the elements in his Complaint: he held a power of attorney over an unnamed tenant in Defendants’ apartment complex (Complaint, ¶ 138); Bridge had a copy of the power of attorney and disrupted Plaintiff’s duties by evicting the tenant (¶¶ 139, 141.)

First, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s alleged power of attorney qualifies as a “valid contract.” (See Rosenberg v. C. W. Clarke Co. (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 178, 186 [“A power of attorney is ‘… a written authorization to an agent to perform specified acts in behalf of his principal’”].)

Even if this Court assumes that it is a valid contract, the elements of breach and damages are missing. Plaintiff alleges that Bridge’s eviction of the tenant caused him to breach his agreement with the tenant. But without alleging the terms of the power of attorney, it is unclear how this constituted a breach. For example, did the power of attorney require Plaintiff to keep the tenant in his/her home? If not, what was the arrangement between Plaintiff and the tenant? Moreover, even if Defendants evicted the tenant, it is unclear how Plaintiff, as the agent of the tenant (and not a tenant himself), was damaged by that act. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained on this cause of action.

Eighth cause of action – gross negligence

The elements for negligence are: (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co.¿(2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.) There is no distinct cause of action for gross negligence apart from negligence. (Continental Insurance Co. v. American Protection Industries (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 322, 328-330 [“[I]n light of the adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence in California, any attempt to categorize gross negligence separately from ordinary negligence is unnecessary”].)

Defendants argue that Bridge was not the owner of the complex at the time that Plaintiff was injured, and that spoliation of evidence does not constitute a cause of action.

Here, to the extent that Plaintiff is alleging “gross negligence,” the demurrer is sustained. (See also Eriksson v. Nunnink (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 826, 856, n.18 [“‘In reality, California does not recognize a distinct cause of action for “gross negligence” independent of a statutory basis’”].)

Plaintiff’s general negligence claim is based on a “damaged canopy on the grounds of [the] Apartment which was left unrepaired for more than 6 months.” (Complaint, ¶ 68.) However, the duty element is uncertain. Plaintiff concedes that “the accident happened before Bridge took over the property.” (Id. at ¶ 9.) If so, then Bridge did not owe a duty of care to Plaintiff since it was neither the owner nor the lessee of the apartment complex. It follows then that Plaintiff cannot allege that Bridge breached its duty.

However, in that same paragraph, Plaintiff alleged that the damaged canopy “was left sitting unmitigated for more than six months before it would get fixed.” (Complaint, ¶ 68.) This appears to be an argument for premises liability, in which the “owner of premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. A failure to fulfill this duty is negligence.” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619.) If this is the theory, then Plaintiff faces an issue with the causation and damages element. As pled, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was injured on November 2, 2021, which happened “before Bridge took over the property.” He does not plead that Bridge caused his damages nor does he plead that he accrued further damages after Bridge took over the property and failed to repair the canopy.

Plaintiff does not allege when Bridge became the owner or property manager of the complex. Instead, he merely alleges that the canopy “was left unrepaired for more than 6 months until Bridge was forced to repair it after receiving a fix-it-order by jurisdiction’s fire department.” (Complaint, ¶ 68.) But it is unclear when Bridge’s duty to repair the canopy arose, when it was breached, how it caused Plaintiff’s damages, and whether Plaintiff suffered damages because of the failure to repair. For those reasons, the demurrer is sustained.

As to the spoliation of evidence allegations, Plaintiff alleges that Bridge concealed and destroyed evidence. (Complaint, ¶¶ 35, 69, 104.) Such allegations cannot support an independent cause of action of destruction of evidence. (Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 17.)

Leave to amend

After a court sustains a demurrer, the burden is on the plaintiff to show how the complaint can be amended and the legal effect of the amendment on the pleading. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

Plaintiff asserts that if there is a “reasonable possibility that a pleading defect can be cured, leave to amend must be granted.” However, he does not argue how his pleading may be cured by amendment. Because he has not shown a reasonable possibility to cure the defects, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)