Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 22STCV33768, Date: 2022-12-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV33768 Hearing Date: December 20, 2022 Dept: 58
Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki
Department 58
Hearing Date: December
20, 2022
Case Name: Ybanag
Realty & Development Corporation dba D’Ybanag Construction Company v.
Sandor Survivor Trust
Case No.: 22STCV33768
Motion: Demurrer
Moving Party: Defendant
Sandor Survivor Trust
Opposing Party: Unopposed / Plaintiff Ybanag Realty
Tentative Ruling: The
Demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.
Background
This
is an action arising from construction services. Ybanag Realty & Development Corporation
(Ybanag or Plaintiff) sues Sandor Survivor Trust (Sandor or Defendant) for
breach of written contract, money had and received, account stated, and open
book. Ybanag alleges that it contracted
with Sandor to provide construction services including concrete, demolition,
asphalt, and paving. Ybanag avers that Sandor
failed to pay a total of $121,750.50 of an outstanding invoice.
Defendant demurs to the entire Complaint because a trust cannot be named as a
defendant and for insufficient facts on each cause of action. Counsel’s declaration satisfies the
meet-and-confer requirement. (Baradarian
Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) Plaintiff did not file
an opposition.
Legal Standard
A demurrer is an
objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the
face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial
notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30,
subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the
sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the
construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its
allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice
between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . ..” ’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds
(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.)
Discussion
“A trust itself cannot sue or be sued [citation.] ‘As a general rule,
the trustee is the real party in interest with standing to sue and defend on
the trust’s behalf.’ ” (Portico Management Group, LLC v. Harrison (2011)
202 Cal.App.4th 464, 473; see also Presta v. Tepper (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 909, 914; Code Civ. Proc., § 369, subd. (a)(2); Prob. Code, §
18004.) “[T]he real party in interest in litigation involving a trust is always
the trustee.” (Presta, supra,
179 Cal.App.4th at p. 914.)
Here, Plaintiff has named only the trust and must amend to name the
trustee. Therefore, the demurrer is
sustained with leave to amend as to the entire Complaint. The Court next briefly addresses the
sufficiency of the allegations.
First cause of action –breach of contract
To state a claim for
breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to establish: (1)
a contract between the parties; (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for
nonperformance; (3) defendant's breach; and (4) damages to plaintiff from the
breach. (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.)
The allegations are
sufficient here: Plaintiff alleges that it entered into an agreement with
Defendant to provide construction services.
(Complaint, ¶
2.) Plaintiff performed the
services. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Defendant breached by failing to pay. (Id. at ¶ 15.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is
suing under multiple contracts. But the
Court’s reading of the Complaint indicates Plaintiff is only suing on one
contract: “D’Ybanag’s invoice dated July 6, 2021 in the amount of $121,750.50.”[1] If Plaintiff is seeking breaches on multiple
contracts, it is granted leave to add in additional allegations as necessary.
Second through fourth causes of action - common counts – money had and
received, account stated, and open book
“ ‘A common count is not a specific cause of action … ; rather, it is a simplified form
of pleading normally used to aver the existence of various forms of monetary
indebtedness, including that arising from an alleged duty to make restitution
under an assumpsit theory.’ ” (Avidor v. Sutter's Place, Inc. (2013) 212
Cal.App.4th 1439, 1454.) “‘A cause of
action for money had and received is stated if it is alleged [that] the
defendant “is indebted to the plaintiff in a certain sum ‘for money had and
received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff.’”’ [Citation.] The
claim is viable ‘“wherever one person has received money which belongs to
another, and which in equity and good conscience should be paid over to the
latter.”’” (Ibid.)
Generally, to plead
common counts, a plaintiff must allege (1) indebtedness, (2) consideration
(e.g., money had and received, work done, good sold), and (3) nonpayment. (Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Zerin
(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460.
The demurrer for insufficiency of facts here is unavailing. Courts liberally construe common count
pleadings, and such counts are not normally subject to attack by general
demurrer or by a special demurrer for uncertainty, unless it is based on the
same allegations that support another insufficient claim. (Weitzenkorn v. Lesser (1953) 40
Cal.2d 778, 793; Auckland v. Conlin (1928) 203 Cal. 776, 778; Pike v.
Zadig (1867) 171 Cal. 273, 276 [“This form of pleading, a common count, by
long continued practice is not subject to attack by general demurrer or by a
special demurrer for uncertainty”]; Abadie v. Carrillo (1867) 32 Cal.
172, 175.)
Moreover, “[w]hen a common count
is used as an alternative way of seeking the same recovery demanded in a
specific cause of action, and is based on the same facts, the common count is
demurrable if the specific cause of action is demurrable . . . and must stand
or fall” with the specific cause of action. (McBride v. Boughton (2004)
123 Cal.App.4th 379, 394-395; see also Zumbrun v. Univ. of
So. Cal. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1,14.)
Here, Plaintiff is seeking damages from a breach of contract, which
would entitle it to the money that is allegedly being held by Defendant. While the Court sustains the demurrer based
on the incorrect defendant being named, the breach of contract is sufficiently
pled; thus, the common count allegations are also sufficient.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is
precluded from pursuing a breach of contract claim and account stated and open
book. But Plaintiff is permitted to plead
alternative theories of liability and even inconsistent allegations. (See Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th
1395, 1402; Gherman v. Colburn (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 544, 565 [“A
plaintiff may plead cumulative or inconsistent causes of action”].)
Defendant’s final
contention that the account stated claim must specify when a balance was due is
without merit. The Complaint pleads that
the balance is “now due, owing and unpaid.”
(Complaint, ¶¶
20, 24, 28.)
Conclusion
The demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend to add in the
trustee as the proper defendant and supplement with additional facts if
necessary. The Complaint is otherwise
pleaded sufficiently.
[1] Defendant
seemingly concedes that the total amount “references the amount of the original
contract” so it appears Defendant is aware of which contract is at issue here.