Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 22STCV35007, Date: 2023-04-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV35007    Hearing Date: April 24, 2023    Dept: 58

Judge Bruce Iwasaki

Department 58


Hearing Date:              April 24, 2023

Case Name:                 Giuliana Romano v. Ruggero Terzuolo, et al.

Case No.:                    22STCV35007

Motion:                       Preliminary Injunction

Moving Party:             Plaintiffs Giuliana Romano, Tullio Mamolo, and Alma Mamolo

Responding Party:      Defendants Ruggero and Ida P. Terzuolo

 

Tentative Ruling:      Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is denied.

 

 

I.                Introduction

 

This is an action for partition of commercial real property. Before the Court is a motion for preliminary injunction.  Plaintiffs Giuliana Romano (Giuliana), Tullio Mamolo (Tullio), and Alma Mamolo (Alma), as trustee of the First Restatement of the Mamolo Living Trust dated March 11, 1992, (collectively Plaintiffs) move for a preliminary injunction against Defendants Ruggero Terzuolo (Roger), and Ida P. Terzuolo (Ida), both as trustees of the Ruggero Terzuolo and Ida P. Terzuolo 1980 Trusts dated January 24, 1980. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendants from:

 

1)     Denying access to Plaintiffs or their representatives and employees to their co-owned real property, located at 703-705 South Main Street, Burbank, California (the “Burbank Property”)

2)     Changing locks or refusing to supply keys to the co-owners;

3)     Changing or modifying any part of the building structure;

4)     Removing any property, including equipment, furniture and fixtures from the Burbank Property or failing to restore any such removed property to Plaintiffs

5)     Conducting any business on the Burbank Property that Plaintiffs do not authorize;

6)     Permitting any work of improvement on the Burbank Property;

7)     Transferring, conveying or hypothecating any part of the real property and improvements;

8)     Failing to allow any real estate salesperson from inspecting the Burbank Property and posting marketing signs on it;

9)     Denying any persons authorized by the co-owners from access to the Burbank Property.

 

Plaintiffs Giuliana, Tullio, and Alma, and Defendant Roger, are alleged to be co-equal owners of a wholesale bakery and storage facility located at the Burbank Property.  Plaintiffs seek partition of the Burbank Property.  Defendants Roger and Ida oppose imposition of a preliminary injunction.  Their opposition memorandum insists they “do not object to an order that the Property be sold,” and “are not standing in the way.”  But they contend the sale should comply with the terms of an April 2017 Settlement Agreement in Los Angeles Superior Court case no. BC567430.  Roger states that Defendants are “not willing to agree to a sale of the property without protections….”  Plaintiffs contend that they have suffered irreparable injury by the denial of access and use of the Burbank Property and by Defendants’ conduct which Plaintiffs claim has caused injury to the parties’ co-owned business.  The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not adequately demonstrated the likelihood of prevailing on the merits and have not shown irreparable harm.  The motion for preliminary injunction is denied.

 

II.             Factual/Procedural Background

 

In 1973, Ugo Mamolo and Roger Terzuolo purchased the Viktor Benes Co., which owned and operated a bakery.  In 1986, Ugo, Roger, Giuliana, Tullio, and James Maher formed a partnership and purchased the Burbank Property for the purpose of operating a bakery and distribution center.  The partners initially took title to the Burbank Property under “Viktor Benes, Inc.” and caused the Burbank Property to be deeded to each of the individual partners.

 

In 2008, Maher was bought out of the partnership and of the Property; and title to the Property was transferred in 25% equal shares to the Mamolo Trust with Alma as trustee (25%), Roger and Ritta as husband and wife (25%), Giuliana (25%), and Tullio (25%). 

 

There are two other cases, BC567430 and BC577464, involving some of the parties.  On December 19, 2014, Giuliana and Tullio filed the first case (BC567430) against Ugo Mamolo and Roger, alleging that the named defendants misused and mismanaged partnership assets.  On April 2, 2015, the Viktor Benes Company filed the second case (BC577464) against Giuliana, Mamolos Continental Baker, LLC, Frank Romano, and Frank Romano Inc., alleging that Giuliana reportedly failed to pay the company certain licensing fees.  These two cases were consolidated under BC567430.  

 

On January 17, 2017, Plaintiffs Giuliana and Tullio filed with the Court a Notice of Conditional Settlement of the BC567430 case, which conditioned dismissal of the matter on the satisfactory completion of specified terms.

 

On April 26, 2017, the parties in the BC567430 case settled their disputes by entering into a written settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”).

 

On November 2, 2022, Giuliana, Tullio, and Alma, as trustee of the First Restatement of the Mamolo Living Trust dated March 11, 1992 filed this matter.  They sued Roger and Ida, both as trustees of the Ruggero Terzuolo and Ida P. Terzuolo 1980 Trusts dated January 24, 1980, and City National Bank for Partition of Real Property, ejectment, and accounting.  Defendant City National Bank, the mortgagee, consented to the requested relief.

 

On December 20, 2022, Defendants Roger and Ida demurred to the Complaint, arguing that there were prior cases filed in a different court and that this action should be abated because the earlier court had exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.  On January 26, 2023, the Court overruled the demurrer on the grounds that the cases did not arise from the same transaction or events. 

 

On March 23, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for preliminary injunction.  On April 11, 2023, Defendants filed an opposition.  On April 17, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a reply.

 

III.           Evidentiary Objections

 

Defendants’ objections are overruled in full.  These boilerplate objections fail to set forth specific evidence deemed to be inadmissible. 

 

Plaintiffs’ objections as to Declaration of Darin Margules, Esq. are sustained as to no. 2, with respect to incorporation of the Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, and overruled as to nos. 1, 3, and 4.

 

Plaintiffs’ objections as to Declaration of Ruggero Terzuolo are overruled as to nos. 1 and 2.

 

Plaintiffs’ objections as to Declaration of Michael Eveloff are overruled as to nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

 

IV.           Legal Authority

 

“In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a court must weigh two ‘interrelated’ factors: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or nonissuance of the injunction.  . . . .  The trial court’s determination must be guided by a ‘mix’ of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff’s showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction.”  (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677-78 (citations omitted).) 

 

“The general purpose of such an injunction is the preservation of the status quo until a final determination of the merits of the action.”  (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528.)  The status quo is the “last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceding the pending controversy.” (14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Ass’n v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1408 (internal quotations and citations omitted).)  A preliminary mandatory injunction “is not permitted except in extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal.”  (Board of Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286, 295 (citations omitted).)   

 

V.             Discussion

 

A.    Plaintiffs’ arguments in support of preliminary injunction.

 

Plaintiffs argue partition by sale is necessary because the co-owners and parties cannot agree on the use, sale, maintenance, or payment of the Burbank Property’s expenses.  The Burbank Property serves as a central warehouse and baking facility providing baked goods and supplies to the 16 Viktor Benes bakeries which are a licensee within the Gelson’s Markets throughout Southern California.  The Burbank Property — through the jointly-owned Mamolo’s Cont. & Bailey’s Bakeries, Inc. (“Mamolo’s Bakeries”) — provide accounting, billing, and invoicing services to the other bakery operators in the Viktor Benes system.  (Romano Decl. ¶ 4.) 

 

Plaintiffs argue they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because the Burbank Property cannot be divided in kind and partition of sale is the only feasible remedy.  Plaintiffs contend that have the unfettered right to use the property as co-owners and Defendants do not have any legal standing to retain exclusive possession of the Burbank Property.  However, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants and other persons acting in concert have improperly denied or severely restricted Plaintiffs’ access to the Burbank Property.  Plaintiffs seek to recover the use and possession of the Burbank Property.  Plaintiffs state that any delay in seeking injunctive relief was the result of attempts to resolve the matter informally.

 

Plaintiffs also argue that the balance of hardships weigh in favor of granting injunctive relief to preserve the status quo and to halt the ongoing harm resulting from Defendants’ conduct.  Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ conduct prevents the marketing and sale of the Burbank Property and may result in the co-owners receiving a lesser sale price if a sale is delayed.  In Plaintiffs’ reply to Defendants’ opposition, Plaintiffs also state that the denial of their right to access the Burbank Property is an ongoing harm that cannot be compensated by monetary damages.

 

Finally, Plaintiffs submit that no bond or undertaking is required because they are seeking to preserve their fundamental rights, any damages asserted by Defendants are of their own making, and Plaintiffs have been irreparably harmed by the denial of their property rights.

 

B.    Defendants’ opposition to preliminary injunction.

 

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ motion must be denied on the grounds that Plaintiffs fail to show they will prevail on the merits due to their waiver of the partition right by virtue of two written agreements which address how and when the Burbank Property can be sold.  Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the inadequacy of other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of preserving the status quo necessary to support injunctive relief.  Finally, Defendants contend that an undertaking of no less than two million dollars would be necessary, as the requested relief would essentially put Viktor Benes Continental Pastries, Inc. (“VBC,” an entity owned by Roger Terzuolo and his partner who is not a party to this case) out of business and damage the contractual relationships with the various operators of the Viktor Benes bakeries and with Gelson’s Markets.

 

In response to Plaintiffs’ allegations of Defendants’ improper conduct, Defendants contend that they assured Plaintiffs access to the Property with 24-hour advance notice.  Additionally, Defendants state that Plaintiffs could retrieve their personal property and corporate records could be provided upon request.  Defendants claim they only made necessary repairs to maintain proper function of the bakery and installed equipment (cameras, smoke detectors, emergency lighting) to prevent harm and/or to comply with county health codes.  They explain they changed locks for health purposes and only allowed those with active roles at the bakery to use the facility.  Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were welcome to contact Defendants’ counsel to make arrangements for supervised access during normal business hours.  Finally, Defendants state that they moved corporate documents which were deteriorating from dust, damp, and mold, creating a health and safety hazard, but that Plaintiffs could retrieve and have access to them at any time.

 

As to the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs will not prevail on the merits because: (1) other parties who have interest in the property pursuant to the Settlement Agreement have not been joined in the Partition Action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 872.510; (2) the Settlement Agreement acts as a waiver by the owners of the Property to the right to partition; (3) VBC has rights in the property as a tenant; (4) Plaintiffs’ action/partition is moot based on Defendants’ section 998 offer to compromise the partition claim. 

 

Defendants also argue that the balance of harm does not tip in Plaintiffs’ favor because the relief requested would not protect the status quo.  Defendants claim that Plaintiffs have not requested nor needed access to the Property for years and have only recently requested such in service of their alleged desire to sell the Property.  Defendants argue that there is no demonstrable reason why the trial of this matter cannot proceed without an injunction in place especially given that Defendants have agreed to stipulate to the trial being held on shortened time due to age and ill health of all the parties.  Finally, to the extent that Plaintiffs are harmed by the Defendants’ conduct, they can recover money damages.

 

C.    Plaintiffs’ reply arguments

 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants fail to provide any legitimate justification for their conduct and contend that Defendants’ focus on the merits of a pending sale offer is irrelevant.  Plaintiffs point to Defendant Roger Terzuolo’s deposition to show that Defendants are opposed to a sale and that they wish to hold the Property for their own use, to the exclusion of other users.  Plaintiffs state that Defendant Terzuolo acknowledges that Plaintiffs have been denied access to their own property. 

 

Plaintiffs also contend that the Settlement Agreement does not waive any of the co-owners’ right to seek partition of the Property.  Plaintiffs state that Defendants’ attempts to enforce the Settlement Agreement were denied because the Court found that Defendants themselves had not complied with the terms. 

 

Plaintiffs contend the Spousal Agreement between Ruggero Terzuolo and Ugo Mamolo is inapplicable to this instant action, and that it does not contain any language that waives the right to seek partition.

 

Plaintiffs move to strike Defendants’ exhibit containing a section 998 Settlement Offer as it has not yet been accepted by Plaintiffs and it is an improper attempt to use as evidence.  As noted above the Court sustains Plaintiffs’ objection to Defendants’ reference to the offer.

 

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that they have sustained harm by Defendants’ conduct due to being denied access as co-owners, and that the denial of their right to access the Property cannot be compensated by monetary damages.

 

D.    Plaintiffs are not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief

 

                                                  i.     Plaintiffs do not establish a likelihood of prevailing on the merits

 

An action of partition is an equitable proceeding.  (Elbert, Limited v. Federated Income Properties¿(1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 194, 200.)  Whenever a party affirmatively seeks relief through the interposition of the remedy of partition, the courts have adhered, in adjusting the rights of co-tenants and defining their interest in the common property, to the classic formulas encapsuled in the maxims that equity is equality and he who seeks equity must do equity, and have dispensed equitable relief only upon condition that the equitable rights of a co-tenant are respected and safeguarded.”  (Ibid.)¿ 

 

The judgment of partition is left to the discretion of the trial court and the determination requires a factual inquiry by the court.  When the evidence permits the court to reasonably conclude partition by sale would be more equitable to the owners, such decision should be upheld absent an abuse of discretion.  This is because “a partition suit is in equity” and “a court of equity has broad powers and comparatively unlimited discretion to apply.” (Richmond v. Dofflemyer (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 745, 758-59, 765-66.)  

 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits.  First, they do not provide any justification for the failure to join certain parties pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.  Defendants contend that Frank Romano, Frank Romano, Inc., and Viktor Benes Continental Pastries, Inc. have interests in the property pursuant to the Settlement Agreement or via their possession and tenancy at the Burbank Property.  Code of Civil Procedure section 872.510 requires the plaintiff to “join as defendants in the action all persons having or claiming interests of record or actually known to the plaintiff or reasonably apparent from an inspection of the property, in the estate as to which partition is sought.”  Here, Plaintiffs fail to show that they have met this procedural requirement. 

 

Second, the issue is not whether the Burbank Property will be partitioned, but on what terms.  A settlement will be better for the parties than a court order. They should pursue mediation.  But absent that, if the matter goes to trial, a great deal of history, appraisal information, and likely conflicting testimony on the relationship between this case and other litigation, will figure in.  This is a family dispute with understandable emotional issues. Plaintiffs’ specific injunction requests do not preserve the status quo and are likely to make resolution more difficult.

 

On the topic of the merits, the Court is dubious of Defendants’ argument that the 2017 Settlement Agreement acts as a “waiver” of the right to seek partition.  The Court does understand that enforcing the parties’ reasonable expectations in light of that Agreement is an aspect of fashioning an equitable remedy.

 

                                                ii.     The balance of harm does not weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor

 

Here, Plaintiffs fail to show irreparable harm warranting an injunction.  While Plaintiffs point to the potential loss of an opportunity to obtain a higher sale price as a result of Defendants’ prevention of the marketing and sale of the Burbank Property, this demonstrates that monetary damages are an adequate remedy and that Plaintiffs risk no irreparable harm. 

 

Plaintiffs’ declarations in support of this motion are remarkably vague.  The purported harm they allege is lacking in any detail.  Plaintiffs do not contend they have been operating business at the Burbank Property and are now prevented from doing so. Rather, they have an abstract concern of not having keys to the facility.  Their complaints about unspecified construction changes – denied by Defendants – unspecified furniture being moved, unspecified repairs performed, unidentified employees being terminated, and unnamed files and business records made accessible to unidentified persons, fail to meet a minimum standard for extraordinary relief.

 

Plaintiffs fail to show the irreparable injury needed for the Court to issue injunctive relief.

 

VI.           Conclusion

 

Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is denied.

 

That said, as a matter of case management, the Court will at the hearing discuss a prompt schedule for the parties to permit one or more real estate brokers and property appraisers to have access to the Burbank Property to facilitate settlement and trial preparation.  Similarly, if there is personal property the Plaintiffs identify, the Court expects to fashion a schedule and protocols in which the property can be returned, and to the extent the material is shared business information, copied.  The Court will also inquire of the parties concerning trial preparation.