Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case 22STCV37126 2023-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Moving Parties: Defendants Jill Michie-Sanchez (erroneously sued as Jill R. Miche aka Jill Sanchez), Roberto Sanchez, and JRM Property Management, Inc.

Opposing Party: Plaintiffs Cesar Sazo, Ana Diaz, Ana Sazo, Omar Hernandez, Yenmy Sazo, Marvin Medina, Javier Hernandez, Ana Sazo, Jaiden Garcia (a minor by and through his Guardian ad Litem Ana Sazo), Christopher Medina (a minor by and through his Guardian ad Litem Yenmy Sazo), Lesly Medina (a minor by and through her Guardian ad Litem Yenmy Sazo), Adreana Medina (a minor by and through her Guardian ad Litem Yenmy Sazo), and Alexanden Medina (a minor by and through his Guardian ad Litem Yenmy Sazo).

Tentative Ruling: The demurrer is overruled. The motion to strike is denied.

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint filed on April 6, 2023, is stricken.

Plaintiff is ordered to file and serve an amended Complaint within twenty (20) days of this ruling.

This a breach of warranty of habitability action. Plaintiffs allege that they rented a single-family residence located at 865 W. 41^st Dr., Los Angeles, CA 90037, which was inhabitable, resulting in a house fire and causing them injuries and damages.

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Defendants Roberto Sanchez, Jill Michie-Sanchez (erroneously sued as Jill R. Miche aka Jill Sanchez), and JRM Property Management, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging causes of action for (1) breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, (2) breach of implied warranty of habitability, (3) violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”) section 151.04(a), (4) maintenance of nuisance, and (5) collection of rent on substandard dwelling.

On March 13, 2023, Defendants filed their instant Demurrer with Motion to Strike. Defendants demur to the entire Complaint, arguing uncertainty and insufficient facts. They separately move to strike punitive damages allegations and request for attorneys’ fees.

On April 4, 2023, Defendants filed a Notice of Plaintiff’s Failure to Oppose Demurrer and Motion to Strike.

On April 6, 2023, Defendants filed a “Supplemental Reply to Plaintiff’s Non-Opposition to Demurrer and Motion to Strike and Untimely Amended Complaint.” In the supplemental reply, Defendants argue that the FAC is untimely and, therefore, Plaintiffs were required to obtain leave of Court before filing the pleading.

On April 6, 2023, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a declaration, arguing that Plaintiffs did not need leave of Court to file the FAC because the parties stipulated to the filing.

“[T]he filing of an amended complaint renders moot a demurrer to the original complaint.” (JKC3H8 v. Colton (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 468, 477.)

Here, the parties dispute whether the First Amended Complaint Plaintiffs filed on April 6, 2023, is timely. If it is, it will render the Defendants’ demurrer and motion to strike moot.

“A party may amend its pleading once without leave of the court at any time … after a demurrer or motion to strike is filed but before the demurrer or motion to strike is heard if the amended pleading is filed and served no later than the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 472, subd. (a) [emphasis added].)

Here, Defendants filed their demurrer on March 13, 2023. “All papers opposing a motion so noticed shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days, … before the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).)

Therefore, Plaintiffs were required to file their opposition by March 28, 2023, eleven court days before the hearing on April 11, 2023.

Plaintiffs did not file their FAC until April 6, 2023, well after the date for filing their opposition had passed.

However, “[a] party may amend the pleading after the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer or motion to strike, upon stipulation by the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 472, subd. (a) [emphasis added].)

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel attests to the following facts to show that the parties stipulated to the FAC’s filing. On March 13, 2023, Defendants served and filed their instant demurrer with motion to strike the original complaint. On March 16, 2023, Plaintiffs’ counsel emailed defense counsel indicating that Plaintiffs were “likely” going to file the FAC “prior to date of hearing of demurrer.” (Declaration of Robert Ackerman in Response to Reply Papers, filed on April 6, 2023 (“Ackerman Decl.”), ¶ 3; Exhibit A, p. 1.) Defense counsel responded: “Thanks. I’m glad you found our moving papers that persuasive. I look forward to receiving your FAC.” (Ackerman Decl., ¶ 4; Exhibit B, p. 1.)

“‘A stipulation is “[a]n agreement between opposing counsel ... ordinarily entered into for the purpose of avoiding delay, trouble, or expense in the conduct of the action,” [citation] and serves “to obviate need for proof or to narrow [the] range of litigable issues’ (Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed.1990) p. 1415, col. 1).’ [Citation.]” (Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 279.)

“‘California law is clear that there is no contract until there has been a meeting of the minds on all material points.’ [Citation.]” (Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1430.) “[A] contract will be enforced if it is sufficiently definite (and this is a question of law) for the court to ascertain the parties' obligations and to determine whether those obligations have been performed or breached. [Citations.] Stated otherwise, the contract will be enforced if it is possible to reach a fair and just result even if, in the process, the court is required to fill in some gaps. [Citation.]” (Ersa Grae Corp. v. Fluor Corp. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 613, 623.)

Here, there is no proof that the parties agreed to the filing the FAC. Plaintiffs’ counsel only told defense counsel that Plaintiffs were “likely” going to file the FAC. He did not ask whether Plaintiffs could file the FAC before the hearing on the demurrer and motion to strike. In addition, even if defense counsel expressed that he looked forward to receiving the FAC, that does not mean that he agreed to Plaintiffs’ filing the FAC after their deadline to oppose the demurrer with motion to strike had passed.

Accordingly, the Court finds the FAC untimely and improperly filed. The Court will consider Defendants’ demurrer and motion to strike on their merits.

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.)

The Court finds the Defendants have satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (See Declaration of Anthony C. Kohrs, ¶¶ 2-4 [testifying that the parties’ counsel met and conferred via telephone on March 3, 2023, but did not reach an agreement concerning the issues raised in Defendants’ demurrer and motion to strike].)

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “‘“treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….”’” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.)

1. Notice of Case Closure dated December 19, 2022 sent by Los Angeles Department of Housing, Rent Stabilization Division, Investigation and Enforcement Section to Plaintiff ruling in favor of Defendants with regards to Plaintiffs’ claims for illegal rent increase and reduction of services because the property in question, 865 W. 41st Street, is a single family dwelling and not subject to the Rent Stabilization Ordinance, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1;

2. City of Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (“LADBS”) building permits for Additional Dwelling Unit (“ADU”), a true and correct copy of which are attached collectively hereto as Exhibit 2; and

3. LADBS inspection records related to the permitted construction of the ADU, a true and correct copy of which are attached hereto collectively as Exhibit 3.

The Court grants the unopposed request. (See Tower Lane Properties v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 262, 272 [noting that a court “may take judicial notice of local ordinances and other official resolutions, reports, and acts of a city,” as well as sections of the LAMC].)

A party may demur a pleading on the ground that it is “uncertain,” meaning ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)

Here, Defendants demur to each of the five causes of action in the Complaint, arguing that they are uncertain. They imply it is ambiguous or unintelligible because (1) Plaintiffs failed to attach a copy of the alleged lease agreement between the parties or sufficiently allege the lease’s material terms, (2) Plaintiffs failed to identify which of the twelve plaintiffs are tenants such that they have standing to assert their contract-based claims, (3) Plaintiffs fail to identify which violations Defendants failed to correct, the date those violations occurred, the dates Defendants were notified, and whether Defendants were given notice and opportunity to correct them, and (4) the Plaintiffs fail to specify the uninhabitable “conditions with respect to the single family dwelling that was actually occupied.” (Demurrer, pp. 5:7-25; 13:15-24.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)

Here, the Court finds Defendants’ uncertainty arguments unpersuasive for the following reasons.

First, Plaintiffs were not required to attach a copy of the alleged lease agreement. “‘In an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.’ [Citation.]” (Maxwell v. Dolezal (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93, 98; see also Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 402 [“plaintiff’s failure either to attach or to set out verbatim the terms of the contract was not fatal to his breach of contract cause of action”].) Here, Defendants argue that the first cause of action for breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment and second cause of action for breach of implied warranty of habitability were breach of contract claims. Even if the Court were to agree with that argument, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded the legal effect of their lease with regards to those claims by alleging the following. They were in a landlord-tenant relationship with the Defendants based on a written lease agreement. (Compl., ¶ 20.) Under California law, every residential lease contains the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment and implied warranty of habitability. (Compl., ¶¶ 44, 52.) Plaintiffs substantially performed all of their obligations under their lease, or otherwise have been excused from such performance. (Compl., ¶ 46.) Defendants breached those implied covenants as set forth in the Complaint. (Compl., ¶¶ 47, 53, 54.) As an actual and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs suffered harm. (Compl., ¶¶ 54.)

Second, the Complaint alleges that all Plaintiffs were tenants. (Compl., ¶¶ 11 [“At the time the conduct giving rise to Plaintiffs claims for damages occurred, Plaintiffs and each and every one them were rent-paying tenants of Defendants”]; 72 [“During tenancy at the Dwelling Unit, Plaintiffs were in in a landlord-tenant relationship with Defendants, paying rent and occupying the premises, pursuant to a written rental agreement, a written rental agreement that was orally modified, or an oral rental agreement, as specified herein”].) Defendants can obtain further details through discovery.

Third, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs gave Defendants notice and opportunity to correct specific violations, and Defendants failed to correct those violations. (Compl., ¶ 1(B) [alleging that Plaintiffs rented a single-family residence located at 865 W. 41^st Dr., Los Angeles, 90037 (the “Dwelling”)]; ¶ 74 [“The Dwelling Unit substantially lacks, and at all times relevant to this action substantially lacked, the following standard characteristics necessary for habitation in a dwelling as delineated in Civil Code section 1941.1: effective waterproofing and weather protection of roof and exterior walls, including unbroken windows and doors; plumbing and gas facilities maintained in good working order; heating facilities maintained in good working order; electrical lighting maintained in good working order; building kept in every part clean, sanitary, and free from all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, rodents and vermin; and floors, stairways, and railings maintained in good repair, in addition to other characteristics”]; ¶ 42 [“Plaintiffs have notified Defendants of the uninhabitable conditions in the building, and Defendants have at all times had both actual and constructive knowledge of the unsafe and unhealthy conditions in the building”]; ¶ 48 [“Plaintiffs have filed innumerable complaints with Defendants and/or their agents regarding the dilapidated state of their Dwelling Unit and have demanded that Defendants make all necessary repairs to bring the Dwelling Unit therein to tenantable condition, but Defendants have ignored Plaintiffs’ complaints”].)

Fourth, the Complaint alleges the uninhabitable conditions that affected the Dwelling (i.e., the single-family residence at issue in this case). (Compl., ¶¶ 39, 48.)

Defendants demur the first cause of action arguing for breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, arguing that (1) it is uncertain because the lease agreement was not attached, and (2) fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant JRM Property Management, Inc. (“JRM”) because the claim cannot be brought against an agent. (Demurrer, pp. 13:7-14:5.)

However, as discussed above, Plaintiffs were not required to attach the lease agreement.

In addition, the Complaint alleges that “Defendants [including JRM] either were or are the owners of the Subject Property and were additionally responsible for the management of the Subject Property.” (Compl., ¶ 12.)

Since the Court treats a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, the Court cannot sustain the demurrer to the first cause of action as to JRM, on the ground that the defendant was merely an agent.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the first cause of action for breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is overruled.

Defendants demur the second cause of action for breach of implied warranty of habitability, arguing that (1) the Complaint does not allege any facts to establish when they put Defendants on notice of any alleged defects or violations nor do they allege when the alleged violations or defects started or even occurred, (2) Plaintiffs do not allege any facts showing when Defendants were notified nor any facts to show that Defendants were given a reasonable opportunity to provide for such repairs, (3) Plaintiffs did not attach a copy of the lease agreement to the Complaint and do not allege sufficient actual facts to identify the proper parties to the lease contract, and (4) that the cause of action is uncertain.

The elements of a breach of warranty of habitability cause of action “‘are the [1] existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability, [2] notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition, [3] the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and [4] resulting damages.’ [Citation.]” (Peviani v. Arbors at California Oaks Property Owner, LLC (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 874, 891.) “A violation of a statutory housing standard that affects health and safety is a strong indication of a materially defective condition.” (Ibid.) For example, under Civil Code section 1941.1, a dwelling will be considered untenantable if (1) the building, grounds, and appurtenances are not clean, sanitary, and free from all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents, and vermin; or (2) the dwelling substantially lacks an adequate number of appropriate receptacles for garbage and rubbish, in clean condition and good repair. (Ibid.)

Here, as stated above, the Complaint alleges the conditions of the Dwelling that were uninhabitable, including rodent infestation. (Compl., ¶ 39.) Moreover, that the Plaintiffs “filed innumerable complaints with Defendants and/or their agents …,” but the “Defendants … ignored Plaintiffs’ complaints.”

Accordingly, the demurrer to the second cause of action for breach of implied warranty of habitability is overruled.

The Complaint alleges the following under the third cause of action. The Dwelling “is subject to protections of the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (“LARSO”). LAMC, §151.00 et seq.” (Compl., ¶ 57.) “Pursuant to LAMC §151.04, ‘It shall be unlawful for any landlord to demand, accept or retain more than the maximum adjusted rent permitted pursuant to this chapter or regulation or orders adopted pursuant to this chapter.’” (Compl., ¶ 59.) “Pursuant to LAMC §151.02, a ‘Rent Increase’ is defined as ‘[a]n increase in rent or any reduction in housing services where there is not a corresponding reduction in the amount of rent received.’” (Compl., ¶ 60.) “Plaintiffs believes and based on their beliefs alleged that by virtue of the uninhabitable conditions described hereinabove (and amongst other bases) [including the explosion of the heating unit], Defendants herein have demanded, accepted or retained rent from Plaintiffs in excess of the maximum adjusted rent permitted by Los Angeles Municipal Code (Rent Stabilization Ordinance).” (Compl., ¶ 62.)

Defendants demur the third cause of action, arguing that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar the claim for the following reasons. “Plaintiffs previously asserted an enforcement complaint to [Los Angeles Housing Department (“LAHD”)] for alleged reduction in housing services and illegal rent increase against these very same Defendants arising out of their occupancy of the subject property.” (Demurrer, p. 8:19-21, citing Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), ¶ 1, 4-5; Exhibit 1.) However, the LAHD “investigated and resolved said complaint in favor of the Demurring Parties here based on its determination that the subject property is a single family dwelling, as [the] Plaintiffs admit, and NOT subject to the regulations set forth under the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (‘LARSO’).” (Demurrer, p. 8:21-24.)

“‘Collateral estoppel has been described as ‘one aspect of the concept of res judicata.’ [Citation.] ‘Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.’ [Citation.]” (Basurto v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 866, 877 (“Basurto”).) “The threshold prerequisites for its application are well known: ¶ ‘First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.’” (Id. at pp. 877-878.)

“It has long been recognized that collateral estoppel not only prevents relitigation of court findings, but also may be applied to the decision of an administrative agency when that agency is acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” (Basurto, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 878.)

“However, California courts have also emphasized that an administrative decision may operate as a bar to later judicial relief only when the court is first satisfied that the administrative proceeding leading to that decision had a sufficiently ‘judicial’ character.” (Basurto, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 878.) “‘Indicia of [administrative] proceedings undertaken in a judicial capacity include a hearing before an impartial decision maker; testimony given under oath or affirmation; a party’s ability to subpoena, call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce documentary evidence, and to make oral and written argument; the taking of a record of the proceeding; and a written statement of reasons for the decision.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 878-879.)

At this pleading stage, the Court lacks factual allegations to conclude that an LAHD investigation and hearing were sufficiently quasi-judicial to bar litigation in this Court. Defendants have not met their burden of establishing issue or claim preclusion.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the third cause of action for violation of LAMC section 151.04(a) is overruled.

The Complaint alleges the following under the fourth cause of action for maintenance of nuisance. “Defendants negligently caused nuisances to exist, as defined in Civil Code section 3479, at the Apartment Complex.” (Compl., ¶ 69.) “Therefore, pursuant to Civil Code section 3501, Plaintiff brings this civil action for private nuisance. Such nuisance has caused Plaintiff to suffer general and special damages.” (Compl., ¶ 70.)

Defendants demur the fourth cause of action, arguing (among other things) that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for private nuisance.

“Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.)

To state a cause of action for private nuisance, a plaintiff must allege a non-trespassory interference with the private use and enjoyment of property. (Civ. Code, §§ 3479 – 3481; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 938.) Liability for private nuisance also requires two additional elements: (i) substantial actual damage, which is (ii) unreasonable as to its nature, duration, frequency or amount. (Id. at 937-938.)

Virtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of property may amount to a nuisance, so long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable. (Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 263, 302.) “As stated by Prosser: ‘There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word “nuisance.” It has meant all things to all men, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie.’” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 919.) Whether the interference is substantial and unreasonable is a question of fact requiring determination of all the circumstances of the case. (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 263-64.)

Here, the fourth cause of action re-alleged previous paragraphs, including Paragraph 39 which alleges that “at all times relevant to this action,” the Dwelling suffered from: “inadequate sanitation; inadequate heating; dampness; infestations of insects, vermin, or rodents; defective or deteriorated, flooring; and walls and ceilings with deteriorated, crumbling, or loose plaster, in addition to other characteristics.” (Compl., ¶ 39.) The Complaint also alleges that the “Defendants negligently caused nuisances to exist, as defined in Civil Code section 3479, at the Apartment Complex. Therefore, pursuant to Civil Code section 3501, Plaintiff brings this civil action for private nuisance. Such nuisance has caused Plaintiff to suffer general and special damages.” (Compl., ¶¶ 69, 70.)

The Court finds those allegations sufficient. Whether the uninhabitable conditions alleged in the Complaint were substantial and unreasonable is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on demurrer.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the fourth cause of action for maintenance of nuisance is overruled.

Defendants do not raise any specific arguments concerning the fifth cause of action, except they state in a header that the claim is identical and cumulative to the second cause of action for breach of warranty of habitability. (Demurrer, p. 11:17-20.)

The Court does not find the fifth cause of action identical to the second since the former is brought under Civil Code section 1942.4, a statute that is not mentioned under the second cause of action. Defendants have not explained why the two claims are identical. But even if it were, because the demurrer is overruled as to the second cause of action, it is overruled to the fifth cause of action.

The demurrer to the fifth cause of action for maintenance of nuisance is overruled.

1. “The landlord's practice of ignoring these conditions and/or otherwise failing to repair, under the circumstances, is willful and intentional, and is being done with depression and malice against Plaintiffs, and such conduct warrants the imposition of punitive damages.” (Complaint [“Com.”] at ¶ 50.)

2. “For exemplary and punitive damages according to proof.” (Com. at ¶ 4 of the prayer for relief.)

3. “For attorneys’ fees pursuant to applicable contracts and/or statutes.” (Com. at ¶ 6 of the prayer.)

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity. Plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that Defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) A¿plaintiff’s “conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud,¿or malice, express or implied,¿within the meaning of section 3294.”¿ (Brousseau v. Jarrett¿(1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)

Although paragraph 50 of the Complaint erroneously speaks of the Defendants action with “depression,” rather than “oppression,” the pleading alleges uncorrected uninhabitable conditions that support an allegation of oppression and malice, sufficient to permit a prayer for punitive damages. The motion to strike is denied.

The amended complaint Plaintiff filed April 6, 2023 is stricken. Plaintiff is ordered to file a Second Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days of this ruling.