Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case Number: 22STCV37518, Date: 2023-09-28 Tentative Ruling

(1.) Defendants Longwood Enterprises, Inc. dba Longwood Manor Convalescent Hospital, and Longwood Management Corp.

This lawsuit involves the quality of care that decedent Isaac Smith (Decedent) received during his residency at Defendant Longwood Manor Convalescent Hospital, a skilled nursing facility. On November 30, 2022, Plaintiffs David Smith, Isaac Smith, Jr., and Joseph Smith --Decedent’s family members, filed a Complaint, alleging causes of action for (1) wrongful death; (2) physical dependent adult abuse; (3) neglect; (4) unfair business practices; (5) survival; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On August 16, 2023, Defendants Longwood Enterprises, Inc. dba Longwood Manor Convalescent Hospital, and Longwood Management Corp. (Defendants) filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement. Defendants seek an order compelling Plaintiffs to submit their entire Complaint, including each and every cause of action, to binding arbitration.

In addition, Defendants request that this Court stay this action pending completion of the arbitration proceeding pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4.

The Court grants Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration in part and denies it in part. The motion to compel arbitration is granted as to Plaintiffs’ claims brought on behalf of Decedent: the second, third, and fifth causes of action. The motion is denied as to Plaintiffs’ individual claims: the first, fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action. The unopposed motion to stay the non-arbitrable claims is granted pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, a court may order arbitration of a controversy if it finds that the parties have agreed to arbitrate that dispute. Because the obligation to arbitrate arises from contract, the court may compel arbitration only if the dispute in question is one in which the parties have agreed to arbitrate. (Weeks v. Crow (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 350, 352.) Since arbitration is a favored method of dispute resolution, arbitration agreements should be liberally interpreted, and arbitration should be ordered unless the agreement clearly does not apply to the dispute in question. (Id. at p. 353; Segal v. Silberstein (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 627, 633.)

In moving for arbitration, Defendants request a court order compelling Plaintiffs to arbitrate all claims arising out of the Complaint based on the grounds that Decedent executed an Arbitration Agreement, which subjects these disputes to binding arbitration.

In ruling on a petition to compel arbitration, a court must determine two threshold matters: first, whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists; and second, whether that agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.)

By way of background, on May 26, 2021, Decedent signed an Arbitration Agreement prior to becoming a resident at the Longwood Manor; he was a resident at the Longwood Manor from May 25, 2021 to October 25, 2021. (Carlos Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.)

“Article 1. It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to whether any medical services rendered under this contract were unnecessary or unauthorized or were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will be determined by submission to arbitration as provided by California law, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process except as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings . . .

Article 2. It is further understood that any dispute between Resident and Longwood Manor (Facility Name), its owners, operators, officers, directors, administrators, staff, employees, agents, and Longwood Management Corp. and any and all predecessors, successors in interest, and assigns (collectively referred to herein as “Facility”), including any action for injury or death arising from negligence, intentional tort, and/or statutory causes of action (including all California Welfare and Institutions Code sections), will be determined by submission to arbitration as provided by California law, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process except as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings.” (Carlos Decl., Ex. A [Articles 1 and 2].)

Further, by signing the Arbitration Agreement, Decedent agreed that the Agreement also bound his “representatives, executors, family members, and heirs.” (Calros Decl., Ex. A [Article 3].)

In failing to oppose this motion, Plaintiffs do not dispute the existence and validity of this Arbitration Agreement. Defendants have carried their burden of demonstrating the existence of a binding arbitration agreement.

However, Defendants have only demonstrated that some of Plaintiffs’ claims fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement.

Here, the Complaint contains causes of action for (1) wrongful death; (2) physical dependent adult abuse; (3) neglect; (4) unfair business practices; (5) survival; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The causes of action that are entirely survival claims – one’s that belonged to Decedent but survive him – are the second cause of action for physical abuse, the third cause of action for neglect, and the fifth cause of action for “survival.” These all fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. These claims are based on Decedent’s admission to Longwood Manor and on the allegedly improper neglectful care that Decedent received during his residency at that facility. Accordingly, these claims are subject to the Arbitration Agreement signed by Decedent. The Court will compel these claims to arbitration.[1]

In contrast, the first cause of action for wrongful death is held by Plaintiffs in their individual capacity. (Wilson v. John Crane, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 847, 860–861, [explaining that cause of action “for wrongful death belongs ‘not to the decedent or prospective decedent, but to the persons specified’ by statute]; Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1263 [The “purpose [of a wrongful death claim] is to compensate specified persons—heirs—for the loss of companionship and for other losses suffered as a result of a decedent's death.”].) This cause of action arises on the death of the decedent and it is vested in the decedent's heirs. (Grant v. McAuliffe (1953) 41 Cal.2d 859, 864.)

Generally, a plaintiff's “wrongful death claim is personal to her and lies independent of ... survivor claims,” and that “[a]s a general rule, a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute that he or she has not agreed to resolve by arbitration.” (Daniels v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 674, 680.) Nonetheless, Defendants argue that this claim is also subject to arbitration. In support, Defendant cites Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838.

In Ruiz v. Podolsky, our Supreme Court held “that all wrongful death claimants are bound by arbitration agreements entered into pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1295, at least when . . . the language of the agreement manifests an intent to bind these claimants.” (50 Cal.4th at p. 841.) Section 1295 governs agreements to arbitrate professional negligence claims in medical services contracts with health care providers. “The purpose of section 1295 is to encourage and facilitate arbitration of medical malpractice disputes,” because the arbitration of these disputes “furthers MICRA’s goal of reducing costs in the resolution of malpractice claims and therefore malpractice insurance premiums.” (Id. at pp. 843–844.) Ruiz is inapplicable.

Here, however, Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims are based on elder abuse/neglect allegations and not allegations of medical malpractice. (Compl., ¶¶ 32-37; see also Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 406–408.) As explained by the court in Daniels v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 674, “Ruiz is based squarely on section 1295, which governs agreements to arbitrate professional negligence or medical malpractice claims” and “disagree[d] that Ruiz should be extended to arbitration agreements not governed by section 1295, or that are entered into with a person other than a health care provider for claims other than medical malpractice.” (Id. at pp. 682–683; Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835, 842.) The court then went on to reject the defendants’ contention that a residential care facility was “ ‘an extension of a health care facility’” and thus subject to Section 1295. (Id. at pp. 683–684.)

Similarly, Plaintiffs’ remaining individual claims – the fourth cause of action for unfair business practices, the sixth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the seventh cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress – involve conduct directed at Plaintiffs. (Compl., ¶¶ 60, 76, 80.) It is true that these causes of action also appear to allege harm to Decedent himself. The Court declines to compel arbitration of these arguably “mixed” claims. Because Plaintiffs are not signatories to the arbitration agreement, they cannot be bound by its terms to arbitrate these claims.[2] And the Court also declines to bifurcate these causes of action, sending the “survival” aspects of these causes of action to arbitration and keeping in court the aspects of these causes of action directed at Plaintiffs themselves. Such a procedure would result in inefficiency and potentially conflicting results.

Defendants argue that even if the Court determines these claims are not subject to the Arbitration Agreement because of Plaintiffs’ status as non-signatories, the Court should compel them to arbitration based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

But Defendants have not shown that Plaintiffs have accepted any benefits under the contract. Certainly, Decedent accepted the benefits and received services under the contract, but Plaintiffs did not directly receive any benefit under the contract. It is not enough to simply suggest that they benefited because a family member – Decedent – received care and other services under this agreement.

Nor can Defendants show that the causes of action of the non-signatory Plaintiffs are “intimately founded in and intertwined” with the contract obligations. As noted above, Plaintiffs’ claims all arise from tort allegations related to Defendants’ misconduct in the care and treatment of Decedent. While there is overlap in the law and facts of some of these claims, Plaintiffs claims do not arise from the contract. That is, Plaintiffs do not seek to rely on or enforce any contractual agreement with Defendants. (Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of California (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 295, 306 [“ ‘[E]ven if a plaintiff's claims “touch matters” relating to the arbitration agreement, “the claims are not arbitrable unless the plaintiff relies on the agreement to establish its cause of action.’ ” ”]; Pillar Project AG v. Payward Ventures, Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 671, 678 [nonsignatory plaintiff's causes of action for negligence and false advertising did not rely on or refer to an agreement between the defendant and a third party and were not inextricably intertwined with that agreement].) Equitable estoppel does not apply.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants have carried their burden of demonstrating the existence of a valid, binding arbitration agreement and that at least some of Plaintiffs’ claims fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement. Because the motion is unopposed and no unconscionability issues have been raised, the Court’s analysis on the motion to compel arbitration ends here with Defendants having met their burden. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126 [“The burden of proving unconscionability rests upon the party asserting it.”].)

[1] “Unlike a cause of action for wrongful death, a survivor cause of action is not a new cause of action that vests in the heirs on the death of the decedent. It is instead a separate and distinct cause of action which belonged to the decedent before death but, by statute, survives that event.” (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1264.)

[2] To the extent Defendants argue these claims are uncertain or are without merit (Mot., p. 4:25-5:8), such arguments are better suited for a dispositive motion on the merits.

[3] The stay issue is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4; Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1123; Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303, 320.)

Department 58