Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case 22STCV37623 2023-05-04 Tentative Ruling

Opposing Party: Plaintiffs, Sandra Luz Chairez Sanchez, individually and as guardian at litem for Marlene, Darlene, Fernando, Alexia Natalia, and Luis Fernando Cruz

Tentative Ruling: Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

Plaintiffs sued defendants on November 28, 2022 for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, tortious breach of the implied warranty of habitability, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, private nuisance, violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, and unfair business practices.

Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true for the purposes of demurrer: plaintiffs have rented the residential property located at 423 Laurel St., Apt. 11 in Compton, California (the Premises) from defendants since 2017. (See Compl. Ex. A, “Tenant Property Profile”.) They continued to live at the Premises at least through filing their complaint. (Ibid.) During that period the Premises suffered from severe cockroach infestation, widespread water leaks and chronic mold, and various other dilapidated conditions (e.g. crumbling, water-damaged ceilings and walls). (Id., ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs and other tenants have “repeatedly complained” about these conditions, but have been “repeatedly and intentionally ignored by Defendants.” (Id., ¶ 13.)

Defendants demur to all of plaintiffs’ causes of action, arguing that plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to state a claim or, alternatively, that plaintiffs’ complaint is ambiguous and unintelligible.

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . ..” ’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.)

A demurrer for uncertainty lies where the pleading is uncertain, including where the pleading is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f); Landau v. Salam (1971) 4 Cal.3d 901, 909.) To survive demurrer, a plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action. (See Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714, 719.) Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored. (Chen v. Benjamin (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.)

Plaintiffs have given defendants notice of the gravamen of their claims. They have clearly stated the acts or omissions defendants purportedly committed and the legal basis for defendants’ alleged liability. They have alleged the place and time period during which the events took place. As discussed further below, plaintiffs have alleged sufficient grounds for relief on all seven of their proposed theories. Their complaint does not fail for uncertainty.

A warranty of habitability is implied in all residential rental agreements. (See Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 629.) The implied warranty imposes upon the landlord the obligation to maintain leased dwellings in a habitable condition throughout the term of the lease. (See Smith v. David (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 101, 109.)

The elements for a breach of the implied warranty of habitability cause of action are: (1) the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability; (2) notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition; (3) the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency; and (4) resulting damages. (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)

Defendants do not argue in their demurrer that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability. They seem to rely on the argument that the complaint is uncertain – an argument which the court rejected above.

Plaintiffs’ complaint is not a model of specificity. But it provides sufficient facts to state a claim for breach of habitability. Plaintiffs allege, at length, the existence of unhabitable conditions in their particular unit and the property on which it is located. They allege they and other tenants repeatedly gave notice of these conditions over the course of five years; the law does not require them to quote verbatim the time, place, and contents of each notice. And accepting plaintiffs’ allegations as true, defendants were given five years to correct these conditions, which existed throughout the tenancy. Plaintiffs allege damages at least in the amount of rent they paid, for which they did not receive the consideration they were promised from their landlords.

The court overrules defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ first cause of action.

Second Cause of Action for Tortious Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability

Breach of the implied warranty of habitability, as any breach of contract, may be regarded as a tortious breach where an injured party demonstrates the defendant’s intentional, malicious, and outrageous conduct. (Smith v. David (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 101, 112, fn.3; Jones v. Kelly (1929) 208 Cal. 251, 255-256.) California law defines malice as “either (1) conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or (2) ‘despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’ ” (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 330.)

Defendants argue that “[t]he plaintiff must allege the ‘what and when’ of the act” defendant is accused of committing. (Dem., 6:20.) Defendants’ argument relies on the heightened pleading standard unique to fraud actions, not tortious breach of contract. This is not a fraud action. Plaintiffs need only plead sufficient facts for defendants to prepare a defense, and they have done so.

Here, plaintiffs allege “Defendants repeatedly lied . . . that they would make repairs” and defendants’ conduct was “intentional and designed to extract rent . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 27.) They also allege “Defendants were and are aware that Plaintiffs are low-income, unsophisticated and primarily Spanish-speaking tenants who have . . . little or no ability to protect themselves from the unscrupulous conduct of abusive landlords.” (Id., ¶ 26.) In other words, plaintiffs describe longstanding breaches of their rental contract by defendants, knowingly undertaken because plaintiffs were particularly financially vulnerable. Plaintiffs also allege a campaign of harassment mounted “in an effort to intimidate and/or coerce them into not complaining or speaking up about the dangerous and uninhabitable conditions . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 28.) These allegations, if true, amply demonstrate willful and conscious disregard for plaintiffs’ rights.

The court overrules defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ second cause of action.

“To succeed in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, and (3) the breach proximately or legally caused (4) the plaintiff's damages or injuries. (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662.)

Plaintiffs have pled that defendants owed them a legal duty to maintain the Premises in habitable condition, failed to do so, and thereby caused the plaintiff physical, emotional, and economic injury.

Defendants again claim plaintiffs have not pled negligence only because they have not pled sufficiently specific facts. Defendants cite to Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518 at length for the proposition that a negligence plaintiff “must indicate the acts or omissions which are said to have been negligently performed. He may not recover upon the bare statement that the defendant's negligence has caused him injury.”

Defendants quote the law correctly, but they misapply it to plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs do indicate acts and omissions which were negligently performed. According to plaintiffs, defendants have knowingly permitted uninhabitable conditions to persist at the rental property they owned for more than six years. Plaintiffs intimidated and harassed them and made false promises to make repairs.

Defendants attempt to apply a standard of pleading specificity that is unique to fraud actions. But plaintiffs have satisfied the ordinary pleading standard for negligence.

The court overrules defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ third cause of action.

“The elements of the tort for intentional infliction of mental distress are: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering and (4) actual and proximate causation of emotional distress.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921 (tenant may simultaneously recover for breach of warranty of habitability and intentional infliction of mental distress)). Courts have found “outrageous conduct” in clear cases, as where landlords directly threaten violence against tenants. (See Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 288.) However, they have also found “outrageous conduct” in cases where, for instance, a landlord raised rents to a level a tenant could not pay specifically because, the court found, the tenant exercised his “repair and deduct” remedy. (Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 297.) The latter is closer to what plaintiffs allege here. When habitability violations are severe enough, they may permit an inference of malice that rises to the level of “outrageous conduct,” without some specific, intentional, hostile act by a landlord; such was the case in McNairy v. C.K. Realty (McNairy) (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504 (severe habitability problems across multiple buildings and units).

Defendants rely on Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832 for the rule that “[i]n order to avoid a demurrer, the plaintiff must allege with ‘great[ ] specificity’ the acts which he or she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. [Citation.]” Defendants quote the standard correctly – but plaintiffs have satisfied it. Plaintiffs allege longstanding illegal, substandard, dangerous conditions that defendants knowingly permitted to persist over the course of at least five years. They allege, for instance, that they “have been the subject of a severe and persistent cockroach infestation that has caused [them] to inhale and ingest dead cockroach body parts, cockroach feces, cockroach urine and cockroach allergens. During the term of [their] tenancy, cockroaches invaded [their] kitchen, living room, bedroom(s), bathroom(s), appliances, furniture, beds and have continuously crawled on and bit Plaintiffs”, some of whom are minor children.

It is impracticable for plaintiffs to separate this deeply outrageous state of disrepair into discrete instances of distress. Longstanding, serious habitability violations may give rise to liability for intentional infliction. By their nature, such violations are ongoing states of disrepair. Plaintiffs need not list, day by day or hour by hour, each moment they suffered these conditions in order to state a claim with specificity.

The court overrules defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action.

Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action survives demurrer for the same reason as their first through third causes of action.

“Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to. . . an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.) And “[a]n action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by a nuisance.” (Id., § 731.) “[A tenant] may recover damages for the discomfort and annoyance of [her]self and the members of [her] family and for mental suffering occasioned by fear for the safety of [her]self and [her] family when such discomfort or suffering has been proximately caused by a trespass or a nuisance.” (Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Herbert(1960) 54 Cal.2d 328, 337.) Residential tenancies fall within the property interests protected by the law of nuisance. (Jones v. Kelly, supra, 208 Cal. at p. 255.) One may look to Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 919-921 (cited many times by plaintiffs) for a lengthy discussion of how and why a tenant suffering breaches of the warranty of habitability may also state a claim for nuisance. Defendants make no new argument in their demurrer specifically regarding nuisance; they only reiterate arguments that the court rejected above regarding earlier causes of action.

The court overrules defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action.

Civil Code section 1942.4 provides that a landlord “may not demand rent [or] collect rent” while the dwelling he rents out “substantially lacks” any of the characteristics required for it to be habitable, the landlord has been cited by public authorities for the violations, the conditions were not abated for more than thirty-five days, and the tenant did not cause the conditions in question. (Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (a).) A landlord who violates the section is liable for actual damages as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id., subd. (b).)

Plaintiffs have pled substantial and alarming breaches of habitability statutes, as discussed above. They also allege, upon information and belief, that “public agencies including the Los Angeles County Health Department, have inspected the Apartment and expressly informed Defendants in writing that [it] is substandard”, and defendants did not take timely action to correct the issues identified. (Compl., ¶ 56.) Plaintiffs of course do not allege they caused the conditions in question themselves. Thus, they have stated a claim under Civil Code section 1942.4.

Defendants argue that because plaintiffs did not identify a specific public officer making a report on a specific date, “an investigation or answer [is] impossible.” (Dem., 9:18-19.) And they cite to unpublished case law that appears to refer to a negligence per se or res ipsa loquitur rule of dubious relevance here. The court is not persuaded. First of all, plaintiffs did identify at least one public agency that allegedly cited defendants. Regardless, investigation of such citations is a simple matter. Plaintiffs need only allege ultimate facts in their complaint; they do not need to attach the individual reports that they rely on for evidence.

The court overrules defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action.

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) “addresses ‘unfair competition,’ which ‘… include[s] any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice … .” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) An action under the UCL thus must allege behavior that is unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent. (Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 917, 938.) The “unlawful” prong, in particular, is entirely derivative of other claims. (Krantz v. BT Visual Image, LLC (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 164, 178.) .) In that sense, “the UCL is a chameleon. . . . [U]nder the unlawful prong, [it] ‘ “ ‘borrows’ ” ’ violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices' that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.’ ” ’ ” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1196, citations omitted.)

In order to recover for a UCL violation, “ ‘[a] private plaintiff must make a twofold showing: he or she must demonstrate injury in fact and a loss of money or property caused by unfair competition.’ ” (Gray v. Dignity Health (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 225, 237.) Thus, plaintiffs need only allege that the defendants engaged in unlawful business practices that caused plaintiffs injury. As set forth at length above, plaintiffs have alleged multiple unlawful business practices by defendants.

Defendants make the puzzling argument that “[t]here is no allegation [in the complaint] that there was any lost money or property . . . [or] of damages suffered.” (Dem., 11:3-5.) But Plaintiffs allege that they paid rent, and in return, they assert, they did not receive a habitable apartment. This satisfies the “injury” prong of a UCL claim.

The court overrules defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action.

Defendants’ demurrer is overruled in its entirety. Defendants’ Answer shall be served and filed on or before May 25, 2023.