Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 22STCV40843, Date: 2023-07-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV40843    Hearing Date: July 24, 2023    Dept: 58

Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki

Hearing Date:             July 24, 2023

Case Name:                Leah Anne Canfield v. Shields for Families, Inc.

Case No.:                    22STCV40843

Motion:                       Motion to Strike

Moving Party:             Defendant Shields for Families, Inc.

Opposing Party:          Plaintiff Leah Anne Canfield

            This is a disability discrimination and a wrongful termination case. Plaintiff Lean Anne Canfield (Plaintiff) alleges that Defendant Shields for Families, Inc. (Defendant), her employer, refused to accommodate her fibromyalgia medical condition and ultimately terminated her employment.

            Defendant moves to strike the request for punitive damages from the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion, contending that the allegations are sufficient to support this request.

            The motion to strike the request for punitive damages is denied.

Legal Standard

            “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)  “Immaterial” or “irrelevant” matters include allegations not essential to the claim, allegations neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(1)-(3).)

Discussion

            Defendant argues the FAC fails to allege facts to support a request for punitive damages.

A claim for punitive damages in a complaint must allege that the defendant “has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294¿subd. (c)(2).)¿“Fraud means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294,¿subd. (c)(3).) “Malice means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”¿ (Civ. Code, § 3294¿subd. (c)(1); see Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.)

            To survive a motion to strike allegations of punitive damages, “the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.  [Citations.]  In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.  [Citations.]  In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. [Citation.]” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)¿“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.¿ [Citation.] ¿Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grieves v. Superior Court. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)¿ A¿plaintiff’s “conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud,¿or malice, express or implied,¿within the meaning of section 3294.”¿(Brousseau v. Jarrett¿(1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)

            Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant was informed by Plaintiff of her medical condition and her need for a workplace accommodation. (FAC ¶ 14.) Days after receiving this notice and request for accommodation, the Complaint avers, Defendant terminated Plaintiff under a pretextual reason that Plaintiff was not meeting her work performance goals. (FAC ¶ 16.) Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment in order to avoid having to provide a medically necessary workplace accommodation to Plaintiff, and in order to avoid undertaking the task of employing an individual with a serious medical condition. (FAC ¶¶ 17-18.)

            The FAC contains allegations that Defendant engaged in discriminatory conduct that resulted in Plaintiff’s termination. Accepting these allegations as true, the Court finds that they sufficiently plead Defendant’s despicable conduct carried out in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s FEHA rights.

Conclusion

            The Court denies the Motion to Strike.