Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 23STCV03672, Date: 2024-11-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV03672    Hearing Date: November 13, 2024    Dept: 58

Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki

Department 58

Hearing Date:             November 13, 2024

Case Name:                Raul Reyes v. General Motors, LLC

Case No.:                    23STCV03672

Matter:                        Motion for Attorney Fees

Moving Party:             Plaintiffs Raul Reyes, Sr. and Raul Reyes, Jr.

Responding Party:      Defendant General Motors, LLC

Tentative Ruling:      The Motion for Attorney Fees and costs is granted in the reduced amount of $26,323.80 and costs are granted in the reduced amount of $1,248.23.    

This is a Song-Beverly action. In July 2019, Plaintiffs Raul Reyes, Sr. and Raul Reyes, Jr. (Plaintiffs) purchased a 2019 Chevrolet Silverado (Vehicle). On January 23, 2023, Plaintiffs sued Defendant General Motors, LLC (GM) alleging two breach of warranty claims under Song-Beverly, and a cause of action for fraudulent concealment.

The parties settled this Song-Beverly matter except as to the issues of attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs now move for an award of attorneys’ fees.

Plaintiffs argue that, as the prevailing party, they are entitled to fees and costs under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). Plaintiffs seek lodestar attorneys’ fees of $51,912.50, plus a 1.25 multiplier -- in the amount of $12,978.12 -- and costs of $2,018.22. The total requested in attorney fees and costs is $66,908.84.

Defendant filed an opposition, arguing the amounts requested in fees and costs are excessive and unreasonable.

The motion is granted in a reduced amount.

Plaintiffs’ objection to Defendant’s evidence is ruled as follows: No. 1-16, 18-22 are overruled, and No. 17 is sustained.

Legal Standard

            A prevailing buyer in an action under Song-Beverly “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”¿¿(Civ. Code, § 1794,¿subd. (d).)

            The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc.¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees “ ‘is not necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services according to [his] own notion or to the full extent claimed by [him].’ ” (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc.¿(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.)¿¿Therefore, if the “time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America¿(1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)¿¿

¿¿

            A court may “reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.”¿¿(Morris v. Hyundai Motor America¿(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)¿¿It is also appropriate to reduce an award based on inefficient or duplicative efforts. (Id.¿at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions of fairness. (Kerkeles¿v. City of San Jose¿(2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88,¿102.)¿¿Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc.¿(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)

Discussion

Plaintiff seeks $51,912.50 in attorneys’ fees for the Barry Law Firm, plus a 1.25 multiplier enhancement, and costs of $2,018.22, for a total of $66,908.84.

In opposition, Defendant GM argues that the Court should reduce fees by $28,202.50, limiting the attorney fees to the amount of $23,710.

            A calculation of attorneys’ fees for a Song-Beverly action¿begins with the “lodestar” approach, under which the Court fixes the lodestar¿at¿“the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com.¿(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005.) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.)¿ “ ‘The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.’ ” (Id.¿at p. 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services¿provided.¿(Serrano v. Priest¿(1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49;¿PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) 

            “[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's time.” (Fox v. Vice (2011) 563 U.S. 826, 838.)

Attorneys’ Fees

I.               Hourly Rate:

            In assessing the reasonableness of hourly billing rates,¿“the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.”¿(569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.¿(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437; see¿Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 272 [“ ‘ “a reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors…[including] the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case” ’ ”].)¿

            Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks Court approval of hourly rates ranging from $675 to $350. (Mot., 13:17-14:27.) Defendant challenges Plaintiffs’ counsels’ hourly rates as unreasonable.

A review of each declaration submitted in support of the motion for attorney’s fees – which contains a description of each attorneys’ education, date of law school graduation, bar passage, and legal experience – Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates the significant skill and expertise of Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Barry Decl., ¶¶ 26-27, 38-41; Quinn Decl., ¶¶ 4-112; Matera Decl., ¶¶ 3-94; Rabieian Decl., ¶¶ 3-25; Kim Decl., ¶¶ 3-96; Rosner Decl., ¶¶ 1-11 [expert declaration] Pascal Decl., ¶¶ 1-5; Kim Decl., ¶¶ 1-9.)

However – based on the Court’s familiarity with the current local market, and Plaintiffs’ evidence of the experience and skills of the various attorneys, and the non-complex nature of the litigation – the Court finds that Plaintiffs' requested rates per hour are excessive for a straightforward, simple lemon law case. Specifically, the Court will apply counsel’s hourly rates as follows: Attorney Barry at an hourly rate of $600; Attorney Quinn at an hourly rate of $550; Attorney Matera at an hourly rate of $425; Attorney Rabieian at an hourly rate of $425; and Attorney Kim at an hourly rate of $300.

As such, the Court will apply a weighted blended rate of $438.[1]

II.             Number of Hours Incurred:

            Defendant GM challenges the reasonableness of the number of hours incurred for various tasks during this litigation.

Pre-engagement Work: Defendant argues that Attorney Barry should not recover for the 1 hour for time incurred before Plaintiffs were even clients of counsel’s firm. Specifically, counsel “billed” to “[r]eview repair orders and research technical service bulletins and recalls[.]” (Barry Decl., Ex. 4, p. 1.) GM’s challenge is well-taken; although pre-litigation fees (fees incurred prior to filing a complaint) are recoverable, this cost represents time incurred before Plaintiffs were even clients and thus is more akin to a business overhead costs in vetting potential clients than a litigation cost. The fees are reduced by 1 hour ($438).

Communications Regarding Case Status: Defendant seeks to reduce .7 hours for communications with Plaintiffs regarding the “case status” before counsel even “drafted” the complaint. As noted above, pre-litigation fees are recoverable; here, these pre-complaint fees are recoverable and not excessive.

Discovery: Plaintiffs’ counsel billed 4.8 hours to draft Plaintiffs’ discovery requests and the PMK deposition notice. Defendant argues that this amount is excessive given Plaintiffs’ counsel’s reliance on templates. This argument is well taken, especially given Plaintiffs’ counsel purported expertise in this area of litigation. The Court will reduce the fees by 3 hours ($1,314).

Discovery Responses and Meet and Confer: Plaintiffs’ counsel billed a total of 4 hours to review GM’s discovery responses and draft meet-and-confer letters. (Barry Decl., Ex. 4, pp. 10-11.) Defendant argues that this amount is excessive given Plaintiffs’ counsel’s reliance on templates and experience in this area of the law. A reduction is warranted here for the same reasons as identified in the Court’s reduction to the other discovery related fees. However, Defendant’s reduction is too aggressive. The Court will reduce these fees by 2 hours ($876).

Demurrer to Complaint: Defendant argues Plaintiffs should not recover 5.1 hours that counsel “billed” to “review” GM’s demurrer and motion to strike and reply brief and to “draft” Plaintiffs’ opposition to GM’s demurrer and motion to strike. (Barry Decl., Ex. 4, pp. 6-8.) Defendant’s challenge to the fees are well taken given Plaintiffs’ counsel’s reliance on templates and experience in this area of the law. The Court will reduce these fees by 2 hours ($876). 

Demurrer to First Amended Complaint: Plaintiffs request 6 hours to “review” GM’s demurrer and motion to strike and reply brief and to draft Plaintiffs’ opposition to GM’s demurrer and motion to strike. (Barry Decl., Ex. 4, pp. 19-21.). For similar reasons as stated in on the Court’s ruling on the demurrer to the Complaint, the Court will reduce the hours incurred for this task by 3 hours ($1,314).

Preparing Discovery Responses— June 13 & 14, 2023; July 6 & 7, 2023: Plaintiffs request 6.2 hours for reading GM’s discovery request and preparing discovery responses. Defendant contends that these fees are unreasonable given the use of templates and Plaintiffs’ experience with this type of case – noting that there are numerous active cases pending against GM by this law firm. (Kay Decl., ¶ 18.) A reduction is warranted here for the same reasons as identified in the Court’s reduction to the other discovery related fees. However, Defendant’s reduction is too aggressive. The Court will reduce these fees by 4 hours ($1,752).

Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production – July 28, 2023; December 1 & 4-6, 2023: Plaintiffs seek 18.1 hours to draft multiple motions to compel further and review oppositions, and draft the replies. A reduction is warranted here for the same reasons as identified in the Court’s reduction to Plaintiff’s other discovery related fees. Moreover, Plaintiffs only achieved minimal success on these motions. (See 12/13/2023 Minute Order [denying most items in the motions to compel further].) Nonetheless, Defendant’s reduction is too aggressive. The Court will reduce fees by 12 hours ($5,256).

Motion to Compel Deposition of GM’s Person Most Knowledgeable—June 26, 28 & 30, 2024; July 20: Plaintiffs request 9.3 hours for drafting, revise and the motion to compel deposition of Defendant’s PMK, review the opposition, and reply. Although Plaintiffs’ counsel never took the deposition, they are entitled to fees; however, the fees sought are excessive for discovery given counsel’s experience with this type of litigation. The Court will reduce the fees by 7 hours ($3,066).

“Draft Memo for/to File”—June 14 & 20, 2023; September 26, 2023; December 12, 2023: Defendant argues Plaintiffs should not be able to recover 1.5 hours by Plaintiffs’ counsels for time incurred to draft a “memo for/to file.” (Barry Decl., Ex. 4, pp. 11, 19, 26 & 33.) These tasks are not clerical in nature and appear to be recoverable legal work. The Court is not inclined to reduce the fees for this task.

Stipulated Protective Order—July 5, 2023: Defendant moves to strike .3 hours incurred by Attorney Matera to “r]eview: and execute GM’s Proposed Stipulation and Protective Order.” (Barry Decl., Ex. 4, p. 12.) Defendant argues that this is the same protective order GM offers in all its cases with Counsel, and Attorney Matera has reviewed this document numerous times.  However, Plaintiff’s counsel has a duty to review and confirm the terms of the protective order even if GM always provides the “same” one. The request to strike these fees is denied.  

Attorneys’ Fees Demand—August 23, 2024; September 27, 2024 and TBD: Plaintiffs requests fees for 12.3 hours incurred (or estimated to be incurred) on their fee motion. Defendant again repeats similar arguments made stating that Plaintiffs’ counsel largely relies on template work, which drastically reduces the number of hours that may be reasonably requested for these tasks. The argument is well taken. The Court will reduce fees by 8 hours ($3,504).

            Multiplier adjustment:

            Finally, Plaintiffs seek a 1.25 lodestar multiplier based on the risk of taking this case on contingency, the delay in payment and based on the public interests at issue in this matter. 

            Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) 

            Although this matter was taken on contingency (Barry Decl., ¶¶ 40-43), none of the other factors support the application of a multiplier. This was a garden variety Song-Beverly case; there were no novel or difficult questions presented. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 834.) Further, the¿contingent risks, skill, and difficulty¿that Plaintiffs’ attorneys¿assert are absorbed by¿their¿already high hourly rates. (See¿Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California. Inc.¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 822.)

            Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for a lodestar multiplier is denied.

            After applying the weighted blended attorney fee rate, the total lodestar fees requested are $44,719.80. Other adjustments to attorneys’ fees are summarized as follows:

            The Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees in the sum of $26,323.80.

Costs:

Finally, Defendant challenges Plaintiffs’ request for costs seeking a reduction of $919.99.

Item No. 2 – jury fees: Defendant argues that it should not have to cover Plaintiff’s jury fee of $150 when the case never went to trial. This cost was reasonably necessary to the litigation even if the case did not go to trial. The request to strike this cost is denied.

Item No. 2 – court reporter: Plaintiff seeks $550 in court reporter fees for the hearing on the fee motion. Defendant argues that these fees are not recoverable because they have not yet been “actually incurred.” These costs can be assessed at the time of the hearing when they will arguably be incurred.

Item No. 14—Fees for electronic filing or service: Plaintiff seeks $219.99 in “[f]ees for electronic filing and service.” Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ counsel provides no explanation for these alleged costs. Although these costs may be recoverable, the reply does not further substantiate these costs and, therefore, Plaintiff has not met its burden for this cost. Accordingly, these costs will be stricken in their entirety.

Accordingly, the Court will grant costs in the reduced amount of $1,248.23 (a reduction of $769.99).

Conclusion

            The motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in part. In sum, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $26,323.80, which is a reduction of the lodestar amount by $18,396. The request for costs is granted in the amount of $1,248.23. 

            Defendant GM is ordered to pay to Plaintiffs’ counsel the sum of $27,572.03 ($26,323.80 + $1,248.23) for attorneys’ fees and costs on or before December 16, 2024.