Department 58

Hearing Date: March 25, 2025

Case Name: Delgado. v. Hyundai Motor America

Case No.: 23STCV09470

Matter: Motion to Compel Arbitration

Moving Party: Defendant Hyundai Motor America

Responding Party: Plaintiff Amanda Delgado

Tentative Ruling: The Motion to Compel Arbitration is denied.

This is an action in which Amanda Delgado (Plaintiff) alleges violations of the Song-Beverly Act on a vehicle as to causes of action for (1) Violation of Subdivision (D) of Civil Code Section 1793.2, (2) Violation of Subdivision (B) of Civil Code Section 1793.2, (3) Violation of Subdivision (A)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2, (4.) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability.

On February 19, 2025, Defendant Hyundai Motor America filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Defendant’s Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information. In opposition, Plaintiff argues there was no agreement to arbitrate.

The motion to compel arbitration is denied.

Plaintiff’s objection to the declaration of Ali Ameripour is ruled as follows: No. 1 is sustained for lack of Foundation re Exhibit 2. Defendant’s request for judicial notice of Exhibit 1 is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, (d).) Defendant’s reply request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1-4 are granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, (d).)

Legal Standard

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, a court may order arbitration of a controversy if it finds that the parties have agreed to arbitrate that dispute. Because the obligation to arbitrate arises from contract, the court may compel arbitration only if the dispute in question is one in which the parties have agreed to arbitrate. (Weeks v. Crow (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 350, 352.) Since arbitration is a favored method of dispute resolution, arbitration agreements should be liberally interpreted, and arbitration should be ordered unless the agreement clearly does not apply to the dispute in question. (Id. at p. 353; Segal v. Silberstein (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 627, 633.)

Analysis

Existence of a Valid Agreement

In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, a court must determine two threshold matters: first, whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists; and second, whether that agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.)

By way of background, Defendant Hyundai argues that, when the Vehicle was purchased on March 5, 2022, it was accompanied by a warranty provided by Hyundai Motor America, located in the Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information (“Warranty”), which included a binding arbitration provision. (Ameripour Decl., Ex. 2 [Warranty, pp. 14-16].)

Based on the Court’s ruling on the evidentiary objection to the declaration of Ali Ameripour, the motion is denied.

Before a writing may be considered evidence, it must be authenticated. (Evid. Code, § 1401, subd. (a); Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 525–526.) To authenticate a writing, the proponent of the document must introduce “evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is” or establish “such facts by any other means provided by law.” (Evid. Code, § 1400.) For example, a declaration based on information and belief does not constitute admissible evidence. (See Star Motor Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 201, 204 [“An affidavit based on ‘information and belief’ is hearsay and must be disregarded [citations].... Such allegations on ‘information and belief’ furnish “ ‘no proof of the facts stated’ ”].)

Here, Defendant’s outside counsel attached the “2022 Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information” to his declaration in support of Defendant’s motion. (Ameripour Decl., Ex. 2.) The attorney’s declaration makes no representations specific to this Exhibit. (Ameripour Decl., ¶¶ 1-3.) Thus, Attorney Ameripour did not provide any information to establish he had personal knowledge to authenticate the Warranty and did not even attempt to authenticate it. Because Defendant did not authenticate the Warranty, it failed to meet the evidentiary burden necessary to satisfy the statutory requisite of proving the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. (See Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413; Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.)

In reply, Defendant provides no additional evidence. Instead, Defendant relies on Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215 to argue a moving party need not comply with the evidentiary rules of authentication to meet its initial statutory burden. However, two appellate opinions have called Condee into doubt, stating “[t]o the extent Condee conflicts with Rosenthal, our Supreme Court's decision is controlling.” (Toal v. Tardif (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1219, fn. 8; Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 846 [same].) Rosenthal and Engalla held the moving party must prove the existence of an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. As discussed, Defendant failed to provide any admissible evidence to prove the existence of the agreement to arbitrate.

On this basis, Defendant has failed to meet its initial burden. Hyundai’s motion to compel arbitration is denied.