Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 23STCV17045, Date: 2024-05-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV17045 Hearing Date: May 8, 2024 Dept: 58
Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki
Hearing
Date: May 8, 2024
Case
Name: Brian Whitaker v.
Leopardo, Co.
Case
No.: 23STCV17045
Matter: Default Judgment
Application
Moving
Party: Plaintiff Brian
Whitaker
Responding Party: Unopposed
Tentative
Ruling: The Default Judgment
Application is denied.
TENTATIVE RULING
The
Default Judgment Application is denied.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a case for
violation of 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design whereby Plaintiff Brian
Whitaker (“Whitaker” or “Plaintiff”) sues Defendant Leopardo (“Defendant”) for
violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the California Disabled Persons
Act. The Complaint alleges that
Plaintiff went to Defendant Leopardo’s restaurant, Del Terra (“Restaurant”)
located on 7675 Beverly Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA in May of 2023 with the
intent of availing himself to the goods and services of the Restaurant, as well
as to determine if Defendant’s Restaurant complied with the disability access
laws. The Complaint alleges that on the date of Plaintiff’s visit, the Restaurant
failed to comply with ADA Standards as it relates to wheelchair users like Plaintiff,
specifically, that there “was not enough toe clearance under the outside dining
surfaces.”
The clerk entered
default against Defendant on April 16, 2024, and the Doe Defendants were dismissed
on April 17, 2024.
SUMMARY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT REQUEST
SUBMITTED DOCUMENTS (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff sues under the Unruh Civil Rights Act California Civil Code sections 51-53, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
“The ADA permits a disabled individual denied
access to public accommodations to recover damages in a government enforcement
action only, not through a private action by the aggrieved person. But by
incorporating the ADA into the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California's own civil
rights law covering public accommodations, which does provide for such a
private damages action, the Legislature has afforded this remedy to persons
injured by a violation of the ADA. The legislative history shows the
Legislature contemplated and intended this effect, for, as both the legislative
committee reports quoted above state, one purpose of the legislation was to
“provid[e] persons injured by a violation of the ADA with the remedies provided
by the Unruh Act,” including a “right of private action for damages.” (Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 661, 673.)
Plaintiff’s suit similarly relies on United States Code sections
12182-12183. 42 U.S.C. §
12182-12183:
“Discrimination under the ADA includes ‘a
failure to remove architectural barriers ... in existing facilities ... where
such removal is readily achievable.’ (42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).)
Moreover, ‘where an entity can demonstrate that the removal of a barrier ... is
not readily achievable, a failure to make such goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through alternative methods’
is discrimination, ‘if such methods are readily achievable.’” (42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(v).). (Californians
for Disability Rts. v. Mervyn's LLC (2008)165 Cal. App. 4th 571, 591.)
“The term ‘readily achievable’ means easily
accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.
In determining whether an action is readily achievable, factors to be
considered include—[ (A) the nature and cost of the action needed under this
chapter; (B) the overall financial
resources of the facility or facilities involved in the action; the number of
persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the
impact otherwise of such action upon the operation of the facility; (C) the
overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the
business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the
number, type, and location of its facilities; and (D) the type of operation or
operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and
functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness,
administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question
to the covered entity.” (42 U.S.C. § 12181(9).)
Additionally, Plaintiff sues under the California
Disabled Persons Act (“CDPA”) which guarantees that persons with disabilities are entitled to full and
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever within the jurisdiction of the
State of California. (Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1.)
Analysis
The Court
is required to render default judgment only “for that relief … as appears by
the evidence to be just.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 585 subd. (b).) Therefore, it is
up to plaintiff to “prove up” the right to relief, by introducing sufficient
evidence to support his or her claim. Without such evidence, the court may
refuse to grant a default judgment for any amount, notwithstanding defendant’s
default. (Taliaferro v. Hoogs (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 559, 560; see also Holloway
v. Quetel (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1434-1435 [finding trial court did
not err in refusing to enter default judgment for pro per plaintiff who failed
to submit appropriate supporting documentation, but court did fail to give
“neutral (and accurate) guidance” about default requirements].)
The Complaint alleges that on the day Plaintiff
visited the Restaurant, the Restaurant failed to comply with ADA standards
because the Restaurant’s outdoor dining surfaces did not provide enough toe
clearance for a wheelchair user. (Complaint ¶¶ 10- 11.) Plaintiff submitted three Declarations In
Support of Default: (1) the Declaration of Plaintiff Brian Whitaker
(“Plaintiff’s Declaration”); (2) the Declaration of Robert Marquis the
Investigator (“Investigator’s Declaration”); and (3) the Declaration of
Prathima Reddy Price (“Price’s Declaration”) who is one of Plaintiff’s
attorneys of record.
In weighing Plaintiff’s proffered
evidence, it is not clear that the photos depicted in Plaintiff’s Declaration
match the photos of the restaurant depicted in the Investigator’s Declaration. The
two declarations appear to contain exhibits of photos containing tables from
two different restaurants. More important,
it cannot be determined which table presented a problem for Plaintiff, what
that problem was, and whether any request for an accommodation was made. The submissions do not set forth the
investigator’s qualifications or which table in the photograph corresponds to the
measurements recited in the Investigator’s Declaration, and whether it was the
one used by Plaintiff. (Investigator Decl. ¶ 4.) Additionally, the Investigator’s Declaration
accounts for a total of nine tables (Investigator Decl. ¶ 4.) and the pictures
from both declarations depict more than nine tables, meaning it is unclear whether
the remaining tables could accommodate Plaintiff.[1]
Because Plaintiff fails to submit evidence
justifying the Judgment, the request for a default judgment is denied.
[1] Lastly, the
relevance of the Price Declaration is unclear. Page twelve appears to depict
search results 7675 Beverley Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90036. (Price Decl. at 12, Ex. 1) However, page
sixteen depicts a photograph labeled “7667 Beverley Boulevard,” along with the
following page listing the primary owner of the 7667 property as a “Hannah
Gamson.”