Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case Number: 23STCV25426, Date: 2025-04-07 Tentative Ruling

Matter: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or, in the alternative, Motion for Reconsideration

In this employment action, Plaintiff Samuel Alvarado (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint on October 18, 2023, alleging numerous wage and hour Labor Code claims against his former employer, Defendant Henley Pacific LA LLC (Defendant); no PAGA claim was alleged. Then, on February 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging a single “representative” PAGA cause of action; the PAGA claim incorporates the numerous Labor Code violations contained in the original Complaint.

On May 14, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the parties’ arbitration agreement. In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff argued the FAA did not apply to this arbitration agreement and the PAGA claims were not arbitrable. Relying on Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533, the Court, on June 12, 2024, denied the motion to compel arbitration on the grounds the single “representative” PAGA cause of action was not arbitrable.

Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings on the FAC, or, in the alternative, for reconsideration of the Court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted; the motion for reconsideration is moot.

Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings of the First Amended Complaint on the grounds that by failing to allege individual PAGA claims, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim a claim under PAGA. In making its argument, Defendant relies on Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001.

In opposition, Plaintiff -- citing Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services Ltd., LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 69 -- argues that Plaintiff can still state a legitimate cause of action for representative PAGA penalties even while disclaiming individual PAGA penalties.

“[A] motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer.... Indeed, the only significant difference between the two motions is in their timing.” (People v. $20,000 U.S. Currency (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 682, 691.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. The defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [internal citations omitted].)

A plaintiff filing an action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) acts in a representative capacity, both by acting as a proxy for the state Labor and Workforce Development Agency and also by alleging Labor Code violations suffered by other employees (collectively referred to as the “representative PAGA claim”).

On October 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint asserting individual causes of action against Defendant for (1) failure to compensate for all hours worked; (2) failure to pay minimum wages; (3) failure to pay overtime; (4) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (5) failure to pay wages owed every pay period; (6) failure to pay wages when employment ends; (7) failure to give rest breaks; (8) failure to give meal breaks; (9) failure to reimburse for business expenses; (10) failure to provide Plaintiff’s personnel file; (11) failure to provide pay records; and (12) violation of California Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. Plaintiff’s Complaint also asserted a cause of action seeking penalties under PAGA, on the same grounds as (1)–(11) above.

Then, on February 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC), which purported to assert only one cause of action, seeking PAGA penalties, on the same grounds as set forth in the original complaint (hours worked, meal periods and rest breaks, etc.). The FAC also purports to waive all individual relief, seeking only representative PAGA penalties on behalf of “other current and former aggrieved employees” and claiming that he “is not seeking individual/victim specific relief.” (FAC ¶¶ 31-33.)

As noted above, the Court, on June 12, 2024, denied Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s FAC, relying on Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533. In Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc., the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff who forgoes individual relief by “bring[ing] a ‘non-individual’ or representative PAGA action on behalf of [himself] and other ... employees” only retains standing to bring such a claim. (Id. at 536.)

Thereafter, on December 30, 2024, the Second District in Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, held that PAGA actions necessarily include an individual component. In that case, plaintiff Leeper entered into an independent contractor agreement with defendant Shipt, Inc. to provide services as a Shipt shopper. The agreement included an arbitration clause requiring that all disputes be resolved through binding arbitration. Leeper filed a complaint against Shipt and its parent company, Target Corporation, under the PAGA, alleging that Shipt misclassified her and other workers as independent contractors, violating multiple provisions of the Labor Code. Leeper sought civil penalties and injunctive relief on behalf of herself and other aggrieved employees.

The trial court denied Shipt and Target’s motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that Leeper’s PAGA action did not include any individual claims subject to arbitration under the parties’ agreement; the trial court concluded that the action was solely a representative PAGA suit without any individual causes of action to compel to arbitration.

The Court of Appeal reversed on the grounds that every PAGA action “necessarily includes an individual PAGA claim” (i.e., that portion of the action “based on code violations suffered by the plaintiff”), which individual claims are subject to applicable arbitration agreements. (Leeper v. Shipt, Inc., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at 1009.) This was true despite contrary pleading allegations that the PAGA action was brought solely as a “representative, non-individual” action. (Id. at 1006.)

Then, on February 26, 2025, the Fourth District in Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services Ltd., LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 69, 330 Cal.Rptr.3d 256, held that where a plaintiff does not seek individual PAGA relief there were no individual claims to compel to arbitration. In so holding, the Rodriguez court disagreed with Leeper.

In Rodriguez, plaintiff Rodriguez filed a Complaint against his employer, Packers Sanitation Services Ltd., LLC (Packers), under the PAGA, seeking civil penalties for alleged violations of the Labor Code and California Code of Regulations. Packers moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Rodriguez allegedly signed, which included a clause for binding individual arbitration. Rodriguez opposed the motion, arguing he did not recall signing the agreement, his PAGA claims lacked an individual component, and the claims fell under exceptions to arbitration.

The trial court found Rodriguez had signed the agreement, but denied the motion to compel arbitration, interpreting “current law” to mean the law as it stood in 2019, when Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC held PAGA claims were not subject to arbitration. The trial court concluded the parties had not agreed to arbitrate PAGA claims at all.

On appeal, Packers argued that under Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, Rodriguez’s individual PAGA claim should be compelled to arbitration, and non-individual claims should be dismissed. In response, Rodriguez contended his complaint did not include individual PAGA claims, citing Balderas.

Expressly disagreeing with Leeper, the Court of Appeal in Rodriguez affirmed the lower court’s decision and found that Rodriguez had not sought individual PAGA relief in his complaint and, thus, there were no individual claims to compel to arbitration; the Rodriguez Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Packers’ motion to compel arbitration. (Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services Ltd., LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 69.)

Notably, neither Balderas, Leeper, nor Rodrgiuez addressed the specific elements of stating a claim under PAGA on either a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings.

In Balderas, the plaintiff expressly brought a “representative PAGA action on behalf of herself and other Fresh Start employees” based on alleged Labor Code violations that she had experienced. On review of the trial court’s decision granting a motion to strike the complaint for lack of standing, the Balderas Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a plaintiff who did not assert individual claims nonetheless had standing to bring non-individual claims under PAGA. (101 Cal. App. 5th at 539.)

In Leeper, the Court addressed whether a trial court’s decision denying a motion to compel arbitration on the basis that “[the] action [was] solely a representative PAGA suit without any individual causes of action” and “[a]s such, the [c]ourt [had] no individual cause of action it may compel to arbitration” was proper. (Leeper v. Shipt, Inc., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006.) As noted above, the Leeper court held, notwithstanding allegations to the contrary, “that every PAGA action necessarily includes an individual PAGA claim.” (Id. at p. 1005.) Therefore, the Leeper court ordered these individual PAGA claims to arbitration.[1]

In Rodriguez, the Court expressly stated that it was not determining whether “it [was] permissible for a plaintiff to file a complaint that asserts only non-individual PAGA claims” because “it [was] not among the issues presented by this appeal.” (Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services Ltd., LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 69 at p.__; 330 Cal.Rptr.3d 256, 263.) That is, Rodriguez court looked solely at the issue of “whether the complaint includes claims that are arbitrable.” (109 Cal.App.5th 69 at p. __; 330 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 262.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court may rely on all three cases without a conflict in ruling on this motion for judgment on the pleadings.

As Rodriguez specifically stated, it made no finding on whether a PAGA claim must necessarily include individual relief to sufficiently state a claim: “In other words, even if we were to agree with Leeper's interpretation of Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (a)—a question we reserve for another day—just because a PAGA action must include an individual PAGA claim does not mean any particular complaint brought under the auspices of PAGA does contain one.” (Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services Ltd., LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 69, __; 330 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 263-264.) Rodriguez only held that, in that case, there were no individual PAGA claims pled, and a court is bound by the allegations in a complaint in a civil action which “ ‘serves to frame and limit the issues.’” (Rodriguez, 109 Cal.App.5th 69, __; 330 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 264 [quoting Committee On Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211].)

The closest authority on what is necessarily required in a claim under Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (a), is Leeper. In interpreting the statutory language, the Court in Leeper noted that Labor Code section 2699(a) describes a PAGA claim as a “civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of the employee and other current or former employees.” (Leeper, supra, 107 Cal.App.5^th at p. 1009 [quoting Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (a)] [emphasis in original].) The court explained that because “and” is conjunctive, not disjunctive, a PAGA action necessarily requires “both an individual claim component (plaintiff's action on behalf of the plaintiff himself or herself) and a representative component (plaintiff's action on behalf of other aggrieved employees).” (Ibid. [emphasis in original].)

Based on the foregoing authority, Plaintiff’s FAC, which purports to only allege a representative claim, fails to state a PAGA cause of action. On these grounds, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.

[1] In its moving papers, Defendant argues that Balderas does not apply here because “neither the trial court nor the appellate court in Balderas decided whether the complaint stated a cause of action, separate and apart from the standing issue.” (Mot., 5:1-5.) Defendant is technically correct. As noted in Leeper, the court in Balderas “did not have occasion to discuss, did not discuss, and its holding does not address, whether a plaintiff may carve out an individual PAGA claim from a PAGA action.” (Leeper v. Shipt, Inc., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at 1012.)