Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case Number: 23STCV26668, Date: 2024-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Responding Party: Plaintiffs Sahil Desai, Arnold Baek, Sean Coughlin, Christopher Dziubak, Morgan Callahan, Luis Lopez, Ra Moeun and James Turner

Tentative Ruling: The Motion to Transfer Venue is granted.

BACKGROUND

This is action for alleged violations of the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA). Plaintiffs Sahil Desai, Arnold Baek, Sean Coughlin, Christopher Dziubak, Morgan Callahan, Luis Lopez, Ra Moeun and James Turner (Plaintiffs) allege that Defendant Reliant Real Estate Management, Inc. (Defendant) failed to provide copies of the investigative reports to Plaintiffs during their application for tenancy. Plaintiffs assert causes of action against Defendant for (1.) Violations of the ICRAA, (2.) Invasion of Privacy and (3.) Declaratory Relief.

Now, Defendant moves for an order transferring this action to the Orange County Superior Court or, in the alternative, to the “Santa Monica County Superior Court.”[1] Plaintiffs oppose the motion to transfer within Los Angeles County, but do not address the motion to transfer venue to Orange County.

“Venue is determined based on the complaint on file at the time the motion to change venue is made.” (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 482.)

The general rule governing venue is set forth in the first sentence of Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a), which states, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.”

The second sentence of subdivision (a) provides an exception to the general rule and states, in pertinent part, “[i]f the action is for injury to person or personal property ... from wrongful act or negligence, the superior court in either the county where the injury occurs ... or the county where the defendants, or some of them reside at the commencement of the action, is a proper court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. (a).) Thus, where a claim is “for injury to person,” the plaintiff has a choice with respect to venue—either “where the injury occur[ed]” or where the defendant resides. (Ibid.)

“[A] motion for change of venue must satisfy two requirements: (1) it must be shown the action is proper in the county to which the movant seeks transfer; and (2) it must be shown the county in which the action was filed was improper under any applicable theory.” (La Mirada Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 39, 42.)

Additionally, if the court determines the designated court is the proper court, it retains discretionary authority to transfer the action “[w]hen the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.” (Civ. Code Proc., § 397, subd. (c).)

First, Defendant argues Orange County is the proper venue and transfer is mandatory based on Defendant’s residence. In the alternative, Defendant requests the Court exercise its discretionary authority and transfer the action to the Santa Monica courthouse pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 397, subdivision (c).

The Opposition does not address the request to transfer venue to Orange County at all. The Opposition only opposes Defendant’s request to transfer “venue” to the Santa Monica courthouse.

Code of Civil Procedure section 395.5 is California's special venue provision in cases against corporations. Section 395.5 states: “A corporation or association may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as in other cases.” This provision encompasses transitory claims sounding in contract and tort. (Mission Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 927–928.)

In support of the motion to transfer venue, Defendant submits evidence that it is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Santa Ana, California (which is located in Orange County); additionally, Defendant’s officers and directors reside in Tustin and Santa Ana, and its agent is stationed in La Quinta, California. (Valdivia Decl., ¶¶ 2-3; RJN Exs. A-B.)

Thus, Defendant has met its burden of demonstrating that Orange County is a proper venue.

Now, as stated above, when the defendant is a corporation, as is the case here, it has the burden of negativing all the five possible bases of venue articulated in section 395.5. (Fontaine v. Superior Court, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at 836; Karson Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 7, 8-9 [If venue is proper in more than one county, a defendant seeking to change venue must do more than merely show residence in another county; instead, the defendant bears the burden of “negating the propriety of venue as laid on all possible grounds.” [italics in original]].) Those bases, in addition to principal place of business, are county where the contract is made or to be performed or where the obligation or liability arises or breach occurs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 395.5.)

On October 31, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in the Central District of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, asserting causes of action against Defendant for Violation of the ICRAA, Invasion of Privacy and Declaratory Relief. (Compl., ¶ 1).

The Complaint alleges that Defendant owns, manages and operates several multi-family rental properties throughout California, of which five are at issue in this action: (1.) the Roy Apartments located in West Los Angeles; (2.) the Paradise Garden Apartments located in Long Beach; (3.) the Tribeca Urban Apartments located in Marina del Rey; (4.) the Desert Boutique Apartment located in Palm Springs; and (5.) the Whiffle Tree Apartments located in Huntington Beach (collectively, the Properties). (Compl., ¶¶ 14, 20).

Here, the Complaint arises from Defendant’s action of allegedly obtaining at least two investigative consumer reports about Plaintiffs without complying with ICRAA’s legal requirements. (Compl., ¶ 27.) These reports included (1.) a criminal search report, (2.) a tenant performance profile report, and (3.) a character and fitness report. (Compl., ¶ 27). Defendant’s “Application” for residency purportedly failed to give Plaintiffs’ an option to obtain a copy of the report and corresponding consent forms. (Compl., ¶¶ 28, 31, 36.)

Based on these allegations, the Complaint claims are based on statute and common law tort claims related to privacy rights. The Complaint does not arise from and is not based on a contract. Thus, the grounds for venue based on “where the contract is made or is to be performed” does not apply. (See e.g., Dow AgroSciences LLC v. Superior Court (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1073 [“The first venue option provided in section 395.5 does not apply because there is no underlying contract at issue in this case.”].) Based on this statutory ground of Section 395.5, Los Angeles County is not a proper venue under the first venue option.

However, Defendant does not address the second portion of this statute, which permits a corporation to be sued in the county where the obligation or liability arises or the breach occurs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 395.5; see also Bechtel Corp. v. Superior Court (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 405, 411, fn. 5 [“[C]orporation may be sued in the county where the obligation or liability arises or the breach occurs, i.e., the place of injury in a negligence action . . .”].) That is, under section 395.5, venue is proper against the business-entities where the “liability arises.” “For purposes of laying venue, a liability ‘arises' where the injury occurs. [Citations.] Injury ‘ “means a wrongful invasion of legal rights.” ‘ [Citations.]” (Black Diamond Asphalt, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 166, 172.)

Here, some of the alleged misconduct occurred in connection with an application for rental of real property located in West Los Angeles – at least as to some of the Plaintiffs. As such, it appears that venue in Los Angeles County may be proper for some of the Plaintiffs.

“Where the defendant is entitled to a change of venue as to one cause of action, the entire action is transferred.” (Gallin v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 541, 545; (Jhirmack Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 715, 720 [“[W]hen a complaint states multiple causes of action, a defendant who is entitled to a change of venue as to one cause is entitled to a transfer of the entire action.”].)

Here, venue in Los Angeles County is not proper as to all causes of action. That is, causes of action alleged by some Plaintiffs – for instance, the claims brought by Plaintiff Luis Lopez (a prospective tenant and resident at the Desert Boutique Apartments located in Palm Springs) – did not “arise” in Los Angeles County. (Compl., ¶¶ 7, 11.)

Accordingly, Defendant has carried its burden on this motion to demonstrate that the only proper venue for all causes of action is Orange County.

Alternatively, Defendant requests the Court exercise its discretion and transfer venue to “Santa Monica County Superior Court” pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 397, subdivision (c). This motion is faulty for reasons beyond misnaming the transferee court. It should not have been included with a motion to transfer venue. If this were the proper court to hear the motion to transfer within the County, the Court would deny it; but it is not the proper court. In any event, the matter is moot, because the Court grants the change of venue to Orange County. But counsel should be familiar with the Court’s rules regarding transfers.

Code of Civil Procedure section 397, subdivision (c), provides the trial court may change the place of trial “[w]hen the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.”

As the Opposition notes, Code of Civil Procedure section 397, subdivision (c), does not apply where Defendant is seeking a transfer to a different “district” court within the same county. Such a transfer is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 402, subdivision (b), and Los Angeles County Court Rule 2.3. Code of Civil Procedure section 402, subdivision, provides: “A superior court may transfer an action or proceeding filed in one location to another location of the superior court.”

A motion to transfer a civil case within Los Angeles County must be made to the Supervising Judge of the Civil Division, not to the judge assigned to it. (LA County rule 2.3, subd. (b)(2).) Thus, Defendant filed this intra-county transfer before the wrong bench officer. Second, potential grounds for a transfer within the County are for the convenience of witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. Defendant fails to identify the witnesses whose convenience should be considered. (Ibid.) Finally, Plaintiffs’ opposition misquotes Los Angeles County Court Rule 2.1. Both sides made a hash of the motion to transfer within the County. The motion to transfer to Santa Monica is moot.

The motion to transfer venue to Orange County is granted. All hearings in this Court are vacated.

[1] There is no “Santa Monica County Superior Court.” The West District of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County includes a courthouse located in the city of Santa Monica.

Department 58

BACKGROUND