Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 23STCV28828, Date: 2024-03-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV28828    Hearing Date: March 21, 2024    Dept: 58

Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki

Department 58

Hearing Date:             March 21, 2024

Case Name:                Harran v. DCH Torrance Imports Inc.  

Case No.:                    23STCV28828

Motion:                       Motion to Strike

Moving Party:             Defendant DCH Torrance Imports Inc.

Opposing Party:          Plaintiff Ihab Harran

            This is an employment discrimination action. The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1.) sexual harassment, (2.) battery, (3.) retaliation under FEHA, (4.) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, (5.) failure to prevent discrimination and harassment, and (6) wrongful termination.

Defendant DCH Torrance Imports Inc. (DCH) moves to strike the request for punitive damages from the Complaint. Plaintiff Ihab Harran (Plaintiff) opposes the motion.

The motion to strike portions of the Complaint is denied.

            Defendants’ request for judicial notice of Exhibit A-B is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d), (h).)

Legal Standard for Motion to Strike

            “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “Immaterial” or “irrelevant” matters include allegations not essential to the claim, allegations neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(1)-(3).)

Discussion

            Defendant DCH moves to strike the request for punitive damages in the Complaint against DCH on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to plead the request for these damages with the heightened particularity required for pleading punitive damages against a corporate employer.

Punitive damages are recoverable where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied. (Civ. Code, § 3294.) “ ‘Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or “malice,” or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton.’” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-895 [quoting Prosser, Law of Torts].) Specific intent to injure is not necessary for a showing of malice—it is sufficient that the defendant’s conduct was so “wanton or so reckless as to evince malice or conscious disregard of others’ rights.” (McConnell v. Quinn (1925) 71 Cal. App. 671, 682.)

A request for punitive damages that is not supported with specific allegations of oppression, fraud, or malice is subject to a motion to strike. Conclusory allegations that defendants acted “willfully,” “maliciously,” or with “oppression, fraud, or malice” are not, without more, sufficient to give rise to a claim for punitive damages, but such language is permissible where the complaint contains sufficient factual support for the conclusions. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7.)

Further, Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), provides as follows: “An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”

Here, the Complaint alleges that DCH Torrance’s General Manager was Charlie Park (Park), “whose role was to oversee the operations” of DCH Torrance. (Compl., ¶ 6.) Further, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was sexually harassed by Defendant Haroon on multiple occasions, which included instances of unwanted touching. (Compl., ¶¶ 8-13.) Plaintiff allegedly reported this harassment to Park “on or about September 26, 2023.” (Compl., ¶ 14.) The Complaint alleges no investigation was initiated into these allegations. (Compl., ¶ 14.) Rather, a few days later, Park issued a disciplinary notice to Plaintiff, demoting Plaintiff, which the Complaint alleges was in retaliation for reporting the harassing conduct to Park. (Compl., ¶ 15.)

In moving to strike the punitive damages request against Defendant DCH, Defendant argues that the only identified individuals are Haroon and Park – neither of whom are named as managing agents for DCH Torrance. (Compl. ¶ 6.) That is, the Complaint does not allege that either Haroon and/or Park exercised substantial independent authority such that their decision making ultimately determined corporate policy.

Generally, “principal liability for punitive damages [does] not depend on employees’ managerial level, but on the extent to which they exercise substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.” (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 576–577.) Thus, to establish that an individual is a managing agent, a plaintiff seeking punitive damages must show that “the employee exercised substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of a corporation's business.” (Id. at p. 577.) In this context, “corporate policy” refers to “ ‘formal policies that affect a substantial portion of the company and that are of the type likely to come to the attention of corporate leadership.’ ” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 715; Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167–168 [“ ‘corporate policy’ is the general principles which guide a corporation, or rules intended to be followed consistently over time in corporate operations,” and thus “[a] ‘managing agent’ is one with substantial authority over decisions that set these general principles and rules”].)

The allegations pertaining to Park and his role as a general manager overseeing the operations of Defendant DCH are sufficient for pleading purposes to show that he is a managing agent. (Compl., ¶ 6.)

Further, based on the allegations of sexual harassment and Park’s response to Plaintiff’s complaint of this harassment (Compl., ¶¶ 8-15), these allegations are sufficient to support a request for punitive damages against DCH. (See e.g., Monge v. Superior Court (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 511 [finding punitive damages adequately pleaded when plaintiffs alleged that defendants sexually harassed plaintiffs and then retaliated against them]; Ortega v. University of Pacific (E.D. Cal., Nov. 15, 2013, No. CIV. S-13-1426 KJM) 2013 WL 6054447, at *4 [allegations that unwanted sexual comments were not investigated or remediated were “sufficient to support a request for punitive damages”].)

Conclusion

            The motion to strike is denied.