Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case Number: 24STCV00677, Date: 2024-07-11 Tentative Ruling

Moving Party: Defendants, The 400 Condominium Owners’ Association and
Desiree Golembiewski

Tentative Ruling: Defendant The 400 Condominium Owners’ Association’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is overruled.

Defendant Desiree Golembiewski’s demurrer to the entire complaint is sustained in its entirety, with thirty (30) days’ leave to amend.

The motion to strike is granted with thirty (30) days’ leave to amend.

Plaintiffs Hyon and Jinny Yi sued defendants The 400 Condominium Owners’ Association (“the HOA”), Desiree Golembiewski (“Golembiewski”), HOA Management Professionals, Inc., and Does 1-100 on January 10, 2024, asserting causes of action for (1) breach of covenants, conditions, and restrictions, (2) intentional interference with contractual relationship, (3) declaratory relief, (4) breach of fiduciary duties, (5) violation of the Davis-Stirling Act, and (6) negligence.

As alleged in the complaint and accepted as true for purposes of demurrer (with paragraph citations to the complaint):

In 1995, Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, bought the property located at 400 S. Lafayette Park Place, Unit 109, Los Angeles 90057 (“the Unit”). (¶¶ 8-9.) The Unit is one of approximately fifty condominiums located in the same development (“the Property”), which is managed by the HOA. (¶ 10 and Exh. 1.) All units on the Property are bound by the same Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictiosn (CC&Rs). (Id., ¶¶ 12.) The HOA is administered according to written bylaws. (¶ 11 and Exh. 2.) Defendant Golembiewski was, at relevant times, the HOA’s Board President. (¶ 26.)

Around February 2021, Plaintiffs sought to rent out the Unit. (¶ 18.) Golembiewski recommended they rent to friends of hers, a Michelle Alvarez and Salvadore Zelaya (“the Tenants”). (¶ 19.) Plaintiffs took Golembiewski’s advice and rented to them. (¶ 21.) About fourteen months after the Tenants executed their lease, Plaintiffs began receiving complaints about them from the HOA. (¶ 22.) One of the Tenants informed Plaintiffs they had personally fallen out with Golembiewski. (¶¶ 26-27.) The HOA began imposing increasing fines on Plaintiffs for their Tenants’ purported nuisance behavior. (¶¶ 28-40.) Eventually, the Board passed a resolution to fine Plaintiffs daily until the Tenants were evicted. (Id., ¶ 41.) Plaintiffs conferred with the Tenants, who agreed to vacate voluntarily and did so in October 2022. (¶¶ 45-46.) Throughout this dispute, Plaintiffs allege the HOA did not hold meetings or impose fines according to its bylaws. (¶¶ 16, 42-43.)

Plaintiffs decided to sell their Unit because they expected the HOA, led by Golembiewski, would conduct themselves similarly toward other tenants. (¶¶ 50-51.) They hired a real estate agent in September 2023. (¶ 51.) Golembiewski then approached the real estate agent and falsely told the agent that Plaintiffs owe $20,000.00 in fees that will be deducted from escrow during the Unit’s sale. (¶¶ 53-54.) The HOA has since provided a breakdown of the fees, several of which are fabricated (e.g., $8,500.00 for “evicting nuisance tenant” who left voluntarily; $4,500.00 in construction work never performed). (¶ 54.)

Plaintiffs attempted to engage the HOA in informal dispute resolution procedures. The HOA failed to cooperate, so Plaintiffs sued.

On June 4, 2024, Golembiewski and the HOA jointly demurred to the complaint and moved to strike certain portions from it. The HOA challenges only the second cause of action against it; Golembiewski challenges all of them. On June 27, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. Neither the HOA nor Golembiewski replied.

Defendants’ requests for judicial notice are denied. “There is ... a precondition to the taking of judicial notice in either its mandatory or permissive form—any matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue.” (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422 fn. 2.) The issuance or non-issuance of restraining orders against the Tenants has no bearing on the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ complaint.

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . ..” ’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.)

The HOA’s Demurrer to the Second Cause of Action for Intentional Interference

The HOA argues only that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim against it for intentional interference with contractual relations.

The elements of intentional interference are (1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party, (2) defendant’s knowledge, (3) intentional acts designed to induce breach or disruption, (4) breach or disruption, and (5) damage. (Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 752, 765-766.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege they had a valid lease with their Tenants, the HOA knew about it, and the HOA fabricated wrongdoing on the Tenants’ part to induce Plaintiffs to evict them, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of rental income. Plaintiffs have pled all the requisite elements of intentional interference. The HOA’s argument relies on facts outside the four corners of the complaint, of which the Court declines to take judicial notice.

Golembiewski’s Demurrer on the Basis of Uncertainty and Failure to State a Claim

Golembiewski demurs, arguing that the complaint is uncertain or fails to state a claim because on its face it only alleges she acted in her capacity as HOA President. She relies on the rule that a corporate director may not be held liable for the corporation’s torts when the director did not personally participate in the torts. (See Frances T. v. Village Green Owners’ Association (1986) 42 Cal.3d 409, 503-504.) Plaintiff argues the inverse: that Golembiewski did personally participate in the torts committed by the HOA, so she can be held liable even though she is also an HOA director.

The Court agrees with Defendants. The complaint is at best unclear which actions were purportedly taken by Golembiewski in her individual capacity and which as HOA President. The Court is not persuaded that any of the actions in question permit individual liability to be imposed on Golembiewski, but will permit Plaintiffs to amend their pleading to provide more clarity.

Code of Civil Procedure section 436 provides that the Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 435, or at any time within its discretion and upon terms it deems proper, “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” and/or “strike out all or part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).) In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

A motion to strike is the procedure to attack a purportedly improper remedy such as unjustified punitive damages. (Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1561-1562.) A complaint including a request for punitive damages must also include allegations showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such an award. (Clauson v. Superior Court, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255.) A claim for punitive damages cannot be pleaded generally and allegations that a defendant acted “with oppression, fraud and malice” toward plaintiff are insufficient legal conclusions to show that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Specific factual allegations are required to support a claim for punitive damages. (Ibid.)

Here, there are no specific factual allegations in the complaint that permit an inference of fraud, malice, or oppression. The complaint depicts a straightforward dispute over CC&Rs, perhaps improperly influenced by the personal biases of an HOA director. But that is not sufficient to satisfy Civil Code section 3294, which requires despicable conduct (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(1)-(2)), intentional conduct intended to cause injury (id., subd. (c)(1)), or intentional fraud (id., subd. (c)(3)).

Defendant The 400 Condominium Owners’ Association’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is overruled.

Defendant Desiree Golembiewski’s demurrer to the entire complaint is sustained in its entirety, with thirty (30) days’ leave to amend.