Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case Number: 24STCV02795, Date: 2024-05-02 Tentative Ruling

Responding Party: Plaintiff Stephen Snyder

Tentative Ruling: The motion to quash service of summons is granted based on a lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant Mark Styslinger.

This action arises from a transaction to acquire the rights to a feature film. Plaintiff Stephen Snyder (Plaintiff) sued Defendants James Cardwell, James Cummings, Dweller, LLC, Monty the Dog Productions, Inc., Big Movie, LLC, Leonard Maurice Foley II, and Mark Styslinger for fraudulently inducing Plaintiff into executing an Acquisition and Release Agreement where the Defendants acquired all rights, entitlements, controls and all other interests which are associated with the motion picture titled “Dweller.”

On February 20, 2024, Defendant Mark Styslinger (Styslinger) specially appeared and moved to quash service of summons based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff opposes the motion to quash, contending that there is personal jurisdiction over Styslinger.

The motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted.

Defendant’s objections to the declaration of Anthony Throne are ruled as follows: Nos. 1-21 are sustained. Defendant’s objections to the declaration of Stephen Snyder are ruled as follows: Nos. 1-15 are sustained.

Defendant Styslinger argues that he is not subject to either general or specific jurisdiction in California. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Styslinger’s position as a director at 101 Studios, LLC – a California LLC – and his involvement in the Los Angeles film industry is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over him.

“The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts. [Citation.] [A] nonresident generally must have ‘certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 283 (Walden).) Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. For general jurisdiction, a defendant’s forum contacts must be “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the defendant] essentially at home in the forum State.” (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 139.) The paradigm of general jurisdiction for a corporation is its state of incorporation or principal place of business. (Id. at p. 137.)

Specific or case-linked jurisdiction “ ‘focuses on “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” ’ ” (Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at pp. 283-284.) In particular, “the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.” (Id. at p. 284.) There are three requirements for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: “First, the defendant must have purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits or purposefully directed activities at forum residents. Second, the controversy must relate to or arise out of the defendant’s forum-related activities. Third, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” (David L. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 359, 366.) The plaintiff has the initial burden to establish the first two requirements. Only after doing so does the burden shift to the defendant to show that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Id. at p. 367.) The plaintiff must do more than merely allege jurisdictional facts. “ ‘It must present evidence sufficient to justify a finding that California may properly exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.’ ” (Zehia v. Superior Court (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 543, 552.)

Here, as preliminary matter, Plaintiff alleges that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Styslinger due to Defendant Styslinger’s principal place of residence being Los Angeles, California, and that Styslinger has sufficient minimum contacts arising from the activities of the business entities known as Dweller, LLC and Big Movie, LLC, in which Styslinger is alleged to have ownership interest. (FAC ¶ 8.)

In response to these allegations, Defendant Styslinger submits evidence directly contradicting these allegations. He states that he is a resident of the State of Alabama and does not own or rent any commercial or rental property in California. (Styslinger Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) He also submits evidence that he is not a member of Dweller, LLC, Big Movie, LLC, and not a shareholder of Dog Productions, Inc.; he also represents that he has no control over any of these entities either. (Styslinger Decl., ¶¶ 4-6.)

Finally, he asserts that he has not conducted business in California individually that in any way relates to Plaintiff’s claims. (Styslinger Decl., ¶¶ 7-11.)

In opposition, Plaintiff submits evidence that Defendant Styslinger is a director of non-party 101 Studios LLC, which has a principal place of business in California. (Snyder Decl., Ex. 1.) Plaintiff claims that 101 Studios LLC is the production company behind the “Yellowstone” TV series, along with the “Yellowstone” spinoffs of “1923: A Yellowstone Origin Story” and “1883: A Yellowstone Origin Story.” (Snyder Decl., Ex. 3.) Additionally, 101 Studios LLC has produced the television series “Tulsa King,” “Mayor of Kingstown,” “George & Tammy,” and “Special Op: Lioness,” among other titles. (Snyder Decl., Ex. 3.)

Plaintiff also asserts that Styslinger arranged for his daughter, Lydia Styslinger, to appear as an actress in several films. (Snyder Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.)

Finally, Plaintiff submits evidence that Styslinger “conducts business” in the film industry in Los Angeles “in concert with” James Cardwell and James Cummings (Thorne Decl., ¶¶ 2-4, Ex. 7.)

The Court rules that none of this evidence is admissible. Plaintiff’s declarations are almost entirely speculative, lacking in foundation, and largely irrelevant. Thus, the motion must be granted on this ground alone because Plaintiff has not met his “initial burden to demonstrate facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.” (Rivelli v. Hemm (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 393.)

Further, even if the Court considered Styslinger’s role as director for 101 Studios, LLC, this evidence is inadequate to establish specific personal jurisdiction. Here, there is no evidence of any specific conduct by Defendant Styslinger directed at the forum state of California.

“ ‘[P]urposeful availment occurs where a nonresident defendant “ ‘purposefully direct[s]’ [its] activities at residents of the forum” [citation], “ ‘purposefully derive[s] benefit’ from” its activities in the forum [citation], “create[s] a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum” [citation], “ ‘deliberately’ has engaged in significant activities within” the forum [citation], or “has created ‘continuing obligations’ between [itself] and residents of the forum” [citation]. By limiting the scope of a forum’s jurisdiction in this manner, the “ ‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts … .” [Citation.] Instead, the defendant will be subject to personal jurisdiction only if “ ‘it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the state.’ ” [Citations.]’ ” (HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1168.)

First, non-party 101 Studios, LLC has nothing to do with the causes of action alleged in the FAC, which arise from the allegations that Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiff to sign an agreement. Second, although the filing indicates a California address for Defendant Styslinger in his role as one of twelve directors, the identified address is not identified as Defendant Styslinger’s “domicile”; instead, the address listed under his name is an office address that is repeated for every one of the 12 directors of 101 Studios LLC and is also identified as the principal place of business for 101 Studios, LLC. (Snyder Decl., Ex. 1.)

Finally, and most importantly, Defendant Styslinger’s position as nonresident director of an LLC does not by itself permit the Court to exercise jurisdiction over him.

“[J]urisdiction over an employee does not automatically follow from jurisdiction over the corporation which employs him[.]” (Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (1984) 465 U.S. 770, 781, fn. 13; see Goehring v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894, 904 [“jurisdiction over a partnership does not necessarily permit a court to assume jurisdiction over the individual partners”]; Colt Studio, Inc. v. Badpuppy Enterprise (C.D. Cal. 1999) 75 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1111 [“The mere fact that a corporation is subject to local jurisdiction does not necessarily mean its nonresident officers, directors, agents, and employees are suable locally as well.”].)

This rule is in keeping with the principle that jurisdiction cannot be vicarious or derivative, but must be established with respect to each prospective nonresident defendant. (See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 284 [the relationship between the defendant and the forum State “must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State”]; Sibley v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 442, 448 [“the purpose of other parties cannot be imputed to petitioner for the purpose of assuming personal jurisdiction over him”]; In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110 [“The jurisdictional facts shown must pertain to each separate nonresident defendant”].)

Here, Plaintiff’s evidence shows nothing more than Defendant Styslinger was one of 12 directors for 101 Studios, LLC. There is no evidence of Defendant Styslinger’s “control of, and direct participation in the alleged activities” of the LLC. (Clarus Transphase Scientific, Inc. v. Q-Ray, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Aug. 16, 2006, No. C 06-3450 JF RS) 2006 WL 2374738, at *3.)[1] Plaintiffs failed to identify any “specific facts, transactions, or conduct” that might give rise to personal jurisdiction.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of establishing general jurisdiction or the first two requirements for specific jurisdiction. As Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing the first two requirements for specific jurisdiction, the Court need not address whether exercise of jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable.

The Court grants Defendant Styslinger’s motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismisses him from this case.

[1] However, as noted above, even this evidence would, alone, be insufficient to extend specific jurisdiction over Defendant Styslinger, where 101 Studios, LLC is a completely unrelated entity with respect to the allegations in the FAC.

Department 58