Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki

Department 58

Hearing Date: September 30, 2024

Case Name: Lee v. Luxe Seafood Company et al.

Case No.: 24STCV04067

Matter: Motion for Leave to File XC

Moving Party: Defendant Luxe Seafood Company

Responding Party: Plaintiff Sebastian Lee

Tentative Ruling: The Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint is GRANTED.

Background

This action arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on March 26, 2022. Plaintiff Sebastian Lee (“Plaintiff”) alleges Defendants Eduardo Gonzalez, Luxe Seafood Company, and Does 1 to 50 (“Defendants”) negligently operated a motor vehicle, causing Plaintiff’s injuries.

On February 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants for two causes of action: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence and (2) General Negligence.

On February 27, 2024, Defendant filed an answer.

On August 28, 2024, Defendants filed this Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint. Plaintiff filed no opposition. On September 18, 2024, Defendants filed a reply.

Legal Standard

A defendant can cross-complain against a third person not yet a party to the action if the cause of action asserted “(1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.10, subd. (b).)

Cross-complaints against third parties are permissive. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024), ¶ 6:544.) Code of Civil Procedure section 428.50, subdivision (b) requires that any cross-complaint, other than a compulsory cross-complaint, must be filed “at any time before the court has set a date for trial.” Once a court has set a trial date, section 428.50, subdivision (c) provides that “[a] party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except one filed within the time specified in subdivision (a) or (b). Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.” Permission to file a permissive cross-complaint is solely within the trial court's discretion. (Orient Handel v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 684, 701.)

Discussion

Defendants seeks leave to file a cross-complaint against third parties, Jairo Hernandez (“Hernandez”), David Arcos (“Arcos”), and Roes 1 to 100 (“collectively Cross-Defendants”) for indemnity or contribution.

In absence of stipulation, the defendant seeking leave to file a cross-complaint must file a noticed motion. (See Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024), ¶ 6:561.) The Court finds that Defendants have provided the requisite moving papers—i.e., notice, declaration by Defendants’ counsel, points and authorities, and a copy of the proposed cross-complaint. (Keogh Decl., Exh. A.) Defendants’ counsel was not able to obtain information necessary to determine Cross-Defendants’ involvement in the accident before filing the answer. (Keogh Decl., ¶ 4.) Defendants’ counsel learned about Cross-Defendants’ involvement in the accident through recent depositions of Plaintiff and Defendant Gonzalez. (Ibid.) Defendants’ counsel has thus adequately explained that recent discovery of new facts caused the delay in filing the cross-complaint.

Defendants may cross-complain against any person from whom they seek equitable indemnity. Defendants must only allege that the harm for which they are being sued is attributable, at least in part, to the cross-defendant. (American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 607; Paragon Real Estate Group of San Francisco, Inc. v. Hansen (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 177, 182]

Defendants allege that Cross-Defendants’ negligence caused Plaintiffs injuries, and Defendants are entitled to indemnification. Specifically, Defendants claim Hernandez, driving at a high speed, attempted to squeeze in between Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s vehicle. (Keogh Decl., ¶ 4.) Hernandez’ vehicle made impact with Plaintiff’s vehicle, which caused Hernandez to crash into Defendant’s vehicle. (Ibid.) Arcos owned vehicle Hernandez drove. (Ibid.) The Court therefore finds Defendants’ indemnification claim “arises out of the same transaction” as the incidents in the Complaint because Cross-Defendants were involved in the accident at issue in the Complaint. (See Time for Living, Inc. v. Guy Hatfield Homes/All American Develop. Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 30, 38 [“Cross complaints for comparative equitable indemnity would appear virtually always transactionally related to the main action.”].)

As recognized by Defendants, the cross-complaint is permissive. The standard is whether it would be in the interest of justice to permit leave to file the cross-complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50, subd. (c).) Defendant must show that the delay does not “unreasonably burden and complicate plaintiff’s lawsuit with cross-actions and third parties.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024), ¶ 6:565.)

The Court finds that the interests of justice will be served by granting leave to file a cross-complaint. A separate case for indemnification between Defendants and Cross-Defendants would require relitigation of the same issues in the present case and may result in inconsistent rulings. Further, Plaintiff will not be unreasonably burdened by delay. The Court notes Plaintiff has filed no opposition and has been unresponsive to Defendants’ counsel meet and confer attempts. (Keogh Decl., ¶ 5.)

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint.