Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 24STCV04168, Date: 2024-11-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV04168 Hearing Date: November 25, 2024 Dept: 58
Judge Bruce Iwasaki
Hearing Date: November
25, 2024
Case Name: Li
v. Yu
Case No.: 24STCV04168
Matter: Default
Judgment prove-up
Moving Party: Plaintiff
Fei Li
Responding Party: Unopposed
Tentative
Ruling: The request for default judgment is denied.
This is a breach
of contract and fraud action. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Fei Li (Plaintiff)
entered into an agreement with Defendant Dong Yu (Defendant Yu). Under the
agreement, Plaintiff was to invest $200,000 into a Robinhood account, with Defendant
Yu managing the account as Plaintiff’s stockbroker for a commission. Over time,
Plaintiff invested a total of $620,000 at Defendant Yu’s urging, but alleges
that Defendant Yu, in conspiracy with Defendant Kundi Li, manipulated
Plaintiff’s investments for their own profit without adequately disclosing the
risks involved. Plaintiff also paid $123, 300 as commissions to Defendant Golden
Baby Inc.
In July
2022, Defendants agree to compensate Plaintiff’s loss with 4 installments of
payments for a total of $725,000; in consideration, Plaintiff agreed he would not
pursue any damage claim to Defendants.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on February
20, 2024. The Request for Entry of Default against Defendants was entered on August
30, 2024. Plaintiff has not dismissed DOES 1-20. (CRC 3.1800, subd.
(a)(7).)
The request for entry of default
judgment is denied.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
requests entry of default judgment in the amount of $725,000 plus $957.26 in
costs.
Plaintiff does not seek attorney
fees and does not provide an amount for prejudgment interest as required in the
CIV-100 Form. In the proposed judgment, Plaintiff seeks “prejudgment interest
accruing at a rate of $198.63 per day from January 1, 2024, to the date of
entry of judgment.” No interest calculation is provided. (CRC 3.1800, subd.
(a)(3).)
In support
of the request for damages, Plaintiff submits evidence that he invested a total
amount of $620,000 into the Robinhood account under the solicitation of Defendant
Yu, who acted as his stockbroker for commissions. (Li Decl., ¶¶ 1-2; Yang
Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, 14, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff also paid to pay commissions to Defendant Golden Baby Inc. in the amount of $123,000,
which was an entity owned by Defendant Kundi Li, who is allegedly an
employee of Defendant Yu. (Li Decl., ¶¶ 3-5; Yang Decl., ¶¶ 7, 15, Ex. 2.)
Based on a
declaration from Plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiff states, as a result of
Defendant Dong Yu’s lack of due diligence and failure to fulfill his fiduciary
duty, Plaintiff missed the opportunity to withdraw from the stock market and
suffered substantial financial losses. (Yang Decl., ¶¶ 9-11.)
Thereafter,
in July 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant Yu reached an agreement whereby
Defendants promised to compensate Plaintiff with $725,000, payable in four
installments: $185,000 on January 1, 2023, $180,000 on May 1, 2023, $180,000 on
September 1, 2023, and $180,000 on December 1, 2023. (Li Decl., ¶ 7; Yang
Decl., ¶¶ 12, 18.) However, after the agreement was reached, Plaintiff was
unable to contact Defendants, and they have failed to make any payments under
the compensation agreement. (Li Decl., ¶ 8.)
The evidence, however, only supports (at most) damages as to
Defendant Yu under a breach of contract theory for the alleged contract entered
into in July 2022. (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 267, 288 [“ ‘[p]laintiffs in a default judgment proceeding must
prove they are entitled to the damages claimed’ ”].)
The Complaint -- which alleges
only the conversion, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment against “all
Defendants” -- does not support any legal theory of recovery against Defendant
Golden Baby Inc. or Defendant Kundi Li.
In the context of a default proceeding, A defendant's default
operates as an admission of the matters well-pleaded in a complaint. (Kim v.
Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 281.) “The
‘well-pleaded allegations’ of a complaint refer to ‘ “ ‘all material facts
properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or
law.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) As a result of the well-pleaded complaint
rule, a plaintiff at a prove-up hearing under section 585 need not introduce
evidence in support of the complaint's allegations of liability. (Carlsen v.
Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 899–900.)
However,
as courts have long recognized, in considering whether to enter a default
judgment, “it is the duty of the court to act as gatekeeper, ensuring that only
appropriate claims get through.” (Hediary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 857, 868.) In performing this gatekeeping duty, trial courts must
determine whether plaintiffs seeking default judgments have stated valid causes
of action and, if they have not, deny judgment. (See, e.g., Grappo v.
McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1014; Kim, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th
at p. 282; Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 829.)
Based on the foregoing, the
request for default judgment is denied.