Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 24STCV08057, Date: 2024-08-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV08057 Hearing Date: August 9, 2024 Dept: 58
Judge Bruce Iwasaki
Hearing Date: August
9, 2024
Case Name: Jorge Caldera, an individual
v. Universal Waste Systems, Inc., a California corporation, CitiStaff Solutions
Inc., a California corporation
Case No.: 24STCV08057
Motion: Motion
to Compel Arbitration
Moving
Party: Defendant CitiStaff
Solutions Inc., Universal Waste Systems, Inc.
Responding Party: Plaintiff Jorge Caldera
Tentative
Ruling: The Motion to compel
arbitration is granted.
On March 29, 2024, Plaintiff Jorge
Caldera (“Caldera”) filed an action against Defendants Universal Waste Systems,
Inc. (“UWS”), CitiStaff Solutions Inc. (“CitiStaff”), and Does 1 through 100,
(collectively “Defendants”) for eight different causes of action arising out of
his alleged wrongful termination by Defendants.
On June 20, 2024, Defendant
CitiStaff filed the instant Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Motion”) pursuant to
California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1281.2, 1281.6, and 1290 and the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.
On June 21, 2024, Defendant UWS
filed a Joinder to the Motion.
Plaintiff filed an Opposition on
July 24, 2024. Defendants UWS and
CitiStaff filed Replies on July 30, 2024.
On August 5, 2024, the Court, on
its own motion, continued the hearing to August 9, 2024.
Legal
Standard
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.2,
generally,
on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless
it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) the right to
compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the
agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration
unnecessary or create conflicting¿rulings on common issues.
When seeking to compel arbitration, the
initial burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the existence of a
valid arbitration agreement by prepondernace of evidence. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 836, 841-42; Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021), 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-65.) It is sufficient for the moving
party to produce a copy of the arbitration agreement or set forth the
agreement’s provisions. (Gamboa,
72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) The
burden then shifts to the opposing party to prove by a preponderance of
evidence any defense to enforcement of the contract or the arbitration clause. (Ruiz, 232 Cal.App.4th at 842; Gamboa,
72 Cal.App.5th at 165.)
Subsequently, the moving party must establish with the preponderance of
admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. (Ibid.) The trial court then weighs all the evidence
submitted and uses its discretion to make a final determination. (Ibid.) “California law, ‘like [federal law],
reflects a strong policy favoring arbitration agreements and requires close
judicial scrutiny of waiver claims.’” (Wagner Const. Co. v. Pacific Mechanical
Corp. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 19, 31.)
The
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to any contract evidencing a
transaction involving interstate commerce which contains an arbitration
clause. (Wolls v. Superior Court
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 197, 211.)
Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration provisions shall be
enforced, save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract. (Ibid.) A state
court may refuse to enforce an arbitration clause on the basis of generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability. (Ibid.) A state court, however, may not defeat an
arbitration clause by applying state laws applicable only to arbitration
provisions. (Ibid.)
For the
FAA to apply, a contract must involve interstate commerce. (Ibid.) When it applies, the FAA preempts any state
law rule that stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s
objectives. (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc.
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 238.) A
party asserting FAA preemption bears the burden to present evidence
establishing a contract with the arbitration provision affects interstate
commerce, and the failure to do so renders the FAA inapplicable. (Ibid.) Evidence must be presented, in the form of
declarations or other evidence, that establishes that the contract affects
interstate commerce. (Ibid.) “[S]ince arbitration is a matter of contract,
the FAA also applies if it is so stated in the agreement.” (Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 956, 963.)
Discussion
A. Joinder
“Although
‘standard practice’ permits parties to join each other’s arguments, ‘joining in
an argument is different from joining in a motion’; absent compliance with
procedural requirements for a properly filed motion, [a] party ‘joining’ [an]
other party’s motion lacks standing to seek relief from the court.” (Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 285, 300, fn. 5.)
The Second District Court of Appeal has recognized that joinder is
permissible to allow a party to join in a separate party’s motion where the
joining party seeks the same relief as the moving party. (Barak v. The Quisenberry Law Firm (2006)
135 Cal.App.4th 654, 661.) The Barak Court
found that unlike party joining a summary judgment motion, which requires
presentation of separate evidence by the moving party, a moving defendant in an
anti-SLAPP motion only needed to demonstrate that the action arose out of
protected First Amendment activity and that a joining defendant had the same
legal burden. (Ibid.)
Here,
Defendant UWS joins in Defendant CitiStaff’s Motion to Compel Arbitration. UWS requests a Court order compelling
Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims against UWS and CitiStaff and to dismiss or
stay the action pending arbitration. UWS
argues that the Arbitration Agreement presented by CitiStaff is valid and
enforceable and applies to arbitration of all disputes arising out of
Plaintiff’s employment with CitiStaff and any of its “purchasers, customers,
officers, employees, [and] agents.”
(Mot., Ex. B.) The Agreement also
applies to a third-party beneficiary as the Arbitration Agreement intended to
benefit UWS, as CitiStaff’s customer.
(Cerdas Decl. ¶ 4.) Furthermore,
the Complaint alleges that CitiStaff and UWS are agents of each other and
alleged “joint employers,” thus, UWS is entitled to enforce the Arbitration
Agreement. (Compl. 11-12.) Finally, UWS can invoke the Agreement under
the doctrine of equitable estoppel because the causes of action against UWS are
intertwined with the underlying contractual obligations.
The Court finds that Defendant
UWS’s Joinder complies with applicable procedural requirements. UWS has complied with the requirements of
California Rules of Court 3.1112 that require a notice of motion, the motion, and
a memorandum in support of the motion outlining the basis of the relief
sought. (Cal. Rules of Court 3.1112(a),
(d).) UWS is also seeking the same
relief as the moving party. Thus, the
Court finds the Joinder to be properly filed.
B.
Motion
Defendant CitiStaff moves for an
order compelling Plaintiff Calderon to submit his claims to mandatory final and
binding arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement (“Agreement”) entered
into by Plaintiff, CitiStaff, and CitiStaff’s customer UWS. (Mot. pp. 1-2.) CitiStaff also requests an order dismissing,
or alternatively, staying the action pending the arbitration. (Ibid. at p. 2.)
Defendant states that it has attempted
to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel several times in order to agree to
a stipulation to arbitrate Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Arbitration
Agreement; however, Plaintiff’s counsel has not agreed to a stipulation. (Slater Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. C.)
First, CitiStaff argues that the
Federal Arbitration Act governs the Arbitration Agreement because CitiStaff and
UWS are within the flow of interstate commerce.
(Mot. pp. 11-12.) CitiStaff is a
temporary staffing agency that places temporary employees to work at companies
throughout California, Arizona, Nevada, Texas, and Washington in warehousing,
logistics, light manufacturing, and food production. (Slater Decl. ¶ 2; Cerdas ¶ 2.) Its employees manufacture goods that are
shipped and distributed outside of California.
UWS, a customer of CitiStaff, is a waste and recycling services company
with operations in California, Arizona, and New Mexico. (Slater Decl. ¶ 3, Cerdas Decl. ¶ 4.) It
receives raw materials from sources outside of California and processes them in
various facilities. (Slater Decl. ¶ 3,
Cerdas Decl. ¶ 4.). For these reasons, CitiStaff and UWS are within the flow of
interstate commerce. From approximately
November 2021 to September 2023, Plaintiff worked for CitiStaff through his
assignment at UWS as a general laborer at UWS’s facility in Santa Fe Springs,
CA. (Cerdas Decl. ¶ 4.) He sorted items and prepared them for
distribution to various processing facilities, which demonstrates that his job
functions were an essential part of Defendants’ interstate commerce.
Under the FAA, the following
employment causes of action, asserted in the Complaint, are subject to
arbitration because these claims are based on Plaintiff’s employment with
CitiStaff and assignment to UWS. (Mot.
pp. 12-14.) The Agreement expressly provides for arbitration of all
employment-related disputes.
(1) Discrimination
Based Upon Physical Disability in Violation of Govt. Code §12940(a);
(2) Hostile
Work Environment in Violation of Govt. Code §12940, et seq;
(3) Retaliation
in Violation of Govt. Code §12940, et seq.;
(4) Failure
to Prevent Discrimination from Occurring in Violation of Govt. Code §12940(k);
(5) Harassment
Based on Physical Disability in Violation of Govt. Code §12940(a);
(6) Failure
to Accommodate Physical Disability in Violation of Govt. Code §12940(m);
(7) Failure
to Engage in a Good Faith Interactive Process in Violation of Govt. Code
§12940(n);
(8) Wrongful
Termination in Violation of Public Policy in Violation of Govt. Code, §12940 et
seq.
(Compl.)
Second, under California law,
Defendants have satisfied their burden for moving to compel arbitration of this
matter by presenting a copy of the fully executed Arbitration Agreement. (Mot. pp. 14-15, Exs. A-B.) Given the strong public policy favoring the
enforcement of arbitration agreements, the Court should give effect to the
parties’ agreement and compel Plaintiff to pursue all of his claims against
Defendants in arbitration.
Third, the Arbitration Agreement is
enforceable pursuant to Armendariz v.
Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. because it (1) provides for a
neutral arbitrator, (2) provides adequate discovery; (3) requires a written
award; (4) allows for all types of relief that would otherwise be available in
court; and (5) does not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or
any arbitrators’ fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration
forum. (Mot. pp. 15-19; Armendariz
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 90.) Here,
Paragraph 8 of the Agreement states that the “binding Arbitration shall be
conducted by a single neutral Arbitrator at either JDR in Costa Mesa, CA or
IVAMS in Santa Ana, CA.” (Exs. A-B at ¶ 8.) The Agreement provides the parties with the
opportunity to conduct adequate discovery because both the JDR and IVAMS follow
California Code of Civil Procedure and Rules of Evidence, including discovery
rules. (Ibid.) Paragraph 12 of the Agreement provides for “a
written decision and award” and does not limit the arbitrator from awarding any
substantive relief allowable by law. (Exs.
A-B at ¶ 12.) Moreover, the Agreement
states that the Employer will pay the arbitrator’s fees and expenses for the
hearing. (Exs. A-B at ¶ 14.) Finally, the Agreement imposes a mutual
obligation because it requires all parties to arbitrate claims arising out of
the employment relationship. (Exs. A-B
at ¶¶ 2-3.)
Fourth, Defendant contends, the
Arbitration Agreement was not procedurally unconscionable. (Mot. pp. 18-19.) Defendant argues that arbitration agreements
governed by the FAA are valid and enforceable.
In addition, when presenting the Arbitration Agreement to its employees,
including Plaintiff, CitiStaff explains that signing of the Arbitration
Agreement is voluntary and not a condition of employment. (Cerdas Decl. ¶¶ 5-7.) During the onboarding process, CitiStaff
gives employment documents to applicants after screening them and determining
they meet qualifications of a job assignment and allows them to take these documents
to review or get advice. (Ibid.) Moreover, Plaintiff signed a copy of the
Arbitration Agreement in Spanish, his preferred language. (Cerdas Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. A.)
Fifth, Defendant argues that the
Arbitration Agreement applies to all Defendants and UWS is entitled to enforce
the Arbitration Agreement. (Mot. pp.
19-21.) Plaintiff’s claims against UWS
fall under the Agreement’s express language, which specifically covers claims
between the Employee and CitiStaff's “customers” and "agents." (Exs. A-B at ¶¶ 1, 3.) Moreover, “‘the causes of action against the
nonsignatory are ‘intimately founded in and intertwined’ with the underlying
contract obligations’ [Citations.]” because each of Plaintiff’s claims arise
from Plaintiff’s employment relationship with CitiStaff and “the alleged
statutory and other legal obligations imposed on all Defendants as a result of
that relationship.” (Mot. p. 19.) Plaintiff himself alleges that Defendants
were “co-employers” and “joint-employers” and UWS contracted with CitiStaff
whereby CitiStaff would provide UWS with staffing/employment services, and
CitiStaff exercised control over Plaintiff on behalf of UWS. Thus, UWS may invoke the arbitration agreement
under ordinary agency and contract principles.
Finally, UWS may enforce the Agreement as a third-party beneficiary because
Plaintiff alleges that CitiStaff would provide UWS with staffing/employment
services as part of their contract.
Sixth,
Defendant argues that a provision deemed unconscionable should be severed and
the remainder of the Arbitration Agreement enforced.
C.
Opposition
In opposition, Plaintiff argues
that the instant Motion should be denied because the Agreement is (1)
procedurally unconscionable and (2) substantively unconscionable. (Oppos. p. 5.)
Plaintiff argues that the Agreement
is procedurally unconscionable because it is a “classic ‘take it or leave it’”
agreement that employers impose on their employees. (Ibid. at p. 7.) Although Defendants argue that Plaintiff was
given a Spanish version of the Agreement and an opportunity to seek legal
counsel, realistically, Plaintiff, as a laborer did not have the resources to
have the Agreement reviewed by an attorney or fully understand that he could
take the job without signing the Agreement.
(Ibid.) The fact that he
was fired after taking medical leave for his injury is evidence of “an
intolerant work place environment.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, Plaintiff argues that the
Agreement is substantively unconscionable.
(Ibid. at pp. 7-11.) First,
the Agreement gives the worksite employer a unilateral advantage because it can
enforce the Agreement against Plaintiff but refuse to be subjected to the
Agreement as it is not a party to it. (Oppos.
pp. 8-9.) If the worksite employer
wanted to pursue certain claims against Plaintiff, it could deny being a party
to the Agreement. Second, the cases
cited by UWS regarding being a third-party beneficiary to the Agreement are
distinguishable as they are not employment or labor cases, and the parties had
more equal bargaining positions. (Oppos.
pp. 8-9.) Third, the Agreement gives
agency and worksite employers unilateral advantage over amending the
Agreement. (Oppos. pp. 9-10.) The category of “Employer” is overly broad
and subject to interpretation by Defendants.
Plaintiff also points to Paragraph 8 of the Agreement, which states that
“[The] terms of this Agreement shall not be modified orally but may be modified
only by a written document signed by the President of CitiStaff and the
Employee.” This is evidence that the
Agreement maximizes the agency employer and worksite employer’s flexibility in
determining the terms of the Agreement.
Fourth, Plaintiff contends, the
Agreement does not carve out required FEHA claims. (Oppos. pp. 10-11.) The Arbitration Agreement lists claims
covered, including those “for employment discrimination and harassment under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and its amendments, the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act, the Equal Pay Act . . . the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act . . .” (Exs. A-B at ¶ 4.) However, the Ending Forced Arbitration of
Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (the Act) (9 U.S.C. §§ 401,
402), signed in March 2022, amends the FAA and voids arbitration clauses
involving sexual harassment allegations.
While there are no allegations of sexual harassment in the instant
action, the Arbitration Agreement encompassing other FEHA claims is further
evidence of substantive unconscionability.
Plaintiff argues that the given the
arguments presented, severing provisions of the Agreement will not remedy the
Agreement’s unconscionability. (Oppos.
p. 11.)
D.
Reply
Defendants argue that the Agreement
is not procedurally unconscionable. (Reply
pp. 4-5.) The fact that a provision for arbitration
is part of a contract of adhesion does not necessarily render it unenforceable,
unless there is evidence of “‘surprise or other sharp practices.’” (Ibid.) Here, the Arbitration Agreement is not
oppressive or unconscionable, does not require employees to pay arbitration
fees, and provides information on the procedures of arbitration.
Moreover,
the Agreement is not substantively unconscionable because it does not produce
“overly harsh” or “one-sided” results.
(Reply p 5.) The Agreement does
not require Plaintiff to bear any costs, provides all forms of relief otherwise
available in a non-arbitration forum, requires a written award, provides for a
neutral arbitrator, and allows for adequate discovery. Defendants argue that when there is minimal
procedural unconscionability, Plaintiff must show substantial substantive
unconscionability.
Defendants
also argue that Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc., cited by
Plaintiff, does not apply to the facts of the instant case because it refers to
an arbitration agreement that did not require the employer to arbitrate
claims. (Reply p. 5, see Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (July 15, 2024, No. S273802) [2024 Cal. LEXIS
3696].) That does not apply to
the Arbitration Agreement in this case.
Finally,
there are no sexual harassment claims here and the severability clause allows
for any unenforceable claims to be severed.
(Reply p. 6.)
UWS
joins in the arguments presented in CitiStaff’s reply. It adds that Plaintiff’s opposition does not address
the fact that the Complaint alleges CitiStaff and UWS to be joint
employers. (See Compl. ¶¶
11-12.) Plaintiff cannot make these
allegations while denying that UWS is a valid third-party beneficiary of the
Agreement. Plaintiff also does not
address that UWS can invoke the Agreement under the
doctrine of equitable estoppel.
E.
Analysis
First,
the Court finds that the Arbitration Agreement in this case is governed by the
FAA. Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that the Arbitration
Agreement at issue is a contract that evidences transactions involving
interstate commerce. Moreover, the
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFFA)
does not apply to the instant case.
According to the EFAA,
“[A]t the election of the person alleging conduct
constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, or the
named representative of a class or in a collective action alleging such
conduct, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver
shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under
Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the
sexual harassment dispute.”
(Murrey
v. Superior Ct. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1223, 1234 [discussing the
applicability of the Ending Forced Arbitration Act (“EFAA)]; see also Yost
v. Everyrealm, Inc. (2023) 657 F.Supp.3d 563, 585 [plaintiff must plead
plausible allegations of sexual harassment to invoke the EFAA].) “FEHA's prohibition against sexual harassment
includes protection from a broad range of conduct, ranging from expressly or
impliedly conditioning employment benefits on submission to or tolerance of
unwelcome sexual advances, to the creation of a work environment that is
hostile or abusive on the basis of sex.” (Lewis v. City of Benicia (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 1519, 1524 [internal quotations omitted].)
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint is completely devoid of any
allegations concerning sexual harassment or a hostile work environment on the
basis of sex. As such, the EFAA does not
render the Arbitration Agreement in this case invalid and unenforceable.
Second, Defendants have complied with Code of Civil
Procedure § 1281.2, which requires that the party seeking to compel arbitration
“plead and prove a prior demand for arbitration
under the parties’ arbitration agreement and a refusal to arbitrate under the
agreement.” (Mansouri v. Super. Ct.
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 633, 640; Civ. Proc. Code, § 1281.2. ) Defendants have presented proof of attempting
to meet and confer with Plaintiff to stipulate to arbitration of Plaintiff’s
claims; however, Plaintiff has refused.
Third,
Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that a valid and enforceable
arbitration agreement exists. They have presented
a copy of the Arbitration Agreement in the matter, both in Spanish, as signed
by Plaintiff, and English. (Mot., Exs.
A-B.) The Agreement expressly states
that it “is entered into between the Employee and CitiStaff, its
purchasers, customers, employees, and agents (collectively referred to as the
"Parties") on the signature date below.” (Exs. A-B at ¶ 1.) The Agreement governs “all employment-related
disputes that may arise” including those under FEHA. (Ibid. at pp. 1-2.)
The burden shifts to Plaintiff to
demonstrate that the Agreement is not enforceable.
An agreement is unenforceable if it is both procedurally
and substantively unconscionable. (OTO,
L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125; Sanchez v. Valencia Holding
Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 910.) Under general
contract principles, procedural unconscionability focuses on oppression or
surprise due to unequal bargaining power, and substantive unconscionability
focuses on overly harsh or one-sided rules.
(Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000)
24 Cal.4th 83, 114.)
Having considered the arguments presented by Plaintiff and
Defendants, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not have equal bargaining power
in this transaction. Although Defendants
argue that Plaintiff was given the opportunity to review the five-page document
and consult with an attorney, there is no language in the Agreement reminding
Plaintiff of this option. The Court also
agrees with Plaintiff’s argument that the difference in sophistication of the
parties rendered it unlikely for Plaintiff to have the means to seek legal
counsel prior to signing the Agreement or understand his right to refuse to
sign the Agreement. The Court finds the
Agreement to be moderately procedurally unconscionable.
On the other hand, the Court does not find that the
Agreement is substantively unconscionable.
Under Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services,
Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, an arbitration agreement is lawful if it: (1)
provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery,
(3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that
would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to
pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’ fees or expenses as a
condition of access to the arbitration forum. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p.
102 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Cole v. Burns Intern. Security Services
(D.C. Cir.1997) 105 F.3d 1465, 1482).)
“Government administrative agencies…all generally oversee
and enforce statutes and regulations against employers to protect employees.” (Hasty
v. Am. Auto. Assn. etc. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1060 (Hasty).) Thus, “[a] waiver of administrative remedies
and relief, hidden in an arbitration agreement, is overly harsh and shocks the
conscience.” (Id.)
To the extent that any provisions
in the arbitration agreements are substantively unconscionable, such provisions
are severable. ¿Civil Code § 1670.5(a) provides that a court may sever
unconscionable provisions from a contract and enforce the remainder of the
contract.¿“The overarching inquiry is whether the interests of justice . . .
would be furthered by severance.” ¿(Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p.
124.) If an arbitration agreement is
permeated by unconscionability (e.g., more than one unconscionable provision),
then severance is not appropriate.¿ (Id. at 126-27.) However, “[i]f the illegality is collateral to
the main purpose of the contract, and the illegal provision can be extirpated
from the contract by means of severance or restriction, then such severance and
restriction are appropriate.”¿ (Id. at 124.)
Here, the Agreement provides for a
neutral arbitrator, an opportunity to conduct adequate discovery pursuant to
California Code of Civil Procedure and Rules of Evidence, including discovery
rules, a written decision and award, and all forms of substantive relief
available by law. Moreover, the
Agreement states that the Employer is responsible for arbitrator’s fees and
expenses and imposes a mutual obligation for all parties to arbitrate claims
arising out of the employment relationship.
The Court also finds that the
Arbitration Agreement is applicable to UWS as the Arbitration Agreement
expressly includes all of CitiStaff’s “purchasers, customers, officers,
employees, agents” as a party to the Agreement even if it is not individually
named. The Complaint itself alleges that
pursuant to the agreement between CitiStaff and UWS, “and given the amount of
influence, control and direction Defendants UWS and CITISTAFF exerted over
Plaintiff’s employment, Defendants UWS and CITISTAFF were Plaintiff’s
co-employers.” (Comp. ¶¶ 11-12.)
Given that the Court does not find
that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable, it is not
unconscionable. Thus, the Arbitration
Agreement is valid and enforceable.
The Court grants Defendants’ Motion
to Compel Arbitration and stays the proceedings pending arbitration.
Conclusion
The Motion
to Compel Arbitration, filed by CitiStaff Solutions, Inc. and joined by
Universal Waste Systems, Inc. is granted.
The Court stays the proceedings until arbitration is completed.