Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 24STCV13168, Date: 2024-08-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV13168 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 58
Judge Bruce Iwasaki
Hearing Date: August
29, 2024
Case Name: Perry & Alznauer, P.C. v.
City National Bank, et al.
Case No.: 24STCV13168
Motion: Motion
to Quash Service of Summons
Moving
Party: Defendant Space Coast
Credit Union
Responding Party: Plaintiff Perry & Alznauer, P.C.
Tentative
Ruling: The Motion to Quash is
granted.
On May 24, 2024,
Plaintiff Perry & Alznauer, P.C. (“P&A”) filed an action against Defendants
City National Bank (“City Bank”), Space Coast Credit Union (“Space Coast”),
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), PNC Bank (“PNC”), Raheem Vassall
(“Vassall”), Dante Prescott (“Prescott”), Michael Carseli (“Carseli”), and Does
1 through 100.
On July 17, 2024,
Defendant Space Coast filed the instant Motion to Quash Service of Summons
(“Motion”). On August 15, 2024,
Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion and on August 22, 2024, Defendant
Space Coast filed a Reply.
On August 6, 2024,
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for (1) violation of
Commercial Code section 11204, (2) negligence, (3) common counts, (4)
conversion, and (5) violation of Penal Code section 496 against Defendants.
Legal Standard
“A
defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further
time that the court may for good cause allow” may move “to quash service of
summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).
A defendant has 30 days after the service of the summons to file a
responsive pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., §
412.20, subd. (a)(3).)
“The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of
its courts. [Citation.] [A] nonresident generally must have ‘certain minimum
contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277,
283.) Personal jurisdiction may be
either general or specific. For general
jurisdiction, a defendant’s forum contacts must be “so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render [the defendant] essentially at home in the forum
State.” (Daimler AG v. Bauman
(2014) 571 U.S. 117, 139.) The paradigm
of general jurisdiction for a corporation is its state of incorporation or
principal place of business. (Ibid.
at p. 137.)
Specific or case-linked jurisdiction “‘focuses on ‘the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’’” (Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at
283-284.) In particular, “the
defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the
forum State.” (Ibid. at
284.) There are three requirements for a
court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant:
First, the defendant
must have purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits or
purposefully directed activities at forum residents. Second, the controversy
must relate to or arise out of the defendant’s forum-related activities. Third,
the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”
(David
L. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 359, 366.) The plaintiff has the initial burden to
establish the first two requirements.
Only after doing so does the burden shift to the defendant to show that
exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable.
(Ibid. at 367.) The
plaintiff must do more than merely allege jurisdictional facts. “‘It must present evidence sufficient to
justify a finding that California may properly exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant.’” (Zehia v. Superior Court
(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 543, 552.)
“‘[P]urposeful availment occurs where a nonresident
defendant ‘‘purposefully direct[s]’ ‘[its] activities at residents of the
forum” [citation], “ ‘purposefully derive[s] benefit’ from” its activities in
the forum [citation], “create[s] a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum”
[citation], “ ‘deliberately’ has engaged in significant activities within” the
forum [citation], or “has created ‘continuing obligations’ between [itself] and
residents of the forum” [citation]. By limiting the scope of a forum’s
jurisdiction in this manner, the “ ‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures
that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of
‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts … .” [Citation.] Instead, the defendant will be subject to
personal jurisdiction only if “ ‘it has clear notice that it is subject to suit
there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring
insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too
great, severing its connection with the state.’ ” [Citations.]’ ” (HealthMarkets,
Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1168.)
In Walden, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized
two important principles underlying the jurisdictional inquiry: “First, the
relationship must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates
with the forum State. [Citation.] Due process limits on the State’s
adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident
defendant – not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.” (Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 284.) “Second, our ‘minimum contacts’ analysis
looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the
defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” (Id. at p. 285.) “[T]he plaintiff cannot be the only link
between the defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that
must form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for
its jurisdiction over him.” (Ibid.) Therefore, “mere injury to a forum resident
is not a sufficient connection to the forum.”
(Id. at 290.) “The proper
question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect
but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful
way.” (Ibid.)
Discussion
A. Motion
Defendant
Space Coast specially appears to challenge the Court’s personal
jurisdiction. (Mot. p. 6.)
Plaintiff alleges
that it had personal and business bank accounts with Defendant City Bank. (FAC ¶ 10.)
On November 27, 2023, an unauthorized person initiated payment orders
from two of Plaintiff’s accounts to various individuals, including certain
Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 11,
27.) On November 28, 2023, Plaintiff
discovered these unauthorized transactions, immediately notified City Bank, and
filed a report with the Federal Bureau of Investigations. (Id. at ¶ 12.) While certain transactions were blocked,
others were not, causing Plaintiff to incur damages. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.) One of these payment orders was allegedly
made to an account owned by Defendant Raheem Vassall at Space Coast. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 27.) Plaintiff filed this action against the
individuals whose accounts received funds, City Bank, and the other financial
institutions with the accounts where the funds were allegedly transferred,
including Space Coast. Plaintiff asserts
two causes of action against Space Coast for negligence and common counts,
stating that Space Coast breached its duty to non-customer Plaintiff by failing
to protect it from the illegal conduct committed by its own customer. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-34.)
Defendant Space Coast
presents the declaration of Shane Hoyle, Senior Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer, in support of its Motion.
According to Hoyle, Space Coast is a Florida state-chartered
credit union, with headquarters and a principal place of business located at
8045 N. Wickham Road, Melbourne, Florida, 32940. (Hoyle Decl. ¶ 4.) Space Coast does not and did not, during the
time alleged in the Complaint, have branches, offices, or employees in the
State of California. (Id. at ¶
5.) Space Coast does not and did not, during
the time alleged in the Complaint, own or lease real or personal property in
the State of California. (Id. at
¶ 6.) Moreover, it does not and has not
solicited any business in the State of California. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Space Coast requires that a person either
work or live in one of the 34 counties in the State of Florida to be a
member. (Ibid.) All deposit accounts of Space Coast members
are now and were, during the time alleged in the Complaint, maintained and
serviced in the State of Florida. (Id.
at ¶ 8). Moreover, all funds of Space
Coast members deposited into Space Coast accounts are and were, at the time
alleged in the Complaint, maintained outside the State of California. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Finally, all records and persons of knowledge
of Space Coast’s operations are located in the State of Florida and requiring
Space Coast to participate in the instant lawsuit in Los Angeles would be
extremely burdensome. (Id. at ¶
10.)
Based
on this evidence, Space Coast argues that it is not subject to general or
specific personal jurisdiction in California.
(Mot. p. 9.)
First,
the State of California is not Space Coast’s place of incorporation or
principal place of business as it is a Florida-state chartered credit union
headquartered in Florida. (Ibid.) Space Coast also does not have any operations
in California. (Ibid.)
Second,
none of the requirements for the exercise of specific jurisdiction are met in
this case. (Id. at p. 10.) Space Coast did not purposefully direct its
activities at California: it has not conducted any business, leased any real or
personal property, maintained any branches, offices, or employees, and or
service any member accounts in California.
(Id. at p. 11.) Since
Space Coast does not have any California contacts, it is impossible for any of
Plaintiff’s claims to arise from those contacts. (Ibid.) Space Coast contests Plaintiff’s claims that
Space Coast owed duties to non-members in California. (Ibid.) Simply accepting a payment order from
Plaintiff’s bank account in California is insufficient to establish
jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 11-12.) Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction would
be unreasonable because Space Coast has no presence in California, and it would
be unreasonable to demand Space Coast to appear in this Court when it lacks any
connection to the state and operates on the other side of the country. (Id. at p. 12.)
B. Opposition
Plaintiff
opposes the Motion. It states that
shortly after the unauthorized wire transfer from City Bank’s account to Space
Coast, Space Coast was notified about the transaction. (Perry Decl. ¶ 3.) Space Coast disregarded the notice and gave
the money to the third-party, without Plaintiff’s authorization. (Ibid.).
Plaintiff
does not dispute that the Court cannot exercise general personal jurisdiction
over Defendant Space Coast. (Oppos. p.
2.) However, Plaintiff requests leave to
conduct jurisdictional discovery to develop the facts necessary to show that
the Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Space Coast. (Id. at p. 3.) Plaintiff argues that the evidence presented
by Defendant “does not rule out the possibility that Space Coast does extensive
business in California.” (Id. at
pp. 3-4.) Like most financial
institutions, Space Coast allows its customers to send and receive wire
transfers and ACH payments to or from individuals in other states or
internationally, including sending and receiving funds from California
banks. (Id. at p. 4.) This constitutes an intentional activity in
California. (Ibid.) Plaintiff also argues that the facts of the
instant case are distinguishable from Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of
America Bank and S.H. Silver Co. v. David Morris Int'l, cases cited
by Defendant for the proposition that wire transfer activity in the forum
jurisdiction is not sufficient to create personal jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 4-5; Resolution Trust
Corp. v. First of America Bank (C.D. Cal. 1992) 796 F.Supp.1333); S.H.
Silver Co. v. David Morris Int'l (N.D.Cal. Aug. 28, 2008, No. C 08-03550
CRB) 2008 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 116989.) Here,
unlike in Resolution, in which the transfer was from a California bank
to a Michigan bank, it is not clear who initiated the transfer as it may have
been Space Coast. (Id. at p.
5.) Moreover, unlike S.H. Silver,
in which there was no personal jurisdiction because of a few phone calls and
two wire transfers, here, as a large credit union, Space Coast may have
established continuous activity with the forum state. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff
requests leave to conduct discovery to determine the following facts: 1) how
the money got transmitted from Plaintiff’s bank account in California to Space
Coast in Florida; 2) how the money got transmitted from Space Coast to Vassall
and what information Space Coast has about Vassall; 3) how many funds
transfers, by wire or through the ACH system, were made from Space Coast to
banks in California in 2023, and 4) how many funds transfers, by wire or through
the ACH system, were made to Space Coast from banks in California. (Id. at pp. 5-6.)
Plaintiff
argues that its claims do arise from forum-related activities as they are based
on the same wire transfer or ACH activity that forms the basis for finding
minimum contacts. (Id. at p.
6.) Finally, there are other foreign
banks involved in the lawsuit and Space Coast has not demonstrated any
substantial burden in defending itself.
(Ibid.) If City Bank were
to blame Space Coast for the loss, it would not make sense to have two separate
lawsuits, one in California and one in Florida.
(Ibid.)
C. Reply
In its Reply, Space Coast reiterates that it is not
subject to specific personal jurisdiction because it does not purposefully
direct any activities at California and Plaintiff’s claims do not arise from
any such activities. (Reply pp.
4-5.) Space Coast did not purposefully
direct any activities at California by offering wire services to its
Florida-based members. (Id. at p.
5.). Like most financial institutions that do offer wire services, Space Coast
is a member of wire transfer clearinghouses that allow its members to send and
receive wires nationwide. (Ibid.,
Roberts Decl. ¶ 4.) These clearinghouses
facilitate the transfer of funds from one financial institution to another by
sending secure payment instructions, which the participating financial
institutions settle by crediting and debiting funds from their Federal Reserve
accounts. (Roberts Decl. ¶¶ 4-5,
7.) Membership in these clearinghouses
does not automatically subject a financial institution like Space Coast to
national jurisdiction. (Reply p.
5.) Space Coast also states that it does
not have control over wire transfers sent to member accounts and when, from
whom, or from where the wires are sent.
(Roberts Decl. ¶ 8.) The sender
of the wire controls where it is sent and Space Coast’s acceptance of wires in
Florida from California does not result from any action undertaken by Space
Coast. (Reply pp. 5-6.) In this case, Space Coast received wire
transfer instructions to credit $40,051.48 to the account of its Florida-based
member Vassall from an account held by City Bank. (Roberts Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) Space Coast did not initiate the wire
transfer or have any control over where it came from. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8.) This single activity does not establish
specific personal jurisdiction over Space Coast. (Reply p. 6.)
Space Coast also opposes Plaintiff’s request to conduct
jurisdictional discovery because Plaintiff has not made the required showing
that any of the requested discovery will likely lead to evidence establishing
specific jurisdiction. (Id. at p.
7.) Evidence shows that Space Coast did
not send or initiate the wire transfer at issue and wire transfer activity to
and from California by third parties is irrelevant to the jurisdictional
analysis. (Id. at pp. 7-8.)
D.
Analysis
There is no dispute that the Court does not have
general jurisdiction over Space Coast.
Moreover, based on the evidence presented, Space Coast has shown that it
has not purposefully availed itself of forum benefits or purposefully directed
activities at California residents. In
response, Plaintiff does not offer any facts or arguments to sustain its burden
of demonstrating that Space Coast is subject to specific personal jurisdiction
of the Court. Instead, it requests
additional time to conduct jurisdictional discovery to obtain facts in support
of a finding of specific jurisdiction.
A plaintiff seeking to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
is generally entitled to an opportunity to conduct discovery of the facts
necessary to sustain its burden of proof.
(Magnecomp Corp. v. Athene Co., Ltd. (1989) 209
Cal.App.3d 526, 533.)
“In order to prevail on a
motion for a continuance for jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should
demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of
facts establishing jurisdiction.” (In
re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127.) A trial court has discretion to rule on a
motion to continue for additional jurisdictional discovery and will not be
reversed absent a finding of abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff
requests leave to conduct discovery to determine the following facts: 1) how
the money got transmitted from Plaintiff’s bank account in California to Space
Coast in Florida; 2) how the money got transmitted from Space Coast to Vassall
and what information Space Coast has about Vassall; 3) how many funds
transfers, by wire or through the ACH system, were made from Space Coast to
banks in California in 2023, and 4) how many funds transfers, by wire or
through the ACH system, were made to Space Coast from banks in California. (Oppos. pp. 5-6.)
The
Roberts declaration, at paragraphs 6 and 7, answers question 1. The remaining questions are irrelevant to the
jurisdictional issue. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that discovery of such
facts will likely lead to evidence establishing jurisdiction.
In Resolution
Trust Corp, the Court found that wire transfers and participation in a
national clearinghouse service, which facilitates wire transfers, are not sufficient
to demonstrate minimum contacts with a forum, and, thus, are generally
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction on their own. (Resolution Trust Corp., supra,
796 F.Supp.1333). The Court noted that
participation in such a clearinghouse system is a “technological necessity of
modern banking, similar in some respects to having telephone service” and
finding that such participation subject to personal jurisdiction would suggest
that every bank in the nation would be subject to jurisdiction in all states. (Id. at 1335.) Thus, additional affirmative actions aimed at
the forum, such as evidence of advertising, employees or agents in California,
or an intent or purpose to serve the California market, would be necessary to
establish that the party had purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the
forum or directed its activities at the forum.
(Id. at 1336.) Similarly,
in S.H. Silver, the Court found that wire transfers to a California bank
were not sufficient to establish minimum contacts with the forum state. (S.H. Silver, supra, 2008 U.S.Dist.LEXIS
116989.)
Plaintiff
argues that these cases, cited by Defendant, are distinguishable from the facts
of the instant case because it is not clear who initiated the wire transfer and
whether it was Space Coast. In it Reply,
Space Coast’s Vice President of Payment Services and Loss Prevention explains
that on November 27, 2023, Space Coast received wire transfer instructions to
credit funds to Vassall’s account from City Bank. (Roberts Decl. ¶ 3.) Like all other wire transfers sent to Space
Coast member accounts, it did not initiate the wire transfer and had no control
over when or from whom wires were sent to its member’s account. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 7-8.)
The only
information Plaintiff seeks through jurisdictional discovery is regarding the
transfers between Space Coast and California.
First, Space Coast has presented evidence to show that it did not
initiate the wire transfer at issue.
Second, as in Resolution Trust Corp. and S.H. Silver, the
Court finds that mere participation in national clearinghouse systems and
transmission of funds through wire transfers or the ACH system, does not demonstrate
that Space Coast purposefully availed itself of California benefits or
purposefully directed activities at California residents.
Thus, Plaintiff has not established any minimum
contacts between Defendant Space Coast and the forum state or shown that its
claims relate to or arise out of the Defendant’s forum-related activities. As Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of
establishing the first two requirements for specific jurisdiction, the Court
need not address whether exercise of jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable.
Because
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Court has personal jurisdiction over
Defendant Space Coast or that jurisdictional discovery will lead to facts
likely to sustain its burden in establishing personal jurisdiction, the Court
grants Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons and dismisses it from
this case.
Conclusion
The Court grants Defendant
Space Coast Credit Union’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons on the basis of
lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant
Space Coast Credit Union is dismissed from this case.