Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 24STCV19461, Date: 2025-06-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV19461    Hearing Date: June 13, 2025    Dept: 14

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA¿¿¿¿ 

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES¿¿ 

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DEPARTMENT 14¿ 

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I.                Background 

            On August 2, 2024, Plaintiffs Jason, Eric, and Todd Dunlavey (“Plaintiffs”) filed their complaint for personal injury alleging that Mr. David Dunlavey (“Mr. Dunlavey”) developed mesothelioma from occupational exposure to asbestos and asbestos containing products from his work as a pipefitter between 1967 and 2006. As to the moving Defendant Klinger GPI, Inc. (“Klinger GPI” or “Defendant”) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is part of The Klinger Group who along with its predecessors in interest is responsible for manufacture of the Klingerit gasket and packing products that Mr. Dunlavey used in California from 1967 to 1993.

On May 19, 2025, Defendant filed the instant motion to quash service of summons and complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. On May 29, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On June 6, 2025 Defendant filed its reply. On June 13, 2025, the court held a hearing.

As pertinent to the jurisdictional issues in this case, the court previously granted a continuance to conduct jurisdictional discovery into Klinger GPI’s California contacts in the Bobadilla v. 3M Company matter on March 3, 2025. The hearing on the Bobadilla matter is currently set for June 18, 2025.

The court continues the hearing in this motion to quash to June 18, 2025 to be heard alongside the motion to quash in the Bobadilla matter.

II.             Evidentiary Objections

Defendant’s Objections:

Because, as explained further herein, the court finds that the jurisdictional question in this case is duplicative of the jurisdictional question presented in the Bobadilla matter which is currently set for hearing on June 18, 2025, the court defers ruling on evidentiary objections which may or may not be material to the disposition of this motion following Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional discovery in the Bobadilla matter.

III.           Discussion

A.    Legal Standards

A defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over them. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).) The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to Section 418.10. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (h).)¿ 

"A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) "The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations."' (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471 – 472.) A state court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113.)¿ 

When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553.) Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Ibid.) "The plaintiff must provide specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate. [Citation.] The plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts. [Citation.]" (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 222.)¿ 

A defendant is subject to a state's general jurisdiction if its contacts "are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State." (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127.) A nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum "if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the 'controversy is related to or "arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum.' [Citations.]" (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446.) This test does not require a "causal relationship between the defendant's in-state activity and the litigation." (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 592 U.S. 351, 362) The "arise out" of standard "asks about causation," but "relate to" does not. (Ibid.) "[W]hen a corporation has 'continuously and deliberately exploited [a State's] market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State's] court[s]' to defend actions 'based on' products causing injury there." (Id. at p. 364.)¿

B.    General Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction is not presently at issue. General Jurisdiction over a corporate Defendant exists when the corporation's “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render it essentially at home in the forum State.” (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. 117, 139 [quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. 915, 919].) For a corporation, the paradigmatic examples of such affiliations are the locations where the Defendant is incorporated and of the Defendant’s principal place of business. (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. 117, 137.)

Here, Defendant presents evidence that it is not subject to general jurisdiction in California. Defendant presents the declaration of Donald G. Bybee, the former President of Defendant, in which Mr. Bybee states that Defendant is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Texas and not California. (Bybee Decl. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs make no effort to argue there is general jurisdiction over Defendant but appear to reserve the argument that there may be general jurisdiction by imputation from a predecessor entity. (Opposition at p. 4 [“This is not a case relying strictly on General Jurisdiction, although it is not unlikely that through Jurisdictional discovery there would be found sufficient evidence through the corporate history of Defendant and their predecessors are ‘At home’ in California considering the global presence and marketing they admit to least as far back as 1967.”].) Therefore, general jurisdiction over Defendant is not presently at issue.

C.    Specific Jurisdiction

A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a plaintiff when three elements are satisfied: “(1) ‘the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits’ [citation]; (2) ‘the controversy is related to or “arises out of” [the] defendant's contacts with the forum’ [citation]; and (3) “ ‘ “the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice’ ” [citation.]”  (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269.)

Here, Plaintiffs theory of jurisdiction appears to be that Defendant is responsible for the sale of “Klingerit gasket and packing products” in California from 1967 to 1993. (Opposition at p. 3.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue: “Klinger GPI is the gasket arm of the global Klinger group that directly descends, as set out in their website, the 1886 Klinger company.” (Ibid.) Defendant argues: “Klinger GPI is a Texas based company which has never manufactured sold or supplied ‘Klingerit’ gaskets or any asbestos containing product to California. Klinger GPI is the wholly owned subsidiary of CGM, Inc., an Ohio Corporation that does not do business in California. Klinger GPI has not assumed the liabilities of any California company. Klinger GPI is not the agent or alter ego of any company that sold asbestos-containing products in California. Klinger GPI has not merged with any company that sold asbestos-containing products in California.” (Reply at p. 1.)

This is the same theory of jurisdiction presented in the Bobadilla matter. (See March 3, 2025 minute order in the Bobadilla matter at p. 7 [“Plaintiffs also allege that a Klinger entity is responsible for the supply of Klingerit gaskets and packing to California during Mr. Bobadilla’s apparently very lengthy exposure period.”].) The hearing on Defendant’s motion to quash in the Bobadilla matter was continued until June 18, 2025 with supplemental opposition filed on June 6 and supplemental reply filed on June 11.

Here, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ (the Dunlaveys) theory of jurisdiction over Defendant in this matter is identical to plaintiffs’ (the Bobadillas) theory of jurisdiction in the Bobadilla matter. Neither the Dunlaveys nor the Bobadillas appear to allege that Klinger GPI itself manufactured the Klingerit gaskets they allege exposed either Mr. Bobadilla or Mr. Dunlavey to asbestos. Instead, the plaintiffs’ theories in both cases turn on whether the Bobadillas or Dunlaveys present sufficient evidence to permit the court to impute the contacts of the entity responsible for manufacturing Klingerit gaskets and packing to Klinger GPI. The Bobadillas and Dunlaveys may do this in two ways. First, the plaintiffs could present evidence of a corporate structure among the Klinger entities showing that Klinger GPI is a successor entity to the Klinger entity responsible for selling Klingerit gaskets in California. (Ray v. Alad Corp. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 22, 28, 31.) Second, Plaintiffs may attempt to present evidence of an agency or alter ego relationship sufficient to permit the court to impute the contacts of another Klinger entity which sold Klingerite gaskets and packing in Calfiornia to Klinger GPI. (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 223.)

The court finds that the resolution of these issues in the Bobadilla matter and in this case both turn on the same operative facts and law. Because any factual disputes will have been made clearer by the discovery which has been taken in the Bobadilla matter, and the legal issues surrounding imputed contacts will be more fully briefed based upon the discovery taken in that matter, the court finds that it is in the interest of judicial economy to continue this motion to be heard alongside the identical motion in the Bobadilla matter on June 18, 2025.

IV.           Conclusion

Defendant’s motion to quash service of summons and complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction is continued to June 18, 2025 to be heard alongside the motion to quash in the Bobadilla matter which raises identical issues but in which the parties have had a full opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery as to Plaintiffs’ theory of jurisdiction over Klinger GPI.

            Moving party Klinger GPI, Inc. is ordered to give notice.