Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki

Department 58

Hearing Date: January 29, 2024

Case Name: Ciampi v. Small

Case No.: 24STCV23864

Matter: Motion to Strike

Moving Party: Defendant Zachary Austin Small

Responding Party: None

Tentative Ruling: The motion to strike is granted.

This action arises from a car accident. The Complaint contains a single cause of action for negligence.

Defendant Zachary Austin Small (Defendant) filed a motion to strike portions of the Complaint. No opposition was filed.

The motion to strike is granted.

Legal Standard for Motions to Strike

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”¿(Code Civ. Proc. § 436.) “Immaterial” or “irrelevant” matters include allegations not essential to the claim, allegations neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 431.10, subds. (b)(1)-(3).)

Here, Defendant seeks to strike the request for punitive damages in the Complaint.

With respect to allegations of punitive damages, they are recoverable where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied. (Civ. Code, § 3294.) “Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation our outrage, such as spite or ‘malice,’ or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-895 [quoting Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 2, at pp. 9-10] [italics omitted].) However, specific intent to injure is not necessary for a showing of malice—it is sufficient that the defendant’s conduct was so “wanton or so reckless as to evince malice or conscious disregard of others’ rights.” (McConnell v. Quinn (1925) 71 Cal. App. 671, 682.)

A request for punitive damages that is not supported with specific allegations of oppression, fraud, or malice is subject to a motion to strike. Conclusory allegations that defendants acted “willfully,” “maliciously,” or with “oppression, fraud, or malice” are not, without more, sufficient to give rise to a claim for punitive damages, but such language is permissible where the complaint contains sufficient factual support for the conclusions. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7.)

Although the facts in Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 show that intoxication while driving can support a request for punitive damages, the allegations in the Complaint here are distinguishable from those found in Taylor.

In Taylor, the car driven by the defendant collided with plaintiff's car causing him serious injuries, that at the time of the collision, the defendant was drinking an alcoholic beverage and under its influence, he had been an alcoholic for a substantial period of time and was well aware of the serious nature of his alcoholism, he had a history and practice of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, he had previously caused a serious automobile accident while under the influence of alcohol, and had been convicted numerous times for driving under the influence of alcohol. (Id. at p. 893.)

Here, the Complaint only alleges that that Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. (Compl., ¶ 10.) These allegations are insufficient to show a conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s safety or rights.

Thus, the motion to strike portions of the Complaint is granted.

Conclusion

The motion to strike is granted. Given Plaintiff’s lack of opposition to the motion, the Court is not inclined to grant leave to amend absent a specific showing by Plaintiff of a reasonable possibility of amending. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians' Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43 [“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility of amendment.”].)