Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case Number: 24STCV29227, Date: 2025-02-04 Tentative Ruling

This is a personal injury action. Plaintiff Mary Long (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint for (1.) negligence and (2.) premises liability. On December 9, 2024, a First Amended Complaint was filed.

Defendant moves to change venue pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 397, subdivision (a).

“Venue is determined based on the complaint on file at the time the motion to change venue is made. [Citations.]” (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 482.) Code of Civil Procedure section 397 provides that “[t]he court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the following cases: When the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court.”

“If the action is for injury to person or personal property or for death from wrongful act or negligence, the superior court in either the county where the injury occurs or the injury causing death occurs or the county where the defendants, or some of them reside at the commencement of the action, is a proper court for the trial of the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. (a).) Because of the disjunctive nature of Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a), to show venue is improper, the plaintiff’s choice of venue must fail to satisfy either condition.

Here, Defendant argues that the venue is improper because the injury occurred in San Bernardino County. (LaScola Decl., ¶ 4; Compl., ¶¶ 1-2.) Defendant also argues that the Complaint fails to identify any named Defendants that “reside” in Los Angeles County. (See generally Compl.)[1]

In opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute that the injury did not occur in Los Angeles County. Instead, Plaintiff argues that Defendant DTWN Properties, LLC’s principal place of business is in the County of Los Angeles. (Habbas Decl., ¶ 4; FAC ¶ 4.) As such, Plaintiff argues that venue is proper because it was filed in the county in which one of the defendants resides.

It is well-established that “the residence of [a] corporation is the county where it has its principal place of business.” (Hale v. Bohannon (1952) 38 Cal.2d 458, 473; see also Investors Equity Life Holding Co. v. Schmidt (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1380.)

Here, in response to the opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has provided no evidence that Defendant DTWN Properties, LLC’s principal business is located in Los Angeles County. While the evidence’s admissibility is questionable, no evidentiary objection has been filed.

Moreover, even in the absence of any evidence, the motion must still be denied because Plaintiff does not have the burden on this motion. Rather, it is the moving party that must overcome the presumption that the plaintiff has selected the proper venue. (Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 830, 836; Mitchell v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1046.) “It is the moving defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the plaintiff's venue selection is not proper under any of the statutory grounds.” (Ibid.) Thus, it is Defendant Aldi’s burden to submit evidence here. A corporate defendant seeking to change venue “has the burden of negativing all the five possible bases of venue….” (Buran Equipment Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1662, 1666.) In opposing the motion to change venue, “[t]he plaintiff may bolster his or her choice of venue with counter affidavits consistent with the complaint’s theory of the type of action but amplifying the allegations relied upon for venue.” (Lebastchi v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1469 [italics added].)

Here, Defendant Aldi submits no evidence that the venue is improper because Defendant, has not submitted any evidence as to the residence of all of the Defendants. As such, Defendant fails to carry its burden of showing the venue is improper under Section 395, subdivision (a).

[1] Plaintiff also argues “[t]he motion is procedurally defective for its failure to address the First Amended Complaint which has outlined the reasons that venue is proper as a party may file a lawsuit in the jurisdiction where a Defendant has a principal place of business.” (Opp., 3:9-12.) However, Plaintiff omits the fact that the FAC was filed after the motion to change venue was filed.

Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki

Department 58