Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 25STCV05372, Date: 2025-05-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV05372    Hearing Date: May 22, 2025    Dept: 14

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA¿¿¿¿ 

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES¿¿ 

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DEPARTMENT 14¿ 

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I.                Background 

            On February 25, 2025, Plaintiffs Sondra and Richard Scott filed their complaint for personal injury alleging Ms. Scott developed mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos and asbestos contaminated cosmetic talc products between approximately 1960 and 2020. As to Defendant the Stephan Co. and its predecessor in interest Old 97 (“Defendant” or “Stephan Co.”) Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Scott was exposed to asbestos contaminated Gold Bond medicated body powder manufactured by Stephan Co. between 1990 and 1995 while she was living in California between 1991 and 2003.

On April 10, 2025, Stephan Co. filed this motion to quash service of summons and complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction arguing Plaintiffs failed to present evidence of its purposeful availment of California, any relation between Defendant’s activities in California and Plaintiffs claims, and that exercise of jurisdiction over Defendant would be unreasonable. On May 9, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On May 15, 2025, Stephan Co. filed its reply. On May 22, 2025 the court held a hearing.

The court denies Stephan Co.’s motion to quash.

II.             Objections

Plaintiffs’ Objections:

Overruled:

2. Jacobi Decl. ¶ 8, “At all relevant times to this matter, the principal place of business and corporate headquarters of Old 97 Company were located in Florida” does not lack foundation. It is reasonable that the CEO of a company would have personal knowledge of the general corporate history of that company including the locations of the company’s past principal places of business.

3. Jacobi Decl. ¶ 9, “At no time was California the principal place of business and/or corporate headquarters of either The Stephan Co. or Old 97 Company” is admissible for the same reasons described in no. 2.

7. Landis Decl. Ex. 4, “relevant excerpts of the deposition of Lucille Clark Murphy taken June 27, 2024 in the Jody Meade v. Barretts Minerals, Inc., et al matter, LASC Case No. 23STCV23517” is admissible on this motion. While Defendant should properly have included Ms. Murphy’s deposition in its moving papers, Plaintiffs were aware of Ms. Murphy’s testimony and had sufficient opportunity to present countervailing evidence. Ms. Murphy’s testimony is also relevant insofar as her lack of knowledge of shipping Gold Bond to California is potentially probative of whether Stephan Co. shipped products to California. However, as discussed further herein, the court does not find this testimony credible.

Sustained:

1. Jacobi Decl. ¶ 1, “I am familiar with The Stephan Co.’s current and past business activities and corporate history. I make this declaration in support of Old 97 Company and The Stephan Co.’s Motions to Quash based on personal knowledge and review of business records kept in the ordinary course of The Stephan Co. and Old 97 Company’s business. I would competently testify to the following facts if called upon to do so” is inadmissible for lack of foundation. Mr. Jacobi is not an expert witness; accordingly he is limited to testifying only to matters within his personal knowledge. (Evid. Code ¶ 702(a) [“Subject to Section 801, the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter.”].) Mr. Jacobi’s employment with Defendant began only in 2023. (Jacobi Decl. ¶ 1 [“I am the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") for The Stephan Co. I have held the position of CEO of The Stephan Co. since 2023.”].) Mr. Jacobi states his declaration is based on “personal knowledge and review of business records kept in the ordinary course of The Stephan Co. and Old 97 Company's business” (Ibid.) However, as a non-expert, Mr. Jacobi may not permissibly rely on hearsay corporate records. (LAOSD Asbestos Cases [Ramirez] (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 939, 947 [“The Evidence Code also does not recognize a special category of ‘person previously designated as most knowledgeable’ witness.”]; 951 [“Although [defendant’s corporate representative] does not identify any source at all for most of her information, given that she did not work at [defendant] until 1994, her statements involving activities before that time cannot be based on personal knowledge and must be based on hearsay.”].)

Moreover, Mr. Jacobi fails to identify which documents he relied upon, or any basis to discern whether those documents were admissible evidence. (Ramirez, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 951 [“Even assuming for the sake of argument that Gallo could ‘channel’ information received from individuals who had personal knowledge of events and could testify as witnesses, there is no indication that such persons were the source of Gallo's information. Given the timeframe involved, Gallo is most likely ‘channeling’ information from people who not only lacked personal knowledge themselves, but acquired their information from people who also lacked personal knowledge. This oral passing of information raises exactly the reliability concerns which animate the personal knowledge requirement, not to mention the rule against hearsay. The trial court had no way of evaluating the reliability of the information [defendant’s corporate representative] received.”].) Accordingly, the court finds Mr. Jacobi’s declaration as to events before his employment with Defendant began inadmissible for lack of foundation.

4. Jacobi Decl. ¶ 10 “At no time did The Stephan Co. or Old 97 Company research, develop, test, manufacture, package, or warehouse any ‘asbestos and/or asbestiform minerals, including asbestos-containing and/or asbestiform mineral-containing talc’ in California” is inadmissible as lacking foundation for the same reasons described in no. 1.

5. Jacobi Decl. ¶ 5, “At no time did Old 97 Company or The Stephan Co. ship and/or distribute ‘asbestos-containing and/or asbestiform mineral-containing talc’ to and/or from California” is inadmissible as lacking foundation for the same reasons described in no. 1.

6. Landis Decl. Ex. 1, “relevant excerpts of the deposition of Edward T. Noland, Senior, Volume 1, taken on November 14, 2024 in Tucker D. Maute, D.O., et al. v. Barretts Minerals, Inc., et al” is inadmissible hearsay. Defendant fails to rebut the presumption of inadmissibility for prior deposition testimony. (Berroteran v. Superior Court (2022) 12 Cal.5th 867, 895 [“The party urging admission of deposition testimony bears the burden of rebutting the general rule by submitting appropriate information justifying the admission of designated deposition testimony.”].) Defendant does not address the Berroteran factors. Accordingly, Defendant does not satisfy its burden to overcome the presumption of inadmissibility.

Defendant’s Objections:

Overruled:

2. Renken Decl. Ex. 2, “a true and correct copy of the signed Declaration of Sondra Scott in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant The Stephan Co.’s Motion to Quash for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction” is admissible on this motion. This is a declaration made by a percipient witness in lieu of live testimony. Such a declaration is expressly authorized under the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306.) The declaration is relevant because it establishes where and when Ms. Scott and her husband purchased Gold Bond medicated body powder during the period where Gold Bond products were manufactured by Defendant. Defendant fails to identify any undue prejudice.

3. Exhibit 3, an SEC 10-K filing made by Defendant for the year 1995, is not hearsay because it is admissible as a business record under Evidence Code Section 1271. Based on the deposition testimony of Defendant’s Custodian of Records Luz Mir, there are sufficient facts to conclude that the Form 10-K filing is authentic, was made in the regular course of business, was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event, and the sources of information and time of preparation indicate its trustworthiness. (See Renken Decl. Ex. 12 61:20-62:20; 63:4-64:6.) The form is relevant because it indicates the volume of Defendant’s business attributable to their manufacturing of products for Martin Himmel. Stephan Co. fails to identify any prejudice from this document.

4. Exhibit 7, an agreement letter sent by Patrick Dwyer to Frank Ferola, is not inadmissible hearsay because the agreement is a legally operative act and therefore not used for a hearsay purpose. To the extent that the agreement is offered for the truth of the matters asserted therein, it is also an admissible business record under Evidence Code section 1271. Based on the deposition of Patrick Dwyer, Martin Himmel Inc.’s person most knowledgeable and custodian of records, there are sufficient facts to conclude that the letter is authentic, was made in the regular course of business, was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event, and the sources of information and time of preparation indicate its trustworthiness as evidenced by the fact that Mr. Dwyer was a signatory to the agreement. The agreement letter is relevant because it modifies the previous manufacturing agreement (Renken Decl. Exhibit 6) to require Defendant to ship the products to the distributors identified by Martin Himmel. Stephan Co. fails to identify any prejudice.

7. Exhibit 14, the declaration of Patrick Dwyer, is not hearsay, does not lack foundation, and is not irrelevant or unduly prejudicial. Mr. Dwyer’s declaration does not lack foundation as he has personal knowledge of the contents of the declaration from his time as general manager of Martin Himmel.  In particular, as to paragraph 6, [“After Stephan Co. manufacturerd Gold Bond Products, Stephan Co. shipped these products to distributors including Morgan & Sampson Co. in Ontario, CA] Mr. Dwyer’s personal knowledge is predicated on Martin Himmel’s responsibility for directing the shipping of Martin Himmel owned products from the manufacturer to the distributors. The declaration is relevant because it authenticates several agreements attached to the declaration, and establishes that Defendant shipped products to California. Defendant fails to identify how the declaration is prejudicial.

As to Defendant’s hearsay objection, under California law, a declarant in a law and motion proceeding is authorized to submit a declaration in lieu of oral testimony. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2009, 2015.5, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306.) Here, Defendant Martin Himmel, Inc., the company for which Mr. Dwyer worked is a defendant. As such, Mr. Dwyer’s declaration is permissible as a declaration in lieu of in person testimony, which is not hearsay.

Even if the declaration were hearsay, especially given it was authored in a previous case, Mr. Dwyer’s declaration is likely admissible as a statement against interest under Evidence Code section 1230. Under section 1230, “Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, …” (Evid. Code, § 1230.) Here, Mr. Dwyer is unavailable as he is a resident of Connecticut. (See Renken Decl. Ex. 15 at 48: 3-6 [“Q. And I failed to ask you this before, but where do you currently reside? Where's your current residence? A.I live in Wilton, Connecticut.”].) The statements in Mr. Dwyer’s declaration inculpates Defendant Martin Himmel, as responsible for Gold Bond products shipped to California between 1990 and 1995 and are therefore contrary to Martin Himmel’s interests.

Even if the Dwyer declaration is inadmissible as hearsay, Mr. Dwyer testified to the same information during his deposition in the Meade matter (see below), which as discussed further herein, is admissible under Evidence Code section 1291.

8. Renken Decl. Ex 15, “a true and correct copy of the relevant and cited portions of the transcript of the deposition of Patrick G. Dwyer, Martin Himmel Inc.’s person most qualified and custodian of records taken in Jody Kay Meade and Arthur Meade v. Barretts Minerals Inc., et al., Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. 23STCV23517 on October 18, 2024, does not lack foundation, is neither irrelevant nor unduly prejudicial, and is admissible former testimony under Evidence Code section 1291. Mr. Dwyer’s testimony is not speculative and he has foundation as to the shipment of Martin Himmel’s products from Defendant to Martin Himmel’s distributor Morgan & Sampson because he was then the general manager of Martin Himmel with personal knowledge of the operation of Martin Himmel’s business. This testimony is relevant because it authenticates and establishes as business records various documents, establishes that Defendant was the exclusive supplier of Gold Bond products during the period of 1991 to 1995, and that Defendant was responsible for shipping Gold Bond products to California during that period. Defendant fails to articulate the prejudicial nature of this testimony.

This deposition testimony is admissible under Evidence Code section 1291. Under section 1291 “Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and:... (2) The party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing.” (Evid. Code, § 1291.) Mr. Dwyer is unavailable because he is a resident of Connecticut. (Renken Decl. Ex. 15, Dwyer Depo at 48: 3-6.) Defendant was a party to the Meade and Kownacki cases and was present during Mr. Dwyer’s deposition and conducted cross examination. (Id. at p. 3, 6; Landis Decl. Ex. 3 at pp. 105-121.) Finally, the topics covered at this examination were all directed towards jurisdiction in California, and as such the court finds that Defendant had the same interest in cross examining Mr. Dwyer in the Meade and Kownacki cases, as in this case. Therefore, this deposition testimony is admissible.

9. Renken Decl. Ex. 16,  “a true and correct copy of the relevant and cited portions of the transcript of the deposition of Patrick G. Dwyer, Martin Himmel Inc.’s person most qualified and custodian of records taken in multiple cases (all of which involved Gold Bond talcum powder products) on November 20, 2024” is admissible for the same reasons discussed in no. 8.

10. Renken Decl. Ex. 18, “a true and correct copy of “Old 97 Produced Gold Bond Product On Hold By Warehouse 3/29/96” is admissible hearsay, and is neither irrelevant nor unduly prejudicial. Although Mr. Dwyer was not a signatory to this document, he was the general manager of Martin Himmel during its creation and when asked directly about the genesis of this document during his October 18 deposition he confirmed its authenticity and accuracy as a business record. (Renken Decl. Ex. 15 at pp. 102-104.)

11. Renken Decl. Ex. 19 , “a true and correct copy of a Distribution Service Agreement dated April 26, 1990, between Morgan & Sampson, Inc., a California corporation and Martin Himmel Inc.” is admissible for the same reasons as no. 10. Mr. Dwyer authenticates and establishes the admissibility of these documents as business records. (Renken Decl. Ex. 15 at pp. 78-80.)

12. Renken Decl. Ex. 20, a true and correct copy of the Manufacturing Agreement dated February 14, 1996 between Pharma Tech Industries, Inc. and Martin Himmel Inc is admissible for the same reasons as no. 10.

13. Renken Decl. Ex. 21, a “true and correct copy of the Asset Purchase Agreement dated April 10, 1996 between Signal Investment & Management Co., Chattem, Inc., and Martin Himmel Inc.” is admissible for the same reasons as no. 10.

14. Renken Decl. Ex. 22, “a true and correct copy of the Form 10-K that The Stephan Co. filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for Fiscal Year ending December 31, 1994. This document was produced by The Stephan Co. and is bates-stamped Meade TSC Bates 000514 – Meade TSC Bates 000527” is admissible and authenticated for the same reasons described in no. 3.

15. Renken Decl. Ex. 23, “a true and correct copy of the Form 10-Q that Stephan filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for Period ending March 31, 1999” is admissible for the same reasons described in no. 3. Even if this document was hearsay, it would be admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of establishing corporate knowledge because Plaintiffs cite it for the sentence: “It is also anticipated that inventory may rise in the near term due to changing regulations in California as it relates to the alcohol content of certain products. Inventory manufactured prior to June 1, 1999 will not be subject to the more stringent regulations.” Regardless of the truth of the facts within this sentence, the fact that Defendant put forward this sentence in a regulatory filing with the SEC is relevant for the non-hearsay purpose of establishing that Defendant was aware of, and accounting for, changes to California regulations in 1999.   

Sustained:

1. Renken Decl. Ex. 1, “a true and correct copy of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Dept. 15, Honorable Timothy P. Dillon’s January 31, 2025 minute order denying The Stephan Co.’s motion to quash that was filed on December 7, 2023 in another talc case also involving Gold Bond talcum powder products (Jody Kay Meade and Arthur Meade v. Barretts Minerals Inc., et al., Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. 23STCV23517)”; the court takes judicial notice of this document, but it is not received into evidence.

5. Renken Decl. Ex. 8, “a true and correct copy of the cited and relevant pages from the deposition of Jeffrey S. Himmel, Vol. 1, taken in Maute, et al. v. Barretts Minerals, Inc., et al., Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, Case No. CACE-22-008500, taken on June 21, 2023” is inadmissible hearsay. This deposition testimony is an out of court statement introduced for the truth of the matters asserted and therefore is hearsay in the absence of a valid hearsay exception. (Evid. Code § 1200.) As the proponent of the evidence, the burden is on plaintiff to establish an applicable hearsay exception. Plaintiffs provide no evidence to support the application of a hearsay exception especially as the deposition appears to be a discovery deposition. (Berroteran v. Superior Court (2022) 12 Cal.5th 867, 895 [“The party urging admission of deposition testimony bears the burden of rebutting the general rule by submitting appropriate information justifying the admission of designated deposition testimony.”].)

At most Plaintiffs state: “Defendant The Stephan Company was present at this deposition. Mr. Himmel resides in Florida.” (Renken Decl. ¶ 9) Because he lives outside of California, Mr. Himmel is unavailable for the purposes of Evidence Code sections 1291 and 1292. However, Plaintiffs fail to present evidence or argument to show “The party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing.” (Evid. Code § 1291.) Defendant’s presence at the deposition does not show that it had the same right and opportunity to cross examine Mr. Himmel with an interest and motive similar as on this motion.

6. Renken Decl. Ex. 9, “a true and correct copy of the cited and relevant pages from the deposition of Jeffrey S. Himmel, Vol. 2, taken in Maute, et al. v. Barretts Minerals, Inc., et al., Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, Case No. CACE-22-008500, taken on August 16, 2023” is inadmissible for the same reasons described in no. 5.

9. Renken Decl. Ex. 17, “a true and correct copy of a Warning Letter from the Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, dated November 22, 1995 to Stephan Company and the Inspectional Observations” is irrelevant to this motion. Plaintiffs cite this letter of the proposition that “In late 1995, the FDA cited Old 97 for ‘serious deviations from the Current Good Manufacturing Practice . . . in conjunction with [Old 97’s] manufacturing of medicated powder . . .’ ” (Opposition at p. 5.) Plaintiffs continue to state: “In response, Himmel put a stop to Old 97’s manufacturing of Gold Bond and took inventory of where all Old 97-manufactured Gold Bond products were still in warehouses.” (Ibid.) However, the reason Martin Himmel transferred its contract manufacturer from Old 97 to another contract manufacturer is not material to whether Defendant maintained sufficient minimum contacts with California. Accordingly, this FDA letter is irrelevant.

16. Renken Decl. Ex. 24, “a true and correct copy of an advertisement for Gold Bond appearing in The Fresno Bee on May 31, 1995” is irrelevant. Plaintiffs cite this evidence for the proposition that “Gold Bond was sold in California in 1992 and 1995, when Stephan/Old 97 manufactured and distributed Gold Bond and when Mrs. Scott purchased and used Gold Bond.” Opposition at p. 6.) Defendant does not dispute that Gold Bond was sold in California or that Ms. Scott used Gold Bond in California during the period of 1992 to 1995. As such, this evidence is not material to an issue of disputed fact, and therefore not relevant.

17. Renken Decl. Ex. 25, “a true and correct copy of an advertisement for Gold Bond appearing in The Daily Breeze (Torrance, California) on April 5, 1992” is irrelevant for the same reasons described in no. 16.

III.           Discussion

A.    Legal Standards

A defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over them. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).) The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to Section 418.10. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (h).)¿ 

"A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) "The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations."' (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471 – 472.) A state court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113.)¿ 

When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553.) Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Ibid.) "The plaintiff must provide specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate. [Citation.] The plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts. [Citation.]" (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 222.)¿ 

A defendant is subject to a state's general jurisdiction if its contacts "are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State." (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127.) A nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum "if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the 'controversy is related to or "arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum.' [Citations.]" (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446.) This test does not require a "causal relationship between the defendant's in-state activity and the litigation." (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 592 U.S. 351, 362) The "arise out" of standard "asks about causation," but "relate to" does not. (Ibid.) "[W]hen a corporation has 'continuously and deliberately exploited [a State's] market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State's] court[s]' to defend actions 'based on' products causing injury there." (Id. at p. 364.)¿

B.    General Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction is not at issue in this case. General jurisdiction over a corporate defendant exists when the corporation's “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render it essentially at home in the forum State.” (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. 117, 139 [quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. 915, 919].) For a corporation, the paradigmatic examples of such affiliations are the locations where the defendant is incorporated and of the defendant’s principal place of business. (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. 117, 137.)

Plaintiffs do not argue that Stephan Co. is subject to this court’s general jurisdiction. (Opposition at p. 6.) Therefore, the court moves on to specific jurisdiction.

C.    Specific Jurisdiction

A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a plaintiff when three elements are satisfied: “(1) ‘the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits’ [citation]; (2) ‘the controversy is related to or “arises out of” [the] defendant's contacts with the forum’ [citation]; and (3) “ ‘ “the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice’ ” [citation.]”  (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269.)

Here, Stephan Co. contends that Plaintiffs have not produced specific facts showing that it purposefully availed itself of California or that Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of or related to its contacts with California. (Motion at pp. 5-6.) Defendant also argues that it would be unreasonable for this court to exercise jurisdiction over it.

1.     Purposeful Availment

Purposeful availment “focuses on the defendant's intentionality. This prong is satisfied when the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs his activities toward the forum so that he should expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to be subject to the court's jurisdiction based on his contacts with the forum.” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant purposefully availed itself of California by intentionally manufacturing and sending Gold Bond products to California. Specifically Plaintiffs argue: “ Old 97 was the exclusive manufacturer of Gold Bond talcum powder products between at least the end of 1990 and the end of 1995. Stephan/Old 97 obtained financial benefit by manufacturing and distributing Gold Bond. Old 97 agreed to conduct its manufacturing of the product in accordance with all state laws, which presumably included California. As set forth in more detail above, Stephan even contemplated liability for the products by agreeing to maintain insurance policies and accept responsibility for and indemnify Himmel unless certain exceptions existed. Old 97 agreed to and did indeed ship the finished Gold Bond products directly to customers, which included warehouses in California. After the FDA cited Old 97 for violations, an inventory of all Old 97-manufactured Gold Bond showed it was in multiple warehouses, including in California. [¶] The only reasonable inference from these facts is that Stephan/Old 97 knew and intended Gold Bond to be sold to consumers in California” (Opposition at pp. 8-9.)

Plaintiffs primarily cite to six pieces of evidence to establish Defendant’s purposeful availment of California. First, the manufacturing agreement between Defendant and Martin Himmel Inc. (“Martin Himmel”) (Renken Decl. Ex. 6.) Second, a shipping and warehousing agreement between the same parties executed as an agreement letter sent by Patrick Dwyer to Frank Ferola. (Renken Decl. Ex. 7) Third, a distribution agreement between Martin Himmel and Morgan & Sampson Inc., (“Morgan & Sampson”) a California based distributor. (Renken Decl. Ex. 19.) Fourth, Defendant’s 10-K filings with the SEC for fiscal years 1994 to 1995 which show that Defendant and its wholly owned subsidiary, Old 97 Company, derived millions of dollars per year in revenue from sales to Martin Himmel (specifically $4.3 million in 1995) which accounted for a substantial proportion of Defendant’s annual revenues (21% in 1994 and 16% in 1995.) (Renken Decl. Exs. 22, 3.) Plaintiffs also rely on a declaration and deposition testimony from Patrick Dwyer, a former General Manager, Vice President, and President of Martin Himmel in which he authenticates the agreements involving Martin Himmel, states he has personal knowledge that Stephan Co. shipped Gold Bond products to distributors including Morgan & Sampson in California, and that Defendant was the exclusive manufacturer of Gold Bond products from 1990 until 1996. (Renken Decl. Exs. 14, 15 Dwyer Depo 69:4 – 70:9 72: 20 – 25.) Plaintiffs finally rely on a document showing approximately 5,200 cases of Old 97 manufactured product on hold and still within Morgan & Sampson’s warehouses as of March 29, 1996. (Renken Decl. Ex. 18.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to show purposeful availment. Specifically, Defendants contend that “The authority Plaintiffs rely upon in their opposition does not carry the day or meet their burden of proof.” (Reply at p. 7.) Defendant distinguishes the Secrest Machine Corp. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 664, Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, and L.W. v. Audi AG (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 95 cases which Plaintiffs rely upon. Finally, as to the evidence in this case, Defendant argues: “Plaintiffs’ unfounded assertion fails to address the fact that Plaintiffs produced not a single document showing any actual shipment from Defendant into California. Nor did MHI maintain any sort of electronic database of business records going back into the past. Id. at 20:18-21. Plaintiffs’ counsel made various objectionable statements on the record based on such speculation. Id. at 103:21-104:1, 13-22. Plaintiffs’ counsel makes leaps of logic by proclaiming Old 97 shipped to M&S in California at MHI’s direction. Id. Counsel for specially appearing Defendant The Stephan Co. appropriately objected on the grounds the questions called for speculation, misstated the document and testimony, and that Mr. Dwyer lacked foundation. Id. Mr. Dwyer did indeed lack foundation as he confirmed he had no documentary evidence of any shipments of Gold Bond from The Stephan Co. or Old 97 to Morgan & Sampson. Id. at 112:25- 113:7. He also confirmed that he does not have any documentary evidence that show any receipt of any Gold Bond by Morgan & Sampson in California from The Stephan Co. or Old 97. Id. at 112:9-24. In fact, not only does Mr. Dwyer not have any such documents but he confirmed that he is not aware of the existence of any such documents. Id. at 119:14-16. Mr. Dwyer was never an employee of Old 97. Id. at 111:25-112:2. He was never an employee of The Stephan Co. Id. at 112:3-5. He was also never an employee of Morgan & Sampson. Id. at 112:6-8.” (Reply at p. 9). In essence, the substance of Defendant’s argument is that in the absence of documentary evidence showing Defendant’s direct shipment of products to Morgan & Sampson in California, there is no admissible evidence that it ever purposefully availed itself of the California market.

California law indicates that a manufacturer’s mere knowledge of the likelihood that a product will enter a state is insufficient, without more, to establish personal jurisdiction over that Defendant. (Jayone, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 559. [“In the products liability context, merely placing a product into the stream of commerce, even with knowledge that the product might enter the forum state, is not a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.] Accord Dow Chemical Canada ULC v. Superior Court (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 170, 179 [“It is not sufficient for jurisdiction in this case that the defendant Dow might have predicted or known that its products would reach California.”].) Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant manufacturer attempted to purposefully “serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product” in California. (Jayone, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 559.)

Accordingly, the key question is whether a defendant who, at the direction of the owner of those products, shipped the finished products it manufactured to California distributors for sale in California serves the California market directly or indirectly. On this point, the court finds Bridgestone Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 767, Carretti v. Italpast (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1236, and Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, the most instructive cases because they likewise deal with jurisdictional issues relating to sales by out of state manufacturers to in-state distributors.

In Bridgestone, the Court of Appeal held that Bridgestone, a Japanese tire manufacturer, which sold 25,000 tires per month to Firestone, its wholly owned subsidiary and in-state distributor, was sufficient to establish purposeful availment. (Bridgestone, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 777.) Specifically, the Bridgestone court emphasized Bridgestone purposefully availed itself of the California market because its “representatives visited Firestone's distribution center in Ontario and undoubtedly were aware of the large volume of Bridgestone tires that Firestone regularly distributed for sale in California. Bridgestone's sale of tires in Japan for resale in California was not random or fortuitous, and Bridgestone earned substantial income from those sales.” (Ibid.)

Conversely, in Carretti, the Court of Appeal analyzed a situation in which the California distributor of a pasta making machine involved in a California workplace accident filed a cross complaint for indemnity against the foreign manufacturer of the machine. In that case, the Court of Appeal held that there was no purposeful availment by the manufacturer because “the sales to California users took place through the unilateral activity of [cross complainant]… [cross complainant] has only shown us that two machines were resold in California and [cross-defendant] sent representatives to deal with one of the purchasers on two occasions… [¶] In reaching this conclusion, we do not mean to ‘ “suggest[ ] that the fact that a foreign manufacturer or seller rids itself of title by a sale F.O.B. a foreign port is enough to insulate that manufacturer or seller from jurisdiction.” [Citations.]' We also do not mean to suggest that a foreign manufacturer can evade jurisdiction by hiding behind a middleman who acts as a regular distributor of the manufacturer's products in the state. [Citations.] However, [cross-complainant] was not [cross defendant’s] sales agent in California, and indeed, [cross-defendant] had none.” (Caretti, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 1236 at p. 1254.)

Finally, in Jayone the Court of Appeal held that a Korean distributor of humidifier cleaning agent purposefully availed itself of the California market because it engaged in “direct sales transactions with multiple California distributors of its consumer products” including the California distributor who sold the product to the plaintiff, had “regular communications about their business relationship,” and its “direct sales to California businesses generated $1.78 million in revenue for the company between 2005 and 2012, which accounted for more than half of Aekyung's total revenue for products sold to the United States.” (Jayone, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th 543 at p. 557.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient to establish Stephan Co.’s purposeful availment of California. It is undisputed Defendant voluntarily entered into an agreement in which it became a contract manufacturer of Gold Bond products for a period of approximately five years between the end of 1990 and 1996 and thereby assumed certain responsibilities for the product. (Renken Decl. Ex. 6.) There is evidence that Defendant directly shipped this Gold Bond product to California and derived profits from the shipment of products to a warehouse in Ontario, California. (Renken Decl. Ex. 14 ¶ 6 [“After Stephan Co. manufactured Gold Bond Products, Stephan Co. shopped these products to distributors including Morgan & Sampson Co. in Ontario California.”].) Finally, it is undisputed that Ms. Scott and her husband purchased Gold Bond in Santa Barbara California between 1991 and 2004. (Renken Decl. Ex. 2, Scott Decl. ¶ 2 [“Between approximately 1971 and 2004, I lived in Santa Barbara, California. From approximately 1991 through and until 2019, including while living in California, my husband and I both used Gold Bond Medicated Body Powder as part of our personal hygiene. All of the bottles of Gold Bond Medicated Body Powder that we used up until 2019 contained the word talc on the bottles.”].) There is also evidence from a corporate representative of Martin Himmel, the company which owned the Gold Bond during this period, that Stephan Co. was the exclusive manufacturer of Gold Bond product between the end of 1990 and 1996. (See Renken Decl. Ex. 15, Dwyer Depo at 72: 20- 25 [“Martin Himmel, Inc., used other contract manufacturers to manufacture Gold Bond products as well, correct? A. Not -- not until 1996.”].) For the reasons further discussed herein, this evidence is sufficient to establish Stephan Co.’s purposeful availment of California.

 Taking the evidence presented in turn, the manufacturing agreement between Defendant and Martin Himmel indicates that Martin Himmel initially retained control of all shipping of Gold Bond products including the locations to which the product was sold. (Renken Decl. Ex. 6 § 3.2) The manufacturing agreement between Martin Himmel and Defendant further provides:  “Stephan represents that its current capacity for order quantities shall be a minimum of 3,000 Units per day.” (Id. at § 3.3.)  This agreement further provides:  “Stephan shall have sole responsibility and shall be liable for any and all demands, actions, claims, losses, damages and costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys’ fees) (“Liability Claim”) arising from or in connection with all Products identifiable as manufactured by Stephan, regardless of when such Liability Claim is brought or incurred, except for (i) any Liability Claim arising from or in connection or (ii) claims arising strictly out of the Products’ Specifications or as the result solely of any direction by the Company or (iii) acts of any third party not under the control of Stephan.”  (Id. at § 4.2.)  The agreement also provides:  “Stephan will conduct its operations in connection with the manufacture of the Products in accordance with all applicable Federal, state and local laws, ordinances, regulations and requirements and with the regulations and requirements of all governmental authorities, including, but not limited to, all FDA and FTC rules, regulations and guidelines and possesses all approvals, consents, licenses and permits required for the manufacture and sale of the Products.  Stephan has not received any notice relating to changes in the requirements for such approvals, consents, licenses or permits which might be deemed to materially and adversely affect such operations nor has received notice of any challenge, investigation or proceeding in connection with any applicable regulation, guidelines, ordinance or other law, order, regulations or requirement relating to the manufacture or sale of the Products.  Stephan will consistently manufacture the Products in accordance with good manufacturing practices.  Any changes in the Specifications (as hereinafter defied), which result in an increase in the cost of the Products shall be borne by the Company.”  (Id. at § 4.4.)  As to quality control, the agreement states:  “Stephan is fully responsible for quality control in connection with the manufacture of the Products.”  (Id.  at § 5.3.)  Martin Himmel and Defendant also gave each other in their agreement certain indemnities relating to the Gold Bond bond and its manufacture.  (Id. at § 7.)  Dwyer, as vice-president and general manager of Martin Himmel, signed the original agreement and the supplemental agreement on behalf of Martin Himmel.

The distribution agreement between Martin Himmel and Morgan & Sampson provides evidence that a contract manufacturer was shipping Gold Bond product to Ontario, California after May 15, 1990, during the period when Defendant was an undisputed contract manufacturer for Gold Bond products. (Renken Decl. Ex. 19.) 

While Stephan Co. disputes whether it in fact shipped any product to California based on its inability to now produce any shipping records, Plaintiffs present competent deposition testimony from Patrick Dwyer, the then vice-president and general manager of Martin Himmel, who states that Defendant shipped Gold Bond Powder products to Defendant’s distributors, including Morgan & Sampson in Ontario, California and that Defendant was the exclusive manufacturer of those products until 1996. (Renken Decl. Ex. 14, ¶6, Renken Decl. Ex. 15, 72: 20- 25 [“Martin Himmel, Inc., used other contract manufacturers to manufacture Gold Bond products as well, correct? A. Not -- not until 1996.”]) Stephan Co.’s argument that Mr. Dwyer lacks foundation for his testimony that Defendant was responsible for shipping Gold Bond to Morgan & Sampson because he was not a direct employee of Stephan Co. or Morgan & Sampson is unavailing. Mr. Dwyer’s personal knowledge of this fact does not require him to have been an employee of either entity or to have reviewed shipment records because as the general manager of Martin Himmel he was ultimately responsible during this period for ensuring that Martin Himmel fulfilled its contractual obligations to supply Gold Bond products to Morgan & Sampson. Accordingly, it is more than reasonable that a person in his position has personal knowledge of which parties agreed to and actually undertook the shipment of Gold Bond products during the exposure period.

Defendant’s argument that the lack of documentary evidence supporting the shipments of products by Stephan Co. to Morgan & Sampson is unavailing. The court finds that Mr. Dwyer’s testimony is credible and rooted in his personal knowledge of the chain of distribution of Martin Himmel’s products as evidenced by his signature on the agreements between Martin Himmel and Defendant and Martin Himmel and Morgan & Sampson. Dwyer’s testimony is also consistent with substantial amounts of product remaining in California at the end of the Defendant’s term as exclusive manufacturer.  Lucille Murphy’s (Defendant’s PMQ) testimony that there were other manufacturers for Martin Himmel is silent as to time frame and is therefore meaningless testimony.  (See Landis Decl. Ex. 4, Murphy Depo at p. 24.)  Of course, there was another manufacturer after Martin Himmel terminated its agreement with Defendant in 1995.  Martin Himmel replaced Defendant with PTI.  Murphy’s hazy recollection as to shipments to California is also given no weight.  (Id. at pp. 45-46.)  Defendant does not get a benefit in the evidence from a PMQ witness who cannot provide specific testimony and a failure to produce records. Thus, Defendant gets no favorable inference based on its failure to provide shipping records. Given the evidence that Stephan Co. was the exclusive manufacturer and supplier of the Gold Bond powder from 1991 through 1995, the presence 5,200 cases remaining in a California warehouse in 1996 which were regarded in inventory as “Old 97 Produced Gold Bond Product On Hold” is further evidence of Defendant’s continuous and systematic purposeful availment of the California market. (Renken Decl. Ex. 18.) Defendant makes no effort to explain its inability to produce shipping records or how 5,200 cases were remaining in that California warehouse. If any inferences are drawn here, they would be against Defendant.

Plaintiffs also present a form 10-K filed by Stephan Co. with the SEC for 1995 in which Defendant admits that Old 97, its subsidiary for whom it assumed all liabilities, was the “principal manufacturer of ‘Gold Bond’ talc for [Martin Himmel]” and that Defendant derived over 4.3 million dollars, approximately 16% of its consolidated revenue, from sales to Martin Himmel in that year. (Renken Decl. Ex. 3 at p. 6.) The evidence before the court does not distinguish between the amount of money derived from Defendant’s sales of products which were eventually shipped to California and does not confirm any specific number of shipments into California.  However, Plaintiffs present evidence that at least as of March 29, 1996, there were 5,215 cases of Gold Bond product manufactured by Defendant within a Morgan & Sampson’s California warehouse. (Renken Decl. Ex. 18.) This provides evidence of extensive sales specifically into the California market as over 5,200 cases remained unsold in California at the end of Stephan Co.’s term as exclusive contract manufacturer for Gold Bond.

Taken together, the evidence shows that Defendant was operating more like the manufacturers in Bridgestone or Jayone, than the manufacturer in Carretti. Here, as in Jayone, the shipment of products into California was a result of a long-term business relationship between Defendant and Martin Himmel over the course of five years (1990 or 1991 to 1995) during which Defendant was the exclusive manufacturer of Gold Bond products and assumed responsibility for shipping these products to California. Like Jayone and Bridgestone, and unlike Carretti, Defendant received significant economic benefits from their manufacturing and shipping Gold Bond products to a distributor in California, with Defendant’s manufacturing of Martin Himmel products, including Gold Bond, accounting for millions of dollars and more than a tenth and as much as a fifth its consolidated revenues in 1994 and 1995. Even without knowing the precise amounts of that revenue attributable to California sales, it seems apparent given the size of the California market that Defendant’s actions in shipping products to California “reflected an effort to benefit from the California market and constituted economic activity within California ‘ “ ‘as a matter of commercial actuality.’ ”  [Citation.]”  especially given “the income earned by the manufacturer from sale or use of its product in California [was] substantial” (Bridgestone, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 767 at p. 776 – 777.)  As noted in Caretti, the mere decision to structure the shipping of products such that the products were F.O.B. does not insulate a product’s manufacturer from jurisdiction where that manufacturer where the manufacturer otherwise intentionally derived economic benefits from sales into the forum state. (Caretti, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 1236 at p. 1254).

Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Specifically, the mere fact that Defendant did not itself choose the locations to ship the products is not dispositive of a lack of purposeful availment of the California market. To be sure, merely shipping products to California is not necessarily dispositive of purposeful availment where the shipment of products was directed by another entity. (See Clarke v. Air and Liquid Systems Corporation (C.D. Cal., Apr. 20, 2020) 2020 WL 12968241 at *5 [“Plaintiff's allegations that Weir Valves shipped certain products to the Mare Island, CA shipyard during Plaintiff's service there from 1974-1976 are not sufficient, standing alone, to create specific personal jurisdiction, particularly given undisputed evidence provided by Weir Valves that such shipments were made at the Navy's direction, to whichever location where the purchased valves were to be installed.”].) But here, as stated, Plaintiffs present the additional evidence that Defendant derived substantial economic benefits from sales to Martin Himmel including $4.3 million dollars in 1995 alone, which included the revenues from sales to California. (Renken Decl., Ex. 3.) Moreover, given that the agreement between Stephan Co. and Martin Himmel was renewed annually after Defendant was aware of its shipment of products into California, there is evidence that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily re-entered agreements with the intent to take advantage of the California market. (Renken Decl. Ex. 15, Dwyer Depo 70:18 – 71:1)

Stephan Co.’s argument that it never sold directly to the California Distributor is likewise unpersuasive. Here, while Defendant did not pick which distributors it sold to, it did choose to conduct business with Martin Himmel and continued to do so, even after it knew through its own shipment of products directly to California that it was deriving income from the California market. Therefore, while Defendant did not directly transact with a California retailer or distributor, it directly profited from manufacturing and shipping products to California with the knowledge and intention that such products reach California.

 Taken together, this evidence shows that Defendant intentionally entered a series of contracts which obligated them to ship products to California and thereby derived substantial economic benefit. Accordingly, the court finds that Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with and purposefully availed itself of California.

2. Relatedness

The relatedness inquiry is not strictly causal and instead focuses on whether the causes of action “rises out of or has a substantial connection with a business relationship defendant has purposefully established with California.” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th 434, at p. 448.)

            Defendant contends in its moving papers that Plaintiffs’ claims did not arise out of or relate to Defendant’s contacts with California. Specifically, Defendant argues: “Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Ms. Scott’s injury “arose out of” or “relates to” The Stephan Co.’s alleged contacts with California. Indeed, Plaintiffs fail to even establish a connection between The Stephan Co., California, and Ms. Scott’s injury.” (Motion at p. 10.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that their causes of action directly arise from Defendant’s contacts with California because Ms. Scott was harmed by the products Defendant sold to California. Plaintiffs argue: “As set forth in the Statement of Facts, supra, Mrs. Scott purchased and used Gold Bond talcum powder products in California during the years that Stephan/Old 97 manufactured and distributed the products. As such, if plaintiffs show that Stephan/Old 97 purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of California, which they have, plaintiffs’ claims would relate to and arise out of Stephan/Old 97’s contacts with California.” (Opposition at p. 13.)

In reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs never presented evidence that any of the Gold Bond sold in California was manufactured by Defendant or its predecessor in interest Old 97. Defendant argues: “There is no evidence that any Gold Bond manufactured by Old 97 and purchased by MHI was sold or distributed in California by The Stephan Co. MHI was responsible for distributing the finished Gold Bond products, not MHI’s manufacturers. The Stephan Co. did not handle distribution for MHI.” (Reply at p. 10.)

            Here, Plaintiffs’ claims rest on the theory that Defendant caused Plaintiffs’ injury by shipping Gold Bond products to California which Ms. Scott subsequently purchased and used. (Opposition at p. 1) That theory is supported by specific facts showing that Defendant in fact manufactured and shipped products to the sole distributor of Gold Bond in California during a period in which Ms. Scott and her husband purchased and used Gold Bond products in California. (Renken Decl. Ex. 2 , ¶ 2 [“Between approximately 1971 and 2004, I lived in Santa Barbara, California. From approximately 1991 through and until 2019, including while living in California, my husband and I both used Gold Bond Medicated Body Powder as part of our personal hygiene. All of the bottles of Gold Bond Medicated Body Powder that we used up until 2019 contained the word talc on the bottles.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiffs present admissible evidence of a direct causal link between Defendant’s contacts with California and Plaintiffs’ injury which is more than sufficient to satisfy the relatedness prong.

3. Reasonableness

            Once Plaintiffs established Defendant’s minimum contacts with California, the burden shifts to Defendant to show that jurisdiction would be unreasonable. “In evaluating whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice, the ‘ “court ‘must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief…’ ” ‘[Citation.]” (Jayone, supra, 31 Cal.App.5^th 564.) Here, Defendant principally contends that it would be unreasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction over it because “it has no presence in California and at all relevant times, the principal place of business and corporate headquarters of TSC were located in Florida.”  (Motion at 8.)

            The factors traditionally considered by courts in determining the reasonableness of asserting personal jurisdiction uniformly militate towards exercise of jurisdiction in this case. (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 292. ["[T]he burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, [citation]; the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, [citation], at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum, [citation]; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies [citation]." ]  Plaintiffs’ causes of action relate to Defendant’s contacts with California, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant are similar in substance to other lawsuits presently before this court (including the Meade and Kownacki actions which were recently subject to similar motions to quash), the evidence related to Ms. Scott’s use of potentially contaminated Gold Bond products, including witnesses and Ms. Scott’s medical records, are in California, and there is a strong state policy favoring in-state litigation of tort claims for California residents injured in California. As stated, Defendant assumed responsibilities and liabilities for the finished products it shipped to California.  For example, in the “Compliance with Law” section of its agreement with Martin Himmel, Defendant remains responsible for compliance with all applicable laws including FDA regulations “required for the manufacture and sale of the Products.”  (Renken Decl. Ex. 6 § 4.4.)  Under these circumstances, it is certainly fair and reasonable that Defendant expected and should be subject to jurisdiction in California.  Moreover, this case does not raise any concerns regarding the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign citizens against which California and Federal courts caution.  Accordingly, Defendant fails to carry its burden to show that the exercise of jurisdiction in this case would be unreasonable.

IV.           Conclusion

Plaintiffs provide evidence sufficient to show that Stephan Co. purposefully availed itself of California and that Plaintiffs’ claims arise from or relate to its contacts with California. Stephan Co. fails to present sufficient evidence that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable here. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to quash service of summons and complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.