Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 25STCV07399, Date: 2025-05-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV07399    Hearing Date: May 21, 2025    Dept: 14

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA    

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES  

 

DEPARTMENT 14 

 

 

  

CINDA S. STONE, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of MARSHALL B. STONE, Deceased, and SAMANTHA STONE and KATHERINE STONE, Individually

 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

  

BAYER CONSUMER CARE HOLDINGS LLC et al., 

 

Defendants. 

    Case No. 25STCV07399

     

    Hearing Date:  May 21, 2025

    Time:               9:00 a.m. 

 

   ORDER RE: 

 

     SPECIALLY APPEARING DEFENDANT PTI UNION, LLC’S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 

 

 

 

I.                Background

 

On March 13, 2025, Plaintiffs Cinda, Samantha, and Katherine Stone filed their complaint for wrongful death against numerous Defendants alleging Marshall Stone (“Mr. Stone”) developed mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos while doing construction work in California from the 1970s to the 1980s, doing automotive work from the 1970s to the 1990s, and using personal hygiene products from the 1950s to the early 2010s. As against Defendant PTI Union, LLC (“PTI Union”) Plaintiffs allege Mr. Stone developed mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos contaminated talc in Dr. Scholl’s and Gold Bond brand talcum foot powders from the late 1970s to 1993 manufactured by PTI Union.

 

On April 21, 2025, PTI Union filed its motion to quash service of summons and complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. On May 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their opposition in which they requested time to conduct jurisdictional discovery. On May 14, 2025, PTI Union filed its reply. On May 21, 2025, the court held a hearing.

 

II.             Discussion

 

A.    Legal Standards

 

A defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over them. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).) The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to Section 418.10. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (h).) 

 

"A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) "The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations."' (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471-472.) A state court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113.) 

 

When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553.) Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Ibid.) "The plaintiff must provide specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate. [Citation.] The plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts. [Citation.]" (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 222.)

 

A defendant is subject to a state's general jurisdiction if its contacts "are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State." (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127.) A nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum "if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the 'controversy is related to or "arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum.' [Citations.]" (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446.) This test does not require a "causal relationship between the defendant's in-state activity and the litigation." (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 592 U.S. 352, 362.) The "arise out" of standard "asks about causation," but "relate to" does not. (Ibid.) "[W]hen a corporation has 'continuously and deliberately exploited [a State's] market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State's] court[s]' to defend actions 'based on' products causing injury there." (Id. at p. 364.) 

 

B.    Personal Jurisdiction

 

Plaintiffs do not argue that they present sufficient evidence to support a finding of either general or specific personal jurisdiction at this stage. Instead, Plaintiffs request a continuance to conduct jurisdictional discovery. Accordingly, the court focuses on whether Plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to entitle them to conduct jurisdictional discovery.

 

C.    Jurisdictional Discovery

 

“A plaintiff attempting to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is entitled to an opportunity to conduct discovery of the jurisdictional facts necessary to sustain its burden of proof[.]” (Hardell v. Vanzyl (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 960, 975-976; Goehring v. Superior Court (Bernier) (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894.) This court has “discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow the plaintiff to conduct discovery on jurisdictional issues.” (HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173.) However, “In order to prevail on a motion for a continuance for jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127.)

 

Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to jurisdictional discovery. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue: “Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Mr. Stone was exposed to talc from personal use and bystander exposure to Dr. Scholl's talcum foot powder and Gold Bond talcum foot powder. PTI itself admits to participating in the manufacturing process of these products. Additionally, some of the entities with which PTI contract[ed] to produce these products are also named in this lawsuit. Finally, and most importantly, there is already some evidence that PTI directed its products into the State of California.” (Opposition at pp. 5.) Plaintiffs specifically request jurisdictional discovery to determine “the extent to which PTI participated in the manufacture and distribution of Gold Bond and Dr. Scholl's talc containing products directed to the State of California. Defendants BAYER HEALTHCARE, LLC, MERCK & CO., INC., and CHATTEM, INC. all maintain liability for the products at issue in this motion and are named as defendants in this lawsuit. Plaintiffs' jurisdictional discovery efforts will be targeted at these defendants as well.” (Opposition at pp. 5-6.)

 

In reply, PTI Union argues that Plaintiffs fail to present sufficient evidence to show they are entitled to jurisdictional discovery. PTI Union argues: “Mr. Stone’s alleged exposure ended over a decade before Union existed. Compare Pls.’ Opp. p. 3 (stating Mr. Stone’s alleged exposure occurred between “the late 1970s through the 1993 [sic]”) with Brasher Decl. ¶ 3. (Union was “initially formed . . . on November 13, 2007”). There is no plausible basis for Union to be liable for any of Mr. Stone’s exposure because it did not exist.” (Reply at p. 6.) PTI Union further argues: “Jurisdictional discovery will not change this, no matter how many ways Plaintiffs say Union ‘directed its products into the State of California.’ Pls.’ Opp. at 5 (emphasis added). The products are not Union’s and Union has no contact with California. There is no need for jurisdictional discovery.” (Ibid.)

 

Here, the court finds that Plaintiffs fail satisfy their burden to show they are entitled to conduct targeted and limited jurisdictional discovery into PTI Union’s manufacture of Gold Bond and Dr. Scholl’s talcum foot powders from the 1970s to 1993. Plaintiffs present evidence that Mr. Stone used Gold Bond and Dr. Scholls between the 1970s and 1993. (White Decl. Ex. 3 (Stone Decl.) ¶¶ 3-4 [“From the late 1970s through 1993, I observed my husband, Marshall Stone, personally use Gold Bond talcum foot powder in Southern California. [¶] From the late 1970s through the [sic] 1993, I also observed Mr. Marshall Stone's personal use of Dr. Scholl's talcum foot powder in Southern California.”].) However, the undisputed evidence is that Defendant’s corporate existence began only in 2007. (Thrasher Decl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs present no evidence, admissible or inadmissible, that Defendant was responsible for manufacturing either Bold Bond or Dr. Scholl’s foot powders from the 1970s to 1993. At most, Plaintiffs present deposition testimony of PTI Union’s corporate representative Michael Brasher in which he discusses a repository of documents relating to its manufacture of talc containing products, and knowledge of California Proposition 65. (White Decl. Ex. 4, 248:4-250:4, 254:6-255:19, 402:23-403:23.) The only product at issue in this case mentioned is Gold Bond, and Mr. Thrasher is not asked about and, therefore does not provide, any evidence regarding the period during which Defendant was responsible for this product. (Id. at 255:12-19 [“Got it. And so it's -- you didn't pull out certain documents in the talc repository to be scanned related to specifically Ammens or specifically Gold Bond. They scan everything in the repository. It's just a question what has or has not been digitized? A. Again, not knowing the full process, that's my understanding.”].)  Accordingly, there is no evidence, admissible or inadmissible, to support Plaintiffs’ allegations that PTI Union is responsible for either of the products at issue, let alone evidence sufficient to support a showing “that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 127.) Therefore, Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery is denied.

 

III.           Conclusion

 

Plaintiffs fail to present evidence sufficient to satisfy their burden to show the existence of personal jurisdiction over PTI Union. Plaintiffs likewise fail to show evidence sufficient to show they are entitled to jurisdictional discovery. Therefore, PTI Union’s motion to quash service of summons and complaint is granted. The court dismisses the complaint against Defendant without prejudice pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (h) 

 

            Moving party Defendant PTI Union, LLC is ordered to give notice.

 





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