Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: 25STCV07399, Date: 2025-05-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25STCV07399 Hearing Date: May 21, 2025 Dept: 14
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT
14
|
CINDA S. STONE, Individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of MARSHALL B. STONE, Deceased, and SAMANTHA
STONE and KATHERINE STONE, Individually Plaintiffs, v. BAYER CONSUMER CARE HOLDINGS LLC et al., Defendants. |
Case No. 25STCV07399 Hearing Date: May 21, 2025
Time:
9:00 a.m. ORDER
RE:
SPECIALLY APPEARING DEFENDANT PTI UNION, LLC’S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE
OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION |
On March 13, 2025,
Plaintiffs Cinda, Samantha, and Katherine Stone filed their complaint for wrongful
death against numerous Defendants alleging Marshall Stone (“Mr. Stone”) developed
mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos while doing construction work in
California from the 1970s to the 1980s, doing automotive work from the 1970s to
the 1990s, and using personal hygiene products from the 1950s to the early
2010s. As against Defendant PTI Union, LLC (“PTI Union”) Plaintiffs allege Mr.
Stone developed mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos contaminated talc in Dr.
Scholl’s and Gold Bond brand talcum foot powders from the late 1970s to 1993
manufactured by PTI Union.
On April 21, 2025, PTI
Union filed its motion to quash service of summons and complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction. On May 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their opposition in
which they requested time to conduct jurisdictional discovery. On May 14, 2025,
PTI Union filed its reply. On May 21, 2025, the court held a hearing.
A
defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the court over them. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)
The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that
defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to Section 418.10. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 581, subd. (h).)
"A
court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent
with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." (Code Civ.
Proc., § 410.10.) "The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty
interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he
has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations."' (Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471-472.) A state court may
not exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (Asahi
Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987)
480 U.S. 102, 113.)
When
a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the
plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise
of jurisdiction. (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019)
31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553.) Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum
state are established, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate the exercise
of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Ibid.) "The plaintiff must
provide specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated
documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether
jurisdiction is appropriate. [Citation.] The plaintiff cannot rely on
allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of
ultimate facts. [Citation.]" (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair
& Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 222.)
A
defendant is subject to a state's general jurisdiction if its contacts
"are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in
the forum State." (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127.)
A nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the
forum "if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of
forum benefits [citation], and the 'controversy is related to or "arises
out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum.' [Citations.]" (Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446.) This
test does not require a "causal relationship between the defendant's
in-state activity and the litigation." (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana
Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 592 U.S. 352, 362.) The "arise
out" of standard "asks about causation," but "relate
to" does not. (Ibid.) "[W]hen a corporation has 'continuously
and deliberately exploited [a State's] market, it must reasonably anticipate
being haled into [that State's] court[s]' to defend actions 'based on' products
causing injury there." (Id. at p. 364.)
Plaintiffs do not argue
that they present sufficient evidence to support a finding of either general or
specific personal jurisdiction at this stage. Instead, Plaintiffs request a
continuance to conduct jurisdictional discovery. Accordingly, the court focuses
on whether Plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to entitle them to conduct
jurisdictional discovery.
“A plaintiff attempting to
assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is entitled to an opportunity
to conduct discovery of the jurisdictional facts necessary to sustain its
burden of proof[.]” (Hardell v. Vanzyl (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 960,
975-976; Goehring v. Superior Court (Bernier) (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th
894.) This court has “discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to quash
service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow the plaintiff to
conduct discovery on jurisdictional issues.” (HealthMarkets, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173.) However, “In order to
prevail on a motion for a continuance for jurisdictional discovery, the
plaintiff should demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production
of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.” (In re Automobile Antitrust
Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127.)
Plaintiffs argue they are
entitled to jurisdictional discovery. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue: “Plaintiffs
have presented evidence that Mr. Stone was exposed to talc from personal use
and bystander exposure to Dr. Scholl's talcum foot powder and Gold Bond talcum
foot powder. PTI itself admits to participating in the manufacturing process of
these products. Additionally, some of the entities with which PTI contract[ed]
to produce these products are also named in this lawsuit. Finally, and most
importantly, there is already some evidence that PTI directed its products into
the State of California.” (Opposition at pp. 5.) Plaintiffs specifically
request jurisdictional discovery to determine “the extent to which PTI
participated in the manufacture and distribution of Gold Bond and Dr. Scholl's
talc containing products directed to the State of California. Defendants BAYER
HEALTHCARE, LLC, MERCK & CO., INC., and CHATTEM, INC. all maintain
liability for the products at issue in this motion and are named as defendants
in this lawsuit. Plaintiffs' jurisdictional discovery efforts will be targeted
at these defendants as well.” (Opposition at pp. 5-6.)
In reply, PTI Union argues
that Plaintiffs fail to present sufficient evidence to show they are entitled
to jurisdictional discovery. PTI Union argues: “Mr. Stone’s alleged exposure
ended over a decade before Union existed. Compare Pls.’ Opp. p. 3 (stating Mr.
Stone’s alleged exposure occurred between “the late 1970s through the 1993
[sic]”) with Brasher Decl. ¶ 3. (Union was “initially formed . . . on November
13, 2007”). There is no plausible basis for Union to be liable for any of Mr.
Stone’s exposure because it did not exist.” (Reply at p. 6.) PTI Union further
argues: “Jurisdictional discovery will not change this, no matter how many ways
Plaintiffs say Union ‘directed its products into the State of
California.’ Pls.’ Opp. at 5 (emphasis added). The products are not Union’s and
Union has no contact with California. There is no need for jurisdictional
discovery.” (Ibid.)
Here, the court finds that
Plaintiffs fail satisfy their burden to show they are entitled to conduct targeted
and limited jurisdictional discovery into PTI Union’s manufacture of Gold Bond
and Dr. Scholl’s talcum foot powders from the 1970s to 1993. Plaintiffs present
evidence that Mr. Stone used Gold Bond and Dr. Scholls between the 1970s and
1993. (White Decl. Ex. 3 (Stone Decl.) ¶¶ 3-4 [“From the late 1970s through
1993, I observed my husband, Marshall Stone, personally use Gold Bond talcum
foot powder in Southern California. [¶] From the late 1970s through the [sic]
1993, I also observed Mr. Marshall Stone's personal use of Dr. Scholl's talcum
foot powder in Southern California.”].) However, the undisputed evidence is
that Defendant’s corporate existence began only in 2007. (Thrasher Decl. ¶ 3.)
Plaintiffs present no evidence, admissible or inadmissible, that Defendant was
responsible for manufacturing either Bold Bond or Dr. Scholl’s foot powders
from the 1970s to 1993. At most, Plaintiffs present deposition testimony of PTI
Union’s corporate representative Michael Brasher in which he discusses a
repository of documents relating to its manufacture of talc containing
products, and knowledge of California Proposition 65. (White Decl. Ex. 4,
248:4-250:4, 254:6-255:19, 402:23-403:23.) The only product at issue in this
case mentioned is Gold Bond, and Mr. Thrasher is not asked about and, therefore
does not provide, any evidence regarding the period during which Defendant was
responsible for this product. (Id. at 255:12-19 [“Got it. And so it's --
you didn't pull out certain documents in the talc repository to be scanned
related to specifically Ammens or specifically Gold Bond. They scan everything
in the repository. It's just a question what has or has not been digitized? A.
Again, not knowing the full process, that's my understanding.”].) Accordingly, there is no evidence, admissible
or inadmissible, to support Plaintiffs’ allegations that PTI Union is
responsible for either of the products at issue, let alone evidence sufficient
to support a showing “that discovery is likely to lead to the production of
evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.” (In re Automobile Antitrust
Cases I & II, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 127.)
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery is denied.
Plaintiffs fail to present
evidence sufficient to satisfy their burden to show the existence of personal
jurisdiction over PTI Union. Plaintiffs likewise fail to show evidence
sufficient to show they are entitled to jurisdictional discovery. Therefore, PTI
Union’s motion to quash service of summons and complaint is granted. The court
dismisses the complaint against Defendant without prejudice pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (h)
Moving party Defendant PTI Union, LLC is ordered to give
notice.