Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case Number: BC505436, Date: 2025-04-30 Tentative Ruling

Department 58

Tentative Ruling: The Motion to Vacate Renewal of Judgment is granted.

Defendant moves to vacate Plaintiffs’ renewal of the judgment on the grounds that (1.) the underlying judgment is void, (2.) the judgment expired prior to the renewal, and (3.) the judgment was discharged as a non-asset in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy.

The Enforcement of Judgments Law prescribes rules governing the enforcement of judgments. In general, a money judgment is enforceable for only 10 years after the date of entry. (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.020.) This period can be extended by 10 years if an application for renewal is submitted before the original term expires. (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.130, subd. (a).) However, once a judgment expires, it may not be enforced. (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.020, subd. (a).) Upon the judgment's expiration, all enforcement procedures “shall cease,” and any lien pursuant to the judgment “is extinguished.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.020 subds. (b), (c).)

A party may seek to have the renewal of the judgment vacated “on any ground that would be a defense to an action on the judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.170, subd. (a).) A party seeking to vacate a renewed judgment has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (American Contractors Indemnity Co. v. Hernandez (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 845, 848.)

Defendant argues that Judgment was entered on October 27, 2014. Based on the foregoing, the judgment expired on October 28, 2024. As such, Plaintiff’s renewal on January 30, 2025 was untimely.

In opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute that the judgment was entered on October 27, 2024.[1] Instead, Plaintiff argues that, based on a bankruptcy proceeding, the renewal application was timely, applying 11 United States Code section 108, subdivision (c).

It is well settled that, generally, under Title 11 United States Code section 362, subdivision (a)(2), the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of “the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title.” Further, Section 108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code addresses when state law claims may be filed following termination of the automatic bankruptcy stay.

The law is less settled on whether an application for renewal can be filed during a bankruptcy stay. Some courts have found that an application for renewal can be filed during a bankruptcy stay (Rubin v. Ross (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 153, 166 [“the act of renewing a judgment, in and of itself, is expressly permitted under [CCP] section 683.210 and [the automatic stay] … operates only to prohibit subsequent acts intended to enforce a renewed judgment”]; Jonathan Neil & Associates, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488 [“‘Renewal during a stay of enforcement does not affect the stay, but merely prevents the termination of the period of enforceability.”]), while other courts have found that they cannot be filed during this time. (In re Lobherr (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002) 282 B.R. 912, 915-916 [explaining that judgment renewal was continuation of proceeding against debtor under 11 USC § 362(a)(1) and therefore violated automatic stay]).

Irrespective of whether an application for a renewal can be filed during a bankruptcy stay, Plaintiff is correct that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly concluded that title 11 United States Code section 108(c) operates to extend the time within which a judgment creditor has to seek the renewal of a judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 683.110. (In re Spirtos (9th Cir. 2000) 221 F3d 1079, 1080-1082.) Said another way, courts agree that, where the 10-year enforcement period would have expired during a bankruptcy proceeding, that period is extended. For example, if the creditor has a nondischargeable judgment to enforce against the debtor, and where the state law period for enforcing the judgment would otherwise expire after the bankruptcy petition was filed but before the automatic stay terminates as to the creditor, the creditor must renew the judgment within 30 days after notice of termination of the automatic stay. (11 USC § 362, subd. (c)(2); see In re Spirtos (9th Cir. 2000) 221 F3d 1079, 1080-1082.)

However, this is not the issue before this Court on this motion. That is, Plaintiff has conflated the time that is extended when the 10-year enforcement period would otherwise expire during the automatic stay and the concept of tolling the 10-year period under Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020.

Rather than arguing the deadline was extended, Plaintiff argues that the enforcement was tolled by the automatic stay “from at least August 3, 2017 (date of filing of the Valdovinos Chapter 7 Bankruptcy) to May 22, 2019 (when the Bankruptcy Court closed the Valdovinos Chapter 7 Bankruptcy).” (Opp., 9:18-21.) Based on these dates, Plaintiff argues that the bankruptcy period tolled the 10-year period for 658 days, or until August 2026.

However, as discussed in Rubin v. Ross (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 153, Plaintiff’s tolling argument with respect to Section 108(c) is incorrect:

“Judgment creditors use the term “toll” in presenting their arguments on appeal. However, the use of the term “toll” with respect to section 108(c) is misleading. “The term ‘tolled’ in the context of the statute of limitations is commonly understood to mean ‘suspended’ or ‘stopped.’ As [the California] Supreme Court has explained, when a statute of limitation is tolled, ‘the limitations period stops running during the tolling event, and begins to run again only when the tolling event has concluded. As a consequence, the tolled interval, no matter when it took place, is tacked onto the end of the limitations period, thus extending the deadline for suit by the entire length of time during which the tolling event previously occurred.’ ” (Mitchell v. State Dept. of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1011, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 261.) In contrast, section 108(c) has been interpreted to provide a 30-day “grace period” or “extension” for a judgment creditor to perform any act necessary to commence or continue a claim following the expiration of a bankruptcy stay. (Rogers v. Corrosion Products (5th Cir. 1995) 42 F.3d 292, 297; see In re Spirtos (9th Cir. 2000) 221 F.3d 1079, 1080–1081 (Spirtos).)” (Rubin v. Ross, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at 162, fn. 3.)

Rather, the law states that a money judgment’s 10-year period of enforceability in “Section 683.020 commences on the date of entry and is not tolled for any reason.” (Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195, 201 [italics added].)

Plaintiffs also suggest that, under Subdivision (c)(2) of Section 108, their application for renewal was timely because “Plaintiff never received notice of the bankruptcy proceeding and Plaintiff had at least, until the later of 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay.” (Opp., 9:22-25.)

However, Subdivision (c)(2) of Section 108 also does not apply to extend the 10-year period. The ruling in In re Silva (Bankr. D. Idaho 1997) 215 B.R. 73 is instructive. In In re Silva, the issue was a California judgment that, under California law, expired ten years after entry and whether the thirty-day period of section 108(c)(2) came into play to extend the duration of a California judgment. Idaho's bankruptcy court ruled that it did not:

“In this case, Debtor's petition was filed on August 13, 1993. The California judgment, under “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” expired ten years subsequent to date of the entry of the judgment, or in other words, on June 4, 1994. Debtor was discharged in bankruptcy on April 28, 1994, which terminated the automatic stay against actions against the Debtor by operation of law. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C). The 30 day extension of time provided by 11 U.S.C. [section] 108(c)(2), (i.e. May 28, 1994) was thus prior in time to the date of expiration of the judgment under the California statutes. Thus, under the facts of this case, 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) had no tolling effect on the judgment in question, and it would expire on June 4, 1994 unless validly renewed or revived under state law.” (215 B.R. at 76.)

Thus, the bankruptcy court applied the California judgment length of ten years and noted that it expired after the thirty-day period under 11 U.S.C. section 108(c)(2), and therefore, the state statute controlled.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ application for renewal of the judgment was filed after the 10-year period had expired. The application was untimely.

[1] The application for renewal states the judgment was entered on February 25, 2025. There is no explanation for the inclusion of this purportedly incorrect date.