Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case Number: BC665977, Date: 2024-01-25 Tentative Ruling

This is a case alleging employment discrimination. On June 22, 2017, Plaintiff Crisanta Serrano (Plaintiff) filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging causes of action for (1) FEHA discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, (2) FEHA harassment on the basis of pregnancy, (3) FEHA retaliation for complaining of discrimination and/or harassment on the basis of pregnancy, (4) FEHA discrimination on the basis of taking CFRA leave, (5) FEHA harassment on the basis of taking CFRA leave, (6) FEHA retaliation for taking CFRA leave, and (7) FEHA harassment on the basis of gender.

As of December 12, 2017, all causes of action other than the first, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action were dismissed pursuant to demurrer. All Defendants other than Citrus Community College District were also dismissed.

On February 28, 2019, the Court granted Defendant Citrus Community College District’s motion for summary adjudication as to the third cause of action. Only the first, fourth, and sixth causes of action remain.

On August 2, 2019, Defendant Citrus Community College filed a motion to bifurcate. Plaintiff opposed the motion. On August 26, 2019, the Court, before the Honorable John Doyle, denied the motion. The Court did not specify the reasons for why it denied the motion to bifurcate.

Now, Defendant Citrus Community College again moves to bifurcate. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (b) provides: “The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, ..., or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.” Trial courts have broad discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 to determine the order of proof in the interests of judicial economy. (Grappo v. Coventry Financial Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 496, 504.)

Likewise, “[t]he court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order, no later than the close of pretrial conference in cases in which such pretrial conference is to be held, or, in other cases, no later than 30 days before the trial date, that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case, except for special defenses which may be tried first pursuant to Sections 597 and 597.5.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 598.)

Defendant moves to bifurcate trial to first adjudicate its three affirmative defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and failure to exhaust judicial remedies.

Specifically, Defendant argues that, after Plaintiff’s dismissal, she requested a formal hearing pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article 22; thereafter, the Board then unanimously voted in favor of dismissing Plaintiff from her employment in January 2016. Plaintiff never challenged the Board’s findings by filing a writ of mandate. Defendant, citing Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, argues that Plaintiff’s failure to challenge this decision renders those findings binding in this instant lawsuit. (Id. at pp. 69-70 [stating that “unless a party to a quasi-judicial administrative agency proceeding challenges the adverse findings made in that proceeding, by means of a mandate action in superior court, those findings are binding in later civil actions”].)

Thus, Defendant argues the claims are barred under the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and failure to exhaust judicial remedies.

In opposition, Plaintiff citing Ortega v. Contra Costa Community College Dist. (2007) 156 Cal. App. 4th 1073, argues that she was not required to exhaust because the internal grievance process under the collective bargaining agreement qualifies as an arbitration with no final, preclusive effect.

In Ortega v. Contra Costa Community College Dist., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 1073, the court of appeal held the trial court had erred in dismissing a former head football coach's FEHA action against the community college district for failure to exhaust the internal grievance procedures provided in the collective bargaining agreement between the union representing the coach and the district, procedures that culminated in an arbitration. The appellate court refused to give preclusive effect to a grievance procedure provided by a collective bargaining agreement, where the employee union exercised significant control over the process. (Id. at pp. 1085-1086.)

Both parties expend extensive pages arguing the merits of their defenses. The relevant underlying facts are extensive and the legal authority governing these defenses are complicated.

Further, while Ortega is relevant to the Court’s analysis, it is not necessarily dispositive. The court of appeal carefully noted the statutory grievance procedure provided by Education Code section 87610.1 was not at issue in Ortega: “Had Ortega pursued the relief provided for in the Education Code, Johnson and Page might well control the result, but he did not.” (Ortega, at p. 1085, fn. 8.) Thus, the extent to which Ortega controls the facts here depends on the specific procedures of Defendant’s grievance process and the extent to which the employee the opportunity to vigorously participate in the claim presentation and fact-finding process.

However, as argued in the reply, the purpose of the bifurcation motion is not to determine the merits of the defenses,[1] but to determine how to marshal the court’s limited judicial resources most efficiently for trial.

The general rule is that where both legal and equitable claims are present in the same action, the equitable claim may be tried by the court. (Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 665, 671.) Similarly, an equitable defense to a legal claim may be tried by the court sitting without a jury. (Estate of Fincher (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 343, 351.)

The affirmative defenses here would be dispositive to Plaintiff’s remaining underlying discrimination claims, if proven. If Defendant prevails on its affirmative defenses, then a jury trial – which is estimated to last up to three weeks and would include expert testimony – would be moot and unnecessary. Therefore, bifurcation promotes judicial economy and saves judicial resources.

Even if the defenses are ultimately unsuccessful, bifurcation would still promote judicial economy because the two trials would involve different underlying evidence that could confuse the jury. That is, the facts necessary to adjudicate these defenses are entirely different from the facts related to Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination based on her pregnancy.

[1] Moreover, the Court already considered the legal merits of these defenses on a previous summary judgment motion. That is, the Court considered these arguments and determined that it could not grant summary adjudication because “it is unclear from Plaintiff’s collective bargaining agreement that her FEHA claims could have been asserted as a defense in a disciplinary hearing.” (2/28/2019 Minute Order, p. 2.) Thus, the Court did not decide the issue on summary judgment, preserving it for trial.

Department 58