Judge: Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case: BC665977, Date: 2025-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC665977    Hearing Date: April 11, 2025    Dept: 58

Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki

Department 58

Hearing Date:             April 11, 2025

Case Name:                Serrano v. Citrus Community College District

Case No.:                    BC665977

Matter:                        Motion for Reconsideration, or, in the alternative, Motion for New Trial

Moving Party:             Defendant Citrus Community College District

Responding Party:      Plaintiff Crisanta Serrano

Tentative Ruling:      The motion for reconsideration is denied. The motion for new trial is denied.

            This is a case alleging employment discrimination. On June 22, 2017, Plaintiff Crisanta Serrano (Plaintiff) filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging causes of action for (1) FEHA discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, (2) FEHA harassment on the basis of pregnancy, (3) FEHA retaliation for complaining of discrimination and/or harassment on the basis of pregnancy, (4) FEHA discrimination on the basis of taking CFRA leave, (5) FEHA harassment on the basis of taking CFRA leave, (6) FEHA retaliation for taking CFRA leave, and (7) FEHA harassment on the basis of gender.

As of December 12, 2017, all causes of action other than the first, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action were dismissed pursuant to demurrer. All Defendants other than Citrus Community College District were also dismissed.

On February 28, 2019, the Court granted Defendant Citrus Community College District’s motion for summary adjudication as to the third cause of action. Only the first, fourth, and sixth causes of action remain.

On August 2, 2019, Defendant Citrus Community College filed a motion to bifurcate. Plaintiff opposed the motion. On August 26, 2019, the Court, before the Honorable John Doyle, denied the motion. The Court did not specify the reasons for why it denied the motion to bifurcate. Thereafter, Defendant Citrus Community College again moved to bifurcate. Plaintiff opposed the motion. The Court granted the motion.

On February 10, 2025, the Court – after trial on phase one – ruled on the bifurcated issue of claim and issue preclusion, and judicial exhaustion. The Court found in favor of Plaintiff on these affirmative defenses and set a phase two trial to adjudicate the merits of Plaintiff’s claims.

            On February 25, 2025, Defendant District moved for reconsideration of the Court’s February 10, 2025 order. In the alternative, Defendant District moved for a new trial under Code of Civil Procedure sections 597 and 657. Plaintiff opposed the motion.

            The motion for reconsideration is denied. The motion for a new trial is denied.

Discussion

On January 10, 2025, the Court held a bifurcated trial on the District’s affirmative defense of issue and claim preclusion, as well as judicial exhaustion. The Court rendered its ruling on February 10, 2025, in an order finding that Plaintiff’s claims were not barred based on these affirmative defenses and order the case to proceed to trial on the merits of Plaintiff’s FEHA claims.

Defendant District moves for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling of February 10, 2025, or in the alternative for an order for a new trial pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 597, 657 based upon the grounds that the Court’s February 10, 2025 decision was based upon error contrary to the law, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to justify the decision, and the decision is against the law.

Motion for Reconsideration:

            The District seeks relief for reconsideration based on the Court’s inherent authority.[1] Specifically, the District argues that the Court made an error in the law. (Mot., 4:24-26.)

A court may, on its own order, reconsider a prior interim order beyond the 10–day period if it is concerned that it was erroneous and can solicit briefing from the parties on the matter. (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108.) As our Supreme Court explained in Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, a trial court has inherent authority to reconsider its prior interim rulings on its own motion, even in the absence of new facts or law, if it determines a prior ruling was erroneous. (Id. at p. 1107.) Moreover, “it should not matter whether the ‘judge has an unprovoked flash of understanding in the middle of the night’ [citation] or acts in response to a party's suggestion. If a court believe ones of its prior interim orders was erroneous, it should be able to correct that error no matter how it came to acquire that belief.” (Id. at p. 1108.) “ ‘ “ ‘Miscarriage of justice results where a court is unable to correct its own perceived legal errors.’ ” ’ (Phillips v. Sprint PCS (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 758, 768.)

By way of background, Plaintiff Crisanta Serrano sued Defendant Citrus Community College District for alleged violations of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and other employment-related claims, asserting she was discriminated against and harassed due to pregnancy and caregiving responsibilities, and later wrongfully terminated. The District claimed her termination was due to absenteeism, tardiness, and inaccurate timesheets, supported by a disciplinary hearing under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). During the disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff Serrano was not represented by counsel and had limited participation in the hearing; the hearing officer upheld the termination but did not review or rule on any FEHA claims.

In the Court’s February 10, 2025 ruling, it found that Plaintiff Crisanta Serrano was not precluded from pursuing her statutory claims under FEHA, nor was she barred for failure to exhaust judicial remedies.

With respect to the claim and issue preclusion defense, the Court found that the District’s disciplinary hearing was not an arbitration, nor a judicial or quasi-judicial process. Moreover, the hearing officer did not have authority to hear or rule on FEHA claims, and no evidence was presented regarding discrimination or harassment.[2] Finally, the CBA did not “clearly and unmistakably” waive Plaintiff Serrano’s statutory rights under FEHA. Based on Camargo v. California Portland Cement Co. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 995 and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 36, the District’s procedure lacked the hallmarks of quasi-judicial adjudication and therefore did not carry res judicata or collateral estoppel effect with respect to Plaintiff’s claims.

            In moving for relief, Defendant argues that the Court erred. Specifically, the District argues that the this was a disciplinary hearing pursuant to the Education Code and Article 22 of the CBA elected to by the Plaintiff, which was not binding on the parties at the time of the hearing. “Nowhere in the Court’s decision does the Court cite any case law which holds that a voluntary disciplinary hearing elected to by the plaintiff which is not binding on the parties at the time of the hearing is subject to the holdings of Gardener-Denver and Camargo.” (Mot., 6:7-9.)

            Arguing that the disciplinary action was predicated upon and in fulfillment of the statutory requirements in the Education Code – not the CBA -- the District – as it did during phase one of trial – urges the Court to rely on Basurto v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 866. However, as the Court found during trial, Article 22 of the CBA governed the disciplinary procedure. (Trial Ex. 4, pp. 1-2.) The CBA’s reference to the Education Code does not transform the proceeding; rather, the authority for the CBA to control the procedure is specifically provided for by the Education Code, which says, in pertinent part, “The governing board of a community college district shall prescribe written rules and regulations governing the personnel management of the classified service.” (Ed. Code, § 88013, subd. (a).) As the opposition notes, “[n]one of the cases defendant cites – Johnson, Castillo, Basurto, Takahashi, and Schifando – involves a collective bargaining agreement, let alone a hearing procedure used by the parties pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.” (Opp., 12:2628.) Because the District does not dispute that the CBA did not “clearly and unmistakably” waive Plaintiff’s Serrano’s statutory right to litigate FEHA claims in court, there was no error with respect to Court’s ruling on this affirmative defense; that is, the proceeding under the CBA had no preclusive effect on either Plaintiff’s claims or issues.

With respect to the judicial exhaustion defense, the Court found that (1.) Plaintiff Serrano did not initiate the disciplinary process — the District did; and (2.) the hearing was conducted under the CBA, not a statutory or civil service system. Based on precedents like Ortega v. Contra Costa Community College Dist. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1073, exhaustion of judicial remedies is not required when the process arises from a collective bargaining agreement and is not quasi-judicial.

            In moving for reconsideration of this ruling, the District argues that Ortega is distinguishable from the facts here where the Union did not have control over the disciplinary proceeding. As such, the District argues that, once Plaintiff elected to proceed with the disciplinary proceeding, she was required to exhaust her judicial remedies with an administrative writ of mandate, citing Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074 and Page v. Los Angeles County Probation Dept. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1135.

            The authorities relied upon by the District are all cases the Court considered and rejected during Phase One of trial, and, in fact, Ortega specifically addressed and distinguished these authorities. The Court explained:

“The case before us presents an even stronger case than Ortega that the judicial exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable. The formal hearing process here was initiated by the District under the discipline provisions of the CBA; it was not initiated by Plaintiff at all, and certainly not under a civil service or statutory procedure. The hearing provisions of the District’s discipline process are not “quasi-judicial.”  Serrano had no counsel, she could not compel witnesses, discovery was nonexistent. The process was not a grievance procedure, or even an arbitration, but a process expressly part of the discipline procedure under the CBA. And nothing in that procedure required Serrano to file a writ of mandamus and prevail in order bring this action.”

            (Minute Order 12, [footnote omitted].)

            The District’s motion for reconsideration is denied.

Motion for a New Trial based on Code of Civil Procedure section 657 and 597:

            The District also moves for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 657. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant cannot obtain relief under this statute because the motion does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 659.

“The authority of a trial court in this state to grant a new trial is established and circumscribed by statute.” (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2007) 41 Cal.4th 624, 633; In re Marriage of Herr (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1465 [a trial court “has no inherent authority to order a new trial.”].) Section 657 sets forth seven grounds for such a motion, two of which were relied upon by Defendant: Subdivision (6) “Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decisions or the verdict or other decision is against law”; and subdivision (7) “Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application.”

 “California courts have consistently required strict compliance with section 657.” (Oakland Raiders, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 634.) “Substantial compliance with the statute is not sufficient.” (Ibid.)

In reply, Defendant argues that the motion was brought pursuant Code of Civil Procedure section 657, not Section 659. However, a motion brought pursuant to Section 657 must comply with the requirements of Section 659. (Code Civ. Proc., § 659; Smith v. Superior Court (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 434, 436.) Here, a motion for new trial cannot be made until all the issues in a bifurcated case have been determined. (Meyser v. American Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 933, 937; Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1591.)

Defendant also argues that the new trial motion was brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 597. (Reply 3:6-16.) However, Defendant’s reliance on Code of Civil Procedure section 597 does not create a separate ground by which to move for a new trial. Rather, this statute merely provides the procedure by which a party can move for a new trial where there is a bifurcation of the affirmative defense. (See e.g., Woodhouse v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 22, 25; see also Menchaca v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 117, 124 [“[W]here a trial is bifurcated, the resolution In favor of the plaintiff of either the existence of special defenses (Code Civ.Proc., § 597) or the issue of liability (Code Civ.Proc., § 598; Horton v. Jones, 26 Cal.App.3d 952, 103 Cal.Rptr. 399) is not a final judgment, and therefore may not be the subject of an appeal until all other issues have been decided. (See Crofoot v. Crofoot, 132 Cal.App.2d 794, 283 P.2d 283.) A contrary conclusion would defeat the purposes for bifurcation and the final judgment rule.”].)

In Woodhouse, the plaintiff sued a railroad for negligence. The defendants claimed the plaintiff's lawsuit was barred because the plaintiff's father had already sued them for the plaintiff's injuries and had settled his lawsuit. Pursuant to section 597, the trial court “proceeded to the trial of the special defenses before the trial of any other issue in the case” and “rendered an interlocutory judgment” concluding, among other things, that the release executed by the plaintiff's father “was not binding on [the] plaintiff.” (Woodhouse, supra, 112 Cal.App.2d at p. 23.) The defendants moved for a new trial and filed a notice of appeal from the interlocutory judgment. (Id. at p. 24.) The trial court dismissed the new trial motion “and vacated the interlocutory judgment on the ground it was not authorized by section 597 and was inadvertently entered.” (Ibid.) The defendants then appealed from the “interlocutory judgment” and the order dismissing their new trial motion and vacating the interlocutory judgment. (Ibid.)

On appeal, the Woodhouse court determined “[t]he various matters appealed from [we]re nonappealable” and dismissed the appeals. (Woodhouse, supra, 112 Cal.App.2d at p. 24.) The court explained, “When, as in the present case, the answer sets up special defenses not involving the merits of plaintiff's cause of action but constituting a bar to the prosecution thereof, and the decision of the court is in favor of the plaintiff, the action is in the same status it would have been had the special defenses not been pleaded,—and a judgment should not be rendered or entered. [Citation.] The action then proceeds to trial on the issues made by the complaint and the other defenses pleaded,—and, on their determination, a judgment is rendered and entered. [Citation.] In such event the decision of the court on the special defenses tried and all rulings on the trial of them are deemed excepted to and, by the express language of section 597, may be reviewed on motion for a new trial or upon an appeal from the judgment.” (Woodhouse, supra, 112 Cal.App.2d at p. 25.)

The court continued, “If, on the trial of special defenses only, the decision is in favor of the defendant pleading the same, the trial is at an end [citation]; a judgment is then entered for the defendant; and, on a motion for a new trial or upon appeal from the judgment, the decision on the special defenses and all rulings on the trial of them may be reviewed. (Ibid.)

Thus, as the opposition correctly notes, the motion for a new trial under either Code of Civil Procedure section 657 or 597 is premature.

In any case, as noted in the motion for reconsideration above, the motion is not well taken and fails on the merits.

Conclusion

The motion for reconsideration is denied. The motion for a new trial is denied.