Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case Number: BC690869, Date: 2023-10-17 Tentative Ruling

Responding Party: Defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC and Symes Cadillac, Inc. dba Land Rover Pasadena

Tentative Ruling: The Motion for Attorney’s Fees is granted in part for a total of $119,090 in attorney fees. The request for costs is granted in the reduced amount of $24,119.07.

This is an action under the Song-Beverly Act in which Armando De La Paz and Melissa Gomez (Plaintiffs) alleged defects in a 2013 Land Rover Range Rover (Vehicle). Plaintiffs sued Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC and Symes Cadillac, Inc., (Defendant or Jaguar) for breach of express and implied warranties.

Plaintiffs now move for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The parties settled this Song-Beverly matter except as to those issues.

Plaintiffs argue that, as the prevailing party, they are entitled to fees and costs under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). They seek lodestar attorneys’ fees of $148,887.50 ($61,672.50 + $87,215.00), plus a 1.5 multiplier – in the amount of $74,443.75 – and costs of $26,650.98 ($18,715.65 plus $7,935.33). The total requested in attorney fees and costs is $249,982.23.

Defendant filed an opposition arguing the amounts requested in fees and costs are unreasonable and excessive.

The Court grants the motion for attorneys’ fees in part. The request for costs is also granted in a reduced amount.

Plaintiffs’ objections to Defendant Jaguar’s evidence are ruled as follows: No. 2 is sustained, and Nos. 2, 3, are overruled, No. 4 is overruled as to “Using mail merge . . .”, and No. 5 is overruled.

A prevailing buyer in an action under Song-Beverly “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”¿¿(Civ. Code, § 1794,¿subd. (d).)

The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc.¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees “ ‘is not necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services according to [his] own notion or to the full extent claimed by [him].’ ” (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc.¿(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.)¿¿Therefore, if the “time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America¿(1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)¿¿

A court may “reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.”¿¿(Morris v. Hyundai Motor America¿(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)¿¿It is also appropriate to reduce an award based on inefficient or duplicative efforts. (Id.¿at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions of fairness. (Kerkeles¿v. City of San Jose¿(2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88,¿102.)¿¿Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc.¿(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)

Plaintiffs seek $61,672.50 in attorneys’ fees for Knight Law Group, LLP (Knight Law) and $87,215.00 in attorneys’ fees for Wirtz Law APC, plus a 1.5 multiplier enhancement, and costs of $26,650.98, for a total $249,982.23.

Defendant Jaguar does not dispute that Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties under the settlement agreement. Instead, Defendant argues the that hours incurred to litigate this routine, non-complex case that settled before trial is unreasonable. Defendant Jaguar argues that fees should be reduced to a total of $84,303, which represents a reasonable number of hours incurred based on the purported experience level of Plaintiffs’ attorneys and the nature of the litigation. Defendant Jaguar also argues the amount requested in costs should be taxed.

A calculation of attorneys’ fees for a Song-Beverly action¿begins with the “lodestar” approach, under which the Court fixes the lodestar¿at¿“the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”¿(Margolin v. Regional Planning Com.¿(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005.) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.)¿ “ ‘The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.’ ” (Id.¿at p. 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services¿provided.¿(Serrano v. Priest¿(1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49;¿PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

“[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's time.” (Fox v. Vice (2011) 563 U.S. 826, 838.)

Defendant Jaguar first argues that Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ hourly rates are unreasonable.

In assessing the reasonableness of hourly billing rates,¿“the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.”¿(569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.¿(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437; see¿Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 272 [“ ‘ “a reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors…[including] the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case” ’ ”].)¿

Here, Defendant Jaguar argues the rates sought are excessive for this standard lemon law case. Specifically, Defendant points to the hourly rates ranging from $550-$750 billed by the attorneys at Wirtz Law billing and hourly rates ranging from $250-$300 for their paralegals. (Wirtz Decl., ¶¶ 13-28.) Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ hourly rates should be limited to $350/hour maximum for attorneys and $150 for paralegals. Defendant cites Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 245-46 [“The court found the requested fee amount “was just not reasonable.”… The court decided that $350 “is a reasonable hourly rate for the services that were done.”] and Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24.

A limitation of $350 hourly rate for attorneys and $150 for paralegals is not appropriate given the Court’s experience with the hourly rates for attorneys in Los Angeles practicing in this field of litigation. However, Attorney Wirtz’s hourly rate of $750 is unreasonable for this type of litigation. The Court will reduce this rate to $575, which reduces the lodestar amount by $927.50.

The remaining hourly rates are reasonable. A review of the Kirnos Declaration and Wirtz Declaration in support of the motion for attorney’s fees – which contains the descriptions of each attorneys’ education and experience – supports finding Plaintiff’s attorneys’ hourly rates ranging from $225 to $575 were reasonable; the rates are supported by substantial evidence under the present circumstances. (Kirnos Decl., ¶¶ 22-44; Wirtz Decl., ¶¶ 13-29.) Based on the Court's familiarity with the current local market, and Plaintiffs’ evidence of the experience and skills of the various attorneys – Plaintiff's requested rates per hour are reasonable.

Defendant Jaguar also challenges the hours incurred, arguing that the amounts are excessive, duplicative, clerical in nature, and/or otherwise unreasonable.

Jaguar’s opposition challenges numerous specific billing entries.[1] (Reynolds Decl., Ex. A.) The Opposition specifically notes that “[r]eductions should be made for a significant number of entries where clerical or administrative work was performed by paralegals and even attorneys at inflated rates.” (Opp. 9:13-15.) Defendant takes a particular issue with fees incurred on “finalizing ” documents after s for filing and service after an attorney has drafted the document.

The Court will address these challenges by general categories. (Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 744 “A trial court is not required to state each charge it finds reasonable or unreasonable. A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case.”].)

First, in reviewing the billing records, there are numerous entries that suggest duplicative work was done as result of Plaintiffs utilizing thirty different individuals and two different law firms to litigate this simple lemon law case. (See Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38 [“In evaluating whether the attorney fee request is reasonable, the trial court should consider “ ‘whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended.”]; Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272 [finding that “simultaneous representation by multiple law firms posed substantial risks of task padding, over-conferencing, attorney stacking (multiple attendance by attorneys at the same court functions), and excessive research”].)[2] For example, the fees incurred in drafting the Motions in limine by two different timekeepers is duplicative and, therefore, unreasonable. (See e.g., Wirtz Decl., Ex. A [Entries 10/24/2018; see also Entry 5/2/19 [re: Motin in Limine No. 13]).) There are numerous other examples where the work was done by both sets of attorneys – which is a somewhat predictable result of the inefficiencies from retaining two law firms simultaneously. (See e.g., Kirnos Decl., Ex. A [Discovery Entries on 10/2018 generally] with Wirtz Decl., Ex. A [Discovery Entries on 10/2018 generally] [2/4/2019]; see also Kirnos Decl., Ex. A [Entry [2/4/2019], [Entry 12/28/2022] with Wirtz Decl., Ex. A [2/4/2019] [Entry 11/18/2019].) Fees for duplicative work will be reduced by $7,870.

Additionally, Defendant Jaguar contends that the billing entries contain numerous entries for excessive billing, especially given the high hourly rate charged by Plaintiffs’ attorneys. For example, Plaintiffs’ counsel charged an hourly rate of $550 to review what are standard motions in limine and draft an opposition. Similarly, 3.2 hours to prepare for a deposition given the attorney’s expertise (and hourly rate of $550) and based on limited deposition topics warrants a reduction. (Wirtz Decl., Ex. A [Entry 10/28/2019].) Defendant also notes that numerous entries contain vague descriptions that are inadequate to justify the hours sought for these tasks or appear to be unproductive. These entries include “communication with client,” “confer with trial counsel” without specifying the subject, “review client correspondence,” and “schedule short call.” There are also references to “review class action.” The Court reduces the fees claimed for what appear to be unnecessary and unreasonable billing by $12,500.

Lastly, Defendant Jaguar challenges numerous entries for clerical work. These tasks include such things as scheduling/calendaring. (Wirtz Decl., Ex. A [See 6/7/2023, 6/8/2023]). Some of the billing entries that Jaguar identifies as clerical are not clerical. However, these entries are often tasks that do not warrant the time incurred based on the skill of the legal professions conducting such tasks. That is, while the Court did not reduce the hourly rate of the attorneys (except for Attorney Wirtz) above, these higher hourly rates impose a greater expectation of the skill and experience by which these attorneys perform tasks such that rate should be reduced. The Court will reduce the number of hours incurred for overbilling by $8,500.

The Court will reduce the fees requested by Plaintiffs as follows: reducing the hourly rate of Attorney Wirtz by $927.50, reducing duplicative tasks by $7,870, excessive billing by $12,500, and tasks that are clerical in nature by $8,500.

Finally, Plaintiffs seek a 1.5 lodestar multiplier based on excellent result, the risk of taking on the case on contingency, and the substantial delay in payment of attorney fees.

Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

Although this matter was taken on contingency (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 8; Wirtz Decl., ¶¶ 14, 30), none of the other factors support the application of a multiplier. This was a garden variety Song-Beverly case; there were no novel or difficult questions presented. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 834.) Further, the¿contingent risks, skill, and difficulty¿Plaintiff’s attorneys¿assert are absorbed by¿their¿already high (albeit reasonable) hourly rates. (See¿Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California. Inc.¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 822.)

Finally, Defendant Jaguar challenges Plaintiffs’ memorandums of costs requesting a total of $26,650.98. Specifically, Defendant argues that Wirtz Law costs of $2,056.91 and Knight Law’s costs of $506.48, for a total of $2,563.39, in “travel” on the grounds that the law firms do not meet their burden of establishing reasonableness because it lacks any detail as to who traveled where, for what reason, how this expense was incurred, and why it was reasonable.

As a preliminary matter, only costs expressly identified as a non-recoverable costs cannot be recovered. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5, subd. (b).) All other costs are either expressly allowed or subject to the “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation” requirement. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5, subd. (c)(3); Rojas v. HSBC Card Services Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 860, 892 [“The statute also authorizes the trial court in its discretion to award or deny an item of costs not mentioned in this section.”]; Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651, 658.) This is true for travel costs as well. (Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 286, 312-313 [“[A]ttorney's fees for travel hours may be awarded if the court determines they were reasonably incurred [citations].”].)

In response, Plaintiffs suggests that Jaguar waived its right to challenge the costs because it did not follow the procedures for bringing a motion to tax costs in response to a memorandum of costs. The Memorandums of Costs was filed at the same time as the Motion for Attorney fees and Costs. (Mot., 12:9-21.) By seeking costs in both the memorandum of costs and Motion for attorney fees and costs, Defendant Jaguar could properly challenge the costs in response to the motion. That is, Jaguar’s challenge to the costs are properly raised in the Opposition to the Motion for Attorney’s fees and Costs.

In considering these costs, Plaintiffs’ reply evidence adequately substantiates Knight Law’s costs but only demonstrates that some of these costs are reasonably necessary to the litigation; the excessive parking fees and meal costs are not reasonable. (Devabose Reply Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. B.) There is no reply evidence to substantiate and justify the $2,056.91 in costs incurred by Wirtz Law and challenged by Defendant.

Thus, costs will be reduced by $475 for Knight Law and $2,056.91 for Wirtz Law, for a total of $24,119.07.

The motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in part. In sum, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees in the reduced total amount of $119,090, which is a reduction of the lodestar amount by $29,797.50. The request for costs is granted in the reduced amount of $24,119.07.

Defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC and Symes Cadillac, Inc. are ordered to pay to Plaintiffs’ counsel the sum of $143,209.07 ($119,090 + $24,119.07) for attorneys’ fees and costs. This amount shall be paid on or before November 17, 2023.

[1] In reply, Plaintiffs argue that Exhibit A violates California Rules of Court rules 3.1113(d), (g) and (h) because this chart impermissibly adds 35 pages of argument in the Reynolds Declaration. Although this argument is technically correct, the chart effectively responded to the numerous pages of billing entries submitted by Plaintiffs. Alternatively, these amounts would have required the court to sift through numerous entries without the benefit of the specific entries challenged. Jaguar’s opposition chart was helpful in identifying the numerous entries challenged based on the numerous entries submitted by Plaintiffs in their evidentiary exhibits.

[2] The Reply attempts to distinguish Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24 from the facts here. There are, of course, differences (such as the length of litigation), but the inherent inefficiencies from numerous timekeepers in a simple case exists in both.

	Reductions	Total
Original Lodestar Amount		$148,887.50
Reduce hourly rate for Attorney Wirtz	$927.50
Duplicative work	$7,870
Excessive billing	$12,500
Clerical work	$8,500
Reduced Lodestar Amount	$29,797.50	$119,090

Department 58