Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki, Case BC699287 2022-08-03 Tentative Ruling

Tentative Rulings on Defendant’s Motions in Limine

For an order precluding Plaintiff from arguing or mentioning, during voir dire, specific monetary damages purportedly sustained by Plaintiff.

Granted to the extent Plaintiff asks a question in voir dire similar to the following: “If we prove that Plaintiff suffered $1 million in damages, would you award him that amount?” Such a question would improperly ask a juror to commit to vote in a certain way and precondition jurors to a particular result. In voir dire, Plaintiff may not “argue” for a specific monetary amount.

But Plaintiff is not wholly precluded during voir dire from “mentioning” a specific monetary amount. Thus, the motion is Denied to the extent Plaintiff asks: “Assuming we establish Defendant’s liability, would you be able to return a verdict for $1 million?” Similarly permissible: “Would you require a higher standard of proof in order to return a verdict for $1 million.” Such questions appropriately probe a prospective juror’s bias or prejudice.

For an order precluding Plaintiff from mentioning or introducing evidence, argument, or testimony related to: accommodations for or issues arising from Plaintiff’s purported disability after April 20, 2016.

Denied. Such evidence is relevant to Plaintiff’s willingness and ability to complete tasks. Its probative value is not outweighed by any prejudice to Defendant.

For an order precluding Plaintiff from mentioning or introducing evidence, argument, or testimony regarding: the conversation Plaintiff purportedly overheard on which Clint Jones purportedly said to Bob Wheeler: “if you see a Middle Easter guy with a gun, just shoot him.”

Denied. This statement is not an assertion of fact offered for its truth and is thus not hearsay. What Plaintiff heard is not speculation. It is probative on the issue of the environment of Plaintiff’s employment. The probative value outweighs any possible undue prejudice. If it was a “stray remark” it may still be considered by the factfinder. Evidence of racial or ethnic animus and stereotypes is relevant and an improper ground for a motion in limine. (Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4^th 87, 123.)

For an order precluding Plaintiff from mentioning or introducing evidence, argument, or testimony regarding: comments Mike Mingo purportedly made to Plaintiff about eating pork and Plaintiff not eating pork.

Denied. This statement is not an assertion of fact offered for its truth and is thus not hearsay. What Plaintiff heard is not speculation. It is probative on the issue of the environment of Plaintiff’s employment. The probative value outweighs any possible undue prejudice. If it was a “stray remark” it may still be considered by the factfinder. Evidence of religious or ethnic harassment or disparagement is relevant and an improper ground for a motion in limine. (Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4^th 87, 123.)

For an order precluding Plaintiff from mentioning or introducing evidence, argument, or testimony regarding: Bob wheeler’s purported comment to Plaintiff that he should be able to get a security clearance “unless you wear a Burka to work.”

Denied. This statement is not an assertion of fact offered for its truth and is thus not hearsay. It is probative on the issue of the environment of Plaintiff’s employment. The probative value outweighs any possible undue prejudice. If it was a “stray remark” it may still be considered by the factfinder. The time remark was uttered is not a ground for exclusion; it goes to the weight the factfinder may give it. Evidence of religious or ethnic animus and stereotypes is relevant and an improper ground for a motion in limine. (Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4^th 87, 123.)

For an order precluding Plaintiff from mentioning or introducing evidence, argument, or testimony regarding: Cecilia Harrison’s opinions about Bob Wheeler’s purported comments to Plaintiff that he would have no problem receiving a security clearance as long as he did not wear a Burka.

Denied. While evidence that Mr. Wheeler’s comment was actually said to Plaintiff is a predicate to Ms. Harrison’s opinion, this does not render her opinion inadmissible under Evidence Code section 702. Ms. Harrison’s opinion, based on her role as Plaintiff’s manager, is appropriate lay opinion and is not excludable under Evidence Code section 720. Her opinion is is not necessarily unduly prejudicial to Defendant. Indeed, it is a piece of evidence indicating that Defendant’ management did not countenance offensive and discriminatory behavior.

For an order precluding Plaintiff from mentioning or introducing evidence, argument, or testimony regarding: Cecilia Harrison’s opinion of Plaintiff’s job performance after May 2015.

Granted. Ms. Harrison may not opine on Plaintiff’s job performance after she ceased being her supervisor. She may opine on Plaintiff’s strengths and weaknesses as an employee in general based on her personal knowledge acquired during the time she worked for Defendant.

For an order precluding Plaintiff from mentioning or introducing evidence, argument, or testimony regarding: Clint Jones’s purported comments and/or conduct towards Laruen Nalepa.

Granted. Plaintiff has not filed opposition to this motion in limine. The Court agrees that such evidence would likely be more prejudicial than probative.

For an order precluding Plaintiff from mentioning or introducing evidence, argument, or testimony regarding: issues arising from Plaintiff’s move to Northern California.

Denied. This motion appears to conflate Plaintiff’s relocation and his alleged emotional distress. The cause of his emotional distress is a proper subject of direct and cross-examination. Defendant’s arguments go to the weight to give such evidence. The Court does not expect to allow parties to dwell on this testimony at length.

For an order precluding Plaintiff from mentioning or introducing evidence, argument, or testimony regarding: Plaintiff’s job performance from 2004 to 2012.

Denied. Defendant’s arguments on relevance and prejudice go to the weight of such evidence, not admissibility. The Court intends to follow Evidence Code section 765 regarding the control of testimony.

For an order precluding Plaintiff from mentioning or introducing evidence, argument, or testimony relating to: Frank Fatourechi regarding his employment with Raytheon, including any discrimination, retaliation, or harassment towards himself or other employees.

Denied. The evidence of another Iranian American employee of Raytheon who offers testimony of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation because of ethnic background is relevant to the issues of hostile work environment and intent to discriminate. The Court disagrees with Defendant’s reading of Pinter-Brown v. Regents of University of California (2020) 48 Cal.App.5^th 55. That case confirms the valid use of “me-too” evidence to establish intent or motive. The Court of Appeal found fault with the trial court allowing evidence of reports of discrimination campus-wide and university system-wide. The proffered testimony of Mr. Fatourechi, in contrast, is offered to show discrimination against someone within the protected class of Middle Eastern persons. Arguments about the similarities and differences in circumstances between this witness and Plaintiff go to the weight, not admissibility of the testimony. Defendant’s concerns can be addressed with a jury instruction that any “me-too” evidence cannot be used to show the Defendant’s propensity to harass.

Department 58