Judge Carolyn M. Caietti, Case Number: 37-2021-00032808-CU-PO-CTL, Date: 2024-05-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Carolyn M. Caietti, Case: 37-2021-00032808-CU-PO-CTL, Date: 2024-05-17 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

DEPT.:

EVENT DATE:

EVENT TIME:

HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - May 16, 2024

05/17/2024 10:30:00 AM C-70 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Carolyn Caietti

CASE NO.:

CASE CATEGORY:

EVENT TYPE:

CASE TITLE: CASE TYPE:

Civil - Unlimited PI/PD/WD - Other Motion Hearing (Civil) 37-2021-00032808-CU-PO-CTL T H VS COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

Defendant County of San Diego's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

Background Plaintiff's Complaint asserts one cause of action against the County. Plaintiff alleges, in 1988, the County placed Plaintiff in foster care in the custody of foster parents. The foster father and two foster brothers repeatedly sexually assaulted and abused Plaintiff, who was 7-8 years-old at the time.

Preliminary Matters The County's request for judicial notice is granted. (Evid. Code, §§ 452(c), (d).) Plaintiff's request for judicial notice is granted. (Evid. Code, §§ 452(c), (d).) However, with regard to the orders and tentative rulings from other trial courts, notice is taken of their existence only as trial courts are not bound by unpublished California superior court rulings. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.1115; Rittman v. Public Utilities Com. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1018, 1043, fn. 18 [disregarding citations to unpublished orders in a case before another division of the court and in two superior court cases and finding them to be 'patently improper'].) Discussion A motion for judgment on the pleadings serves the function of a demurrer, challenging only defects on the face of the complaint. (C.C.P., § 438.) Per C.C.P. section 438(c)(B)(ii), a defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.

(C.C.P., § 438(d); Civic Partners Stockton, LLC v. Youssefi (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1012–1013 (citations omitted).) The allegations are accepted as true. (Hardy v. America's Best Home Loans (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 795, 802.) Courts must construe the pleadings liberally. (C.C.P., § 452.) Courts may not resolve questions of witness credibility or evidentiary conflicts, but must deny the motion if there are material factual issues that require evidentiary resolution. (Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.) In this case, the County moves for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Plaintiff's Complaint is based on a Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

3106672 42 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: T H VS COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 37-2021-00032808-CU-PO-CTL constitutionally invalid statute and thus barred. More specifically, the County argues the Legislature violated the constitutional prohibition of gifting public funds when it amended Government Code section 905 to retroactively eliminate the claims presentation requirement for sexual abuse claims occurring prior to January 1, 2009 as part of AB 218. (Gov. Code, § 905(m) [All claims for money or damages against local public entities shall present a claim except for 'Claims made pursuant to [C.C.P. section 340.1] for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.'].) Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution states that the Legislature shall not 'have power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual.' The County cites to several cases upholding the constitutional prohibition on gifts of public funds. (See, (Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321; Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17; Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271.) These cases concerned legislation to: (i) appropriate a specific monetary amount; (ii) to compensate a particular individual or class of individuals; (iii) for harm suffered or services rendered in situations in which they would otherwise have no legal claim. (Bourn, supra [Legislature passed a law appropriating payment to a prison guard for a specific claim]; Conlin, supra [Legislature passed a law appropriating money to the plaintiff for recovery on a contract even though the plaintiff was otherwise not legally able to recover that money from the government]; Powell, supra [Legislature required jury fees to be paid to jurors who had served before the law was enacted].) The County's proffered case authority does not support its argument. These earliest cases are inapposite as they each involved legislation to appropriate a specific monetary amount to compensate a particular individual or class of individuals for harm suffered or services rendered in situations in which they would otherwise have no legal claim. In short, none of these cases stand for the proposition that revival of a case for which the claims presentation deadline has passed constitutes an unconstitutional appropriation of money or thing of value akin to a gift.

The changes made by AB 218 do not provide for specific money going to a specific individual or class.

Further, a means to revive stale claims is not a gift, appropriation of money or thing of value. Contrary to the County's argument and its reliance on Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450, AB 218 does not appropriate or award public funds. Rather, it revives previously time-barred civil claims, which still must be proven in court.

Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415 is instructive. There, the school district argued AB 218's revival of claims that were previously barred by the claim presentation requirement was an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it 'imposes liability and sanctions of a punitive nature for conduct that was not previously actionable.' (Coats, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 424.) The court first noted that '[l]egislation reviving the statute of limitations on civil law claims does not violate constitutional principles.' (Id., at pp. 425–428.) The court then noted the 'present case, of course, involves revival of a cause of action barred by a claim presentation requirement, not a statute of limitations. But we are aware of no reason the Legislature should be any less able to revive claims in this context, as it expressly did in Assembly Bill 218.' (Coats, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 428.) Notwithstanding, it is generally held that in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a 'public' or 'private' purpose; the benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited therefrom.' (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 745-46.) 'The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.' (Id. at p. 746.) Here, the Legislature clearly had a public purpose when enacting AB 218. First, the Legislature indicated as much in the Committee Notes. 'Childhood sexual abuse continues to ruin children lives and continues to shock the nature because, unfortunately, perpetrators continue to abuse, often with impunity, and sometimes with the help of third parties who either choose not to get involved or actively cover up the abuse...In an effort to allow more victims of childhood sexual assault to be compensated for their injuries Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

3106672 42 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: T H VS COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 37-2021-00032808-CU-PO-CTL and, to help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse, this bill extends the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault by 14 years, revives old claims for three years , and eliminates existing limitations for claims against public institutions.' (Plaintiff's RFJN No. 29 [Comments Section].) Second, as emphasized by the court in Coats, '[i]n Assembly Bill 218, the Legislature has again attempted to balance the competing concerns of protecting public entities from stale claims and allowing victims of childhood sexual abuse to seek compensation. This time, the Legislature came to a different conclusion, with an express revival provision for claims against public entities as well as those against private defendants.' (Coats, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 429.) Further, 'the Legislature has consistently worked to expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to seek compensation from the responsible parties, on several occasions in direct response to restrictive judicial opinions.' (Id., at p. 430.) The Court is not persuaded the Legislature's decision to revive certain claims is an 'appropriation' of money or thing of value that might constitute a 'gift' within the meaning of the California Constitution.

Even if persuaded the revival of claims was an appropriation, the Court would not find it is an un constitutional 'gift' within the meaning of the California Constitution. As noted above, the Legislature had a primarily public purpose in mind when enacting AB 218. Thus, the Legislature did not violate the prohibition of gifts of public funds and the cause of action against the County does not fail to state sufficient facts.

For these reasons, the motion is DENIED.

Concluding Orders If the tentative ruling is confirmed without modification, the minute order will be the Court's final order.

Defendant County of San Diego is ordered to serve written notice of the Court's final order by May 21, 2024.

At the hearing, the Court will discuss the County's upcoming motion to seal which is not on calendar, but noticed for May 31, 2024, concurrent with the Motion for Summary Judgment hearing.

The parties are reminded to comply with Department 70's Policies and Procedures and to provide courtesy copies of all motion paperwork. Plaintiff is also reminded to electronically bookmark exhibits as required under California Rules of Court, rules 2.256, 3.1110 and San Diego Superior Court Local Rule 2.1.4.1.

Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

3106672 42