Judge: Carolyn M. Caietti, Case: 37-2022-00025999-CU-PA-CTL, Date: 2024-05-03 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

DEPT.:

EVENT DATE:

EVENT TIME:

HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - May 02, 2024

05/03/2024  10:30:00 AM  C-70 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Carolyn Caietti

CASE NO.:

CASE CATEGORY:

EVENT TYPE:

CASE TITLE: CASE TYPE:

Civil - Unlimited  PI/PD/WD - Auto Demurrer / Motion to Strike 37-2022-00025999-CU-PA-CTL CAMPOS VS COBIAN [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

Defendant Francisco Cobian's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is DENIED.

A motion to strike a complaint in whole or in part is governed by C.C.P. sections 435 through 437. C.C.P.

section 436(b), provides that '[t]he court may, upon a motion ... [s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.' The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or matter subject to judicial notice. (C.C.P., § 437(a).) In ruling on a motion to strike, courts must assume the truth of the complaint's allegations and liberally construe the allegations with a view to substantial justice. (Dawes v. Sup. Ct. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 91 & C.C.P., § 452.) A pleading that fails to adequately allege facts supporting a claim for punitive damages is subject to a motion to strike. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 164.) To recover punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead specific facts demonstrating malice, oppression or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294(a).) Malice, oppression and fraud are defined at Civil Code section 3294(c)(1)-(3).

To allege malice in a drunk driving case, a plaintiff must plead facts indicating defendant, 'willfully consume[d] alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed.' (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894; see also, Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88 (order striking punitive damages allegations reversed where, among other things, defendant allegedly ran a stop sign and zigzagged in and out of traffic at a speed in excess of 65 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone while intoxicated); Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1336 (reasoning evidence of a prior arrest for drunk driving tended to show the defendant's awareness of the dangers of drunk driving for purposes of finding malice).) Here, the FAC sufficiently alleges the language from Taylor i.e., Defendant willfully consumed alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing he must operate a motor vehicle. (FAC, at ¶ 7.) Defendant's request to strike Plaintiff's demand for attorney fees is also denied. As alleged, C.C.P.

section 1021.4 authorizes an attorney fee award in favor of the prevailing plaintiff '[i]n an action for damages against a defendant based upon that defendant's commission of a felony offense for which that defendant has been convicted.' (See also, Corenbaum, supra, at p. 1339.) Here, the FAC sufficiently alleges Defendant was convicted of a felony violation of Vehicle Code section 23153(a) for the actions Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3050172  44 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  CAMPOS VS COBIAN [IMAGED]  37-2022-00025999-CU-PA-CTL causing Plaintiff's injuries.

Thus, the motion is DENIED.

Concluding Orders Defendant is ordered to file and serve an answer to the FAC by May 17, 2024.

If the tentative ruling is confirmed without modification, the minute order will be the Court's final ruling.

Defendant is ordered to serve written notice of the Court's final ruling on all appearing parties by May 7, 2024.

Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3050172  44