Judge: Carolyn M. Caietti, Case: 37-2023-00000281-CU-NP-CTL, Date: 2023-11-09 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - November 08, 2023

11/09/2023  10:30:00 AM  C-70 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Carolyn Caietti

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Civil - Unlimited  Non-PI/PD/WD tort - Other SLAPP / SLAPPback Motion Hearing 37-2023-00000281-CU-NP-CTL THAKORE VS BOND [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Motion to Strike, 01/26/2023

Defendants Jared Bond and Tarun Shah's Special Motion to Strike is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

Defendants Jared Bond and Tarun Shah's Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AND MOOT IN PART.

Special Motion to Strike Preliminary Matters Defendants' request for judicial notice Nos. 1-4 is granted and notice will be taken to the extent permitted. (Evid. Code, § 452(d).) See, Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882 ['while courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files.'].) Defendants' request for judicial notice No. 5 is granted and will be taken to the extent it is a news article.

(Evid. Code, § 452(h).) Plaintiffs' opposition objections to the request for judicial notice are overruled.

Defendants' reply objections to the Declaration of Pamela Chalk are overruled as to Nos. 5 and 6 (from 'The allegation...contradict what they have claimed in that case.'). Objection Nos. 1 (as to 'There was no reason why ...DMM employees'), 2 (as to 'there is no reason why Bond had to ... intimidation purposes'), 3, 4, 6 (after, 'I have to wonder...'), 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are sustained.

Defendants' reply objections to the Declaration of Ajay Thakore are overruled as to No. 5. Objection Nos. 1 (as to 'There was no reason why...'), 2 (as to 'so there is no reason why... intimidation purposes'), 3, 4 (except as to 'I observed Bond at Javier's sitting directly adjacent from the booth that is well0known as my reserved booth. I watched Bond during this encounter. He did not appear to be eating, drinking or conducting any business at Javier's'), 6, 7 (as to 'I believe...'), 8 (as to 'In February of 2022, Bond...intimidate me' and 'This was done to harass, scare, stalk and intimidate me'), 9 (as to 'I believe the purpose...settle anything'), 10 (as to 'I believe...contact to me') and 11 are sustained.

Defendants' reply objections to the Declaration of Pras Murthy: Objection Nos. 1 (as to 'There was no Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2994398  36 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  THAKORE VS BOND [IMAGED]  37-2023-00000281-CU-NP-CTL reason...'), 2 (as to 'so there is no reason... intimidation purposes.'), 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 (as to 'I believe this was done on purpose...') are sustained.

Defendants' reply objections to the Declaration of Tiana Luckett are overruled as to Nos. 3 and 5.

Objections Nos. 1 (as to ' There was no reason...like me'), 2 (as to 'so there is no reason...purposes') and 4 (as to 'stalked' and Rather, it appeared that his sole intention...like me') are sustained.

Defendants' reply objections to the Declaration of Shash Sigdel are overruled as to Nos. 3 and 5.

Objections Nos. 1 (as to 'There was no reason ...like me'), 2 (as to 'so there is no reason ...purposes'), 4 (as to 'stalked' and 'Rather, it appeared that his sole intention...like me') are sustained.

Defendants' reply objections to the Declaration of Ashley Mann are overruled as to Nos. 3 and 5.

Objections Nos. 1 (as to 'There was no reason ...like me'), 2 (as to 'so there is no reason ...purposes'), 4 (as to 'stalked' and 'Rather, it appeared that his sole intention...like me') and 6 are sustained.

Defendants' reply objections to the Declaration of Michael Chavez are overruled as to Nos. 3 and 5.

Objections Nos. 1 (as to 'There was no reason...like me'), 2 (as to 'so there is no reason... purposes') and 4 (as to 'stalked' and 'Rather, it appeared that his sole intention...like me') are sustained.

Defendants' reply objections to the Declaration of Kristin Yin are overruled as to Nos. 3 and 5.

Objections Nos. 1 (as to 'There was no reason...like me'), 2 (as to 'so there is no reason...purposes') and 4 (as to 'stalked' and 'Rather, it appeared that his sole intention...like me') are sustained.

Defendants' reply objections to the Declaration of Mary Kim are overruled as to Nos. 3 and 5. Objections Nos. 1 (as to 'There was no reason...like me'), 2 (as to 'so there is no reason...purposes') and 4 (as to 'stalked' and 'Rather, it appeared that his sole intention...like me') are sustained.

Discussion A special motion to strike involves a two-step process. (Sheley v. Harrop (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1161.) First, the defendant must establish the challenged claim arises from activity protected by C.C.P.

section 425.16. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) When a cause of action is 'mixed' by alleging both protected and unprotected activity, it may be subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage. (Id., at p. 396.) 'Analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion is not confined to evaluating whether an entire cause of action, as pleaded by the plaintiff, arises from protected activity or has merit.

Instead, courts should analyze each claim for relief - each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action - to determine whether the acts are protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the requisite degree of merit to survive the motion.' (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010.) If the court determines relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. (Ibid.) There, if the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. (Ibid.) Here, Defendants seek to strike Causes of Action Nos. 1-7 of the Complaint, or alternatively, paragraphs 20, 30, 31, 41, 42, 57, 58, 89, 90, 97, 98 and 101.

First Step Defendants maintain their conduct is protected under C.C.P. section 425.16(e)(2), (3) and (4). (Motion, at p. 2:21.) Defendants do not address or provide any analysis of how their conduct applies to C.C.P. section 425.16(e)(3), defining a qualifying act as 'any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2994398  36 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  THAKORE VS BOND [IMAGED]  37-2023-00000281-CU-NP-CTL to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest' or the 'catchall provision' of section 425.16(e)(4), protecting 'any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.' (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 149.) Thus, Defendants have not met their burden to the extent the motion is based on section 425.16(e)(3) or (e)(4).

At most, Defendants cite to C.C.P. section 425.16(e)(2), which states an 'act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue' includes 'any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.' (C.C.P., § 425.16(e)(2).) A separate showing of a public issue or an issue of public interest is not required as authorized official proceedings necessarily involve a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Bleavins v. Demarest (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1540, citing Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1117-21.) Defendants Have Not Met Their Burden as to Paragraphs 20, 30, 31, 41, 42, 57, 58 and 90 Paragraphs 30, 41, 57 and 90 do not allege 'any written or oral statement or writing...' as required by section 425.16(e)(2). The motion is DENIED as to these paragraphs.

Paragraph 20 alleges, in February 2022, Defendants, 'stalked harassed, threatened and tried to intimidate Thakore.' Paragraphs 31, 42 and 58 allege, in February 2022, Defendants 'made veiled threats' to Plaintiff, 'left him a harassing, creepy note' and showed him a tattoo of Plaintiff on his hand.

Defendants have not met their burden showing a tattoo to Plaintiff or making 'veiled threats' is a qualifying statement or writing in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body or other proceeding authorized by law.

Defendants also have not shown leaving Plaintiff the 'creepy note' was protected activity. Defendants maintain what Plaintiff refers to as a 'creepy note' was a settlement letter for the litigation Plaintiffs filed against them in federal court. (RFJN No. 2.) Although a defendant's burden on the first prong is not an onerous one, Defendants do not provide sufficient analysis of how this letter was made under consideration or review by a judicial body or other proceeding authorized by law. The alleged settlement letter objectively does not concern any litigation, settlement or issue under review. (Declaration of John David Pereira, at ¶ 3; Declaration of Tarun Shah, at ¶ 5 & Ex. 1; Declaration of Jared Bond, at ¶ 5.) Defendants also do not cite to specific portions of the letter attributed to litigation or settlement. In addition, Plaintiffs' evidence shows Defendant Bond acknowledged the letter did not make any settlement proposals regarding the lawsuit, nor requests it be dismissed. (See, ROA 38 – Declaration of Pamela Chalk, at Ex. 4, depo. p., 246:21-247:1.) Defendants Met Their Burden as to Paragraphs 89, 97, 98 and 101 Paragraph 89 alleges Defendants, through their counsel, engaged in acts to induce the breach of a settlement agreement between Plaintiff and other parties. Here, Defendants provide evidence counsel initiated conversation with Plaintiffs' opposing counsel in the separate legal matter (what the parties refer to as the 'Berger Parties'; see also RFJN No. 3) to gather evidence and information in connection with the lawsuit between these parties, qualifying the speech as protected conduct under C.C.P. section 425.16(e)(2). (Pereira Decl., at ¶ 5 & Ex. 2.) According to Defendants, they had no contact with the Berger Parties or their counsel, nor received information about the lawsuit from Attorney Berger or his clients. (Shah Decl., at ¶ 7; Bond Decl., at ¶ 7.) Thus, this alleged conduct is protected.

Paragraphs 97, 98 and 101 allege Defendants falsely stated and represented to third parties that Plaintiff DMM and its employees post fake online reviews about third parties and clients of DMM, that this practice was part of their job at DMM and DMM paid employees to post fake online reviews. Here, Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2994398  36 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  THAKORE VS BOND [IMAGED]  37-2023-00000281-CU-NP-CTL Defendants provide evidence they testified under oath at depositions related to the federal litigation between the parties that DMM and its employees post fake online reviews. (Pereira Decl., at ¶¶ 6-7 & Ex. 3; Shah Decl., at ¶ 8; Bond Decl., at ¶ 8.) Thus, this alleged conduct is protected.

Defendants do not otherwise further identify and assess how each cause of action should be stricken as a whole and do not address how the other allegations within each cause of action assert protected activity. Notably, Defendants do not identify any allegations in the fourth cause of action for stalking and fifth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Accordingly, paragraph 89 alleging Defendants engaged in acts to induce the breach of a settlement agreement, and paragraphs 97, 98 and 101 alleging Defendants defamed Plaintiffs by falsely stating DMM posted fake reviews require analysis under the second step.

Second Step The second step is a 'summary-judgment-like procedure.' (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) The burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. (Ibid.) The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. (Ibid.) Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. (Id. at p. 384-85.) The court accepts the plaintiff's evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant's showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 385.) If there is a conflict in the evidence (the existence of a disputed material fact), the motion should be denied. (See, Ovideo v. Windsor Twelve Properties, LLC (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 97, 112.) Claims with the requisite 'minimal merit' may proceed. (Ibid.) The second step burden of establishing a probability of prevailing is not high.

(Issa v. Applegate (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 689, 702.) The Intentional Interference with a Contractual Relation Cause of Action Must Be Struck Paragraph 89 concerns the sixth cause of action for intentional interference with a contractual relationship. This cause of action requires a plaintiff to prove: (1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant's knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant's intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage. (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1126; see also, CACI 2201.) In opposition, Plaintiffs provide evidence there was a settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and the Berger Parties and that Defendants' counsel reached out to the Berger Parties' counsel. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 6-10.) But there is no evidence Defendants specifically knew of the settlement agreement when their counsel reached out to the Berger Parties' counsel (or knew of it thereafter) and that their reaching out to counsel – or any of the communications with counsel - was designed to induce a breach or disruption of the settlement agreement. None of the exhibits provided by Plaintiffs show, 'Defendants and their counsel were aware of the settlement agreement.' (Complaint, at ¶ 88.) In fact, Defendants' counsel's initiating email to the third parties' counsel, states, 'Wondered if it was possible to get a copy of the Complaint or any other 'record' that you feel might help my clients and which would not violate any settlement agreement your clients have.' (Ex. 8.) There is also no evidence the act of initiating the conversation was designed to induce a breach of the settlement agreement or disrupt the contractual relationship.

The litigation privilege also bars the cause of action. The 'litigation privilege' renders absolutely privileged communications that are (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action. (Civ. Code, § 47(b); Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) The litigation privilege applies to any publication required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even though the publication is made outside Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2994398  36 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  THAKORE VS BOND [IMAGED]  37-2023-00000281-CU-NP-CTL the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056, 1057 [If the challenged action falls within the litigation privilege, the trial court should grant an anti-SLAPP motion to strike].) Here, Defendants' counsel, on behalf of Defendants and litigants to the federal action involving Plaintiffs, sent an email to the Berger Parties' counsel in an effort to gather evidence and information for the federal lawsuit. Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, the litigation privilege is applicable in all tort actions other than malicious prosecution. (See, Silberg, supra, at p. 212; Knoell v. Petrovich (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 164, 169 (applying the litigation privilege to a case alleging interference with contractual relations). While Defendants bear the burden of proving any affirmative defense, including the litigation privilege, Plaintiffs retain the burden to show, under the second-step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, that they have the probability of prevailing on the merits of the claim. (Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 769.) Plaintiffs have not met their burden.

Thus, Plaintiffs have not met their second step burden on the sixth cause of action for intentional inference with contractual relationship. As this conduct serves as the only basis for liability, the Court will strike the entire cause of action.

The Defamation Cause of Action Must Be Struck Paragraphs 97, 98 and 101 concern defamation and Plaintiffs' allegation Defendants falsely stated to other parties that DMM engages in a practice of posting fake online reviews about third parties and clients of DMM and pays employees to do so.

Defamation is an injury to reputation, and the elements of a claim for defamation are: (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage. (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.) 'The general rule is that the words constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint.' (See, Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 888-95 (finding attaching an article to the complaint without identifying which statements in the article formed the basis of the libel claims was insufficient).) Publication is a necessary element of all defamation claims. (Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 45.) Here, first, there is no evidence of a publication. Plaintiffs maintain Defendants 'made false statements to a third party,' but none of the evidence cited in support discuss the 'statement' nor identifies the 'third party.' (Opp., at p. 15:15-22.) Plaintiffs generally cite to the declarations of Ashley Mann, Plaintiff Thakore and Pas Murthy without a specific cite to a paragraph number. None of these declarations show proof Defendants made statements to a third party. (See, Thakore Decl., at ¶ 8; Mann Decl., at ¶ 8; Pras, at ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs also point to American Pizza Manufacturing's (APM) Memorandum of Contentions of Fact and Law in its case against Plaintiffs and how the defendants in this case 'will testify' Plaintiffs paid employees to post fake and negative reviews. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 12.) This is not evidence or proof a statement was made.

Counsel's testimony 'this information was provided voluntarily and not at deposition or in response to a subpoena' is without any proof. (Chalk Decl., at ¶ 24.) In addition, Counsel's testimony '[t]he only way American Pizza Manufacturing or its counsel would have had copies of those checks is if Defendants voluntarily gave them to American Pizza Manufacturing or its counsel' (Chalk Decl., at ¶ 27) is wholly speculative and without foundation.

Second, Plaintiffs argue Defendants 'provided checks' without explaining how providing checks amounts to a publication. Publication, which may be written or oral, is defined as a communication to some third person who understands both the defamatory meaning of the statement and its application to the person to whom reference is made. (Ringler Associates Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co. (2000) 80 Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2994398  36 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  THAKORE VS BOND [IMAGED]  37-2023-00000281-CU-NP-CTL Cal.App.4th 1165, 1179.) There is no evidence of any communications. Notwithstanding, it is unclear from Defendant Shah's deposition testimony whether he provided the check to APM or whether it was a check written to him by DMM. (See, Plaintiffs' Ex. 5, at depo. p. 14:2-8.) Third, Plaintiffs do not make any factual distinction between the two defendants and what publication(s) Defendant Bond made versus what publication(s) Defendant Shah made.

Thus, Plaintiffs have not met their second step burden on the [seventh] cause of action for defamation.

As this conduct serves as the only basis for liability under this cause of action, the Court will strike the entire cause of action.

Conclusion Defendants did not meet their burden as to paragraphs 20, 30, 31, 41, 42, 57, 58 and 90 on the first step.

As to the remaining paragraphs at 89, 97, 98 and 101, Plaintiffs did not meet their burden on the second step.

For these reasons, the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

The Court strikes: - The sixth cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relationship.

- The seventh cause of action for defamation.

Paragraphs 20, 30, 31, 41, 42, 57 and 58 remain as plead.

Demurrer Preliminary Matters Defendants' request for judicial notice Nos. 1-3 is granted and notice will be taken to the extent permitted. (Evid. Code, § 452(d); but see, Lockley, supra.) Note, however, there are no attachments as referenced in the request. (ROA 12; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1306(c) ['A party requesting judicial notice under Evidence Code sections 452 or 453 must provide the court and each party with a copy of the material.'].) Plaintiffs' opposition objections are overruled.

Discussion A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no 'speaking demurrers'). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) The complaint must be liberally construed and given a reasonable interpretation, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140–141; see also, Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-12 [in ruling on demurrers, courts treat as being true 'not only the complaint's material factual allegations, but also facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged'].) The Complaint is Uncertain Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2994398  36 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  THAKORE VS BOND [IMAGED]  37-2023-00000281-CU-NP-CTL As a threshold matter, the Complaint is uncertain. (C.C.P., § 430.10(f).) Each cause of action is against both defendants. Some conduct is alleged against both defendants (see, Complaint, at ¶¶ 20-21) but other conduct is alleged against Defendant Bond alone (id., at ¶¶ 17, 22-25.) The causes of action as plead do not differentiate between the two defendants, making it confusing and precluding the defendants from reasonably determining what issues must be admitted or denied or what claims are directed against them. (Khoury v. Maly's of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) For this reason alone, the demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Notwithstanding, the Court will consider the arguments made to each cause of action.

First Cause of Action - Assault The demurrer to the first cause of action for assault is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiffs allege 'Defendants 'tried and/or did touch Thakore without permission and made veiled threats to him.

They also left him a harassing, creepy note as well as showing him a tattoo meant to signify Thakore...' (Complaint, at ¶ 31.) The Complaint is uncertain as to whether Defendants did or did not touch Thakore and which defendant did so. (C.C.P., § 430.10(f).) Further, mere words, however threatening, do not amount to assault. (Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1604; see also CACI 1301.) As a whole, there are no facts alleged showing an unlawful intent to inflict immediate injury on a person. (Id., at p. 1603-04.) Second Cause of Action – Battery The Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to constitute battery. Plaintiffs allege Defendants, 'began to harass Thakore. They touched Thakore without permission and made veiled threats to him.' (Complaint, at ¶ 42.) There are no facts describing how Defendants 'touched' Plaintiff or how they did so with the intent to harm or offend Plaintiff. (See, So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669; see also, CACI 1300.) A battery is a violation of an individual's interest in freedom from intentional, unlawful, harmful or offensive unconsented contacts with his person. (Rains v. Superior Court (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 933, 938.) There are no facts to show how Plaintiff's interests were violated. Thus, the demurrer to the second cause of action for battery is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Third Cause of Action – Harassment/Stalking The third cause of action fails to state sufficient facts. This cause of action is based on C.C.P. section 527.8, which states, 'Any employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer.' Here, as discussed above, there are insufficient facts of a 'touching.' There is also insufficient facts alleged of any employee suffering unlawful violence or a 'credible threat' of violence that has been 'carried out at the workplace.' At most, the conduct alleged to have taken place at DMM's office is that on November 15, 2022, Bond walked to the water fountain 10 feet from the DMM office and several employees saw him looking through DMM's glass doors. (Complaint, at ¶ 22.) He allegedly did the same thing the next day. (Id., at ¶ 23.) This does not show a credible threat of violence. All other alleged conduct, including liking Plaintiff's Instagram posts and appearing at a restaurant frequented by Plaintiff and DMM employees, was not alleged to have been 'carried out at the workplace.' Thus, the demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Fourth Cause of Action – Stalking Civil Code section 1708.7 creates a tort action for stalking. Several elements must be alleged and proved. (Civ. Code, § 1708.7(a)(1)-(3).) As pertinent here, Plaintiffs did not allege Defendants, as a part Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

2994398  36 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  THAKORE VS BOND [IMAGED]  37-2023-00000281-CU-NP-CTL of a specified pattern of conduct (see, id., at subd. (a)(1)), made a credible threat with either: '(i) the intent to place the plaintiff in reasonable fear for his or her safety, ..., or (ii) reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiff .... In addition, the plaintiff must have, on at least one occasion, clearly and definitively demanded that the defendant cease and abate his or her pattern of conduct and the defendant persisted in his or her pattern of conduct unless exigent circumstances make the plaintiff's communication of the demand impractical or unsafe. (Id., at subd. (a)(3)(A).) At most, Plaintiffs restate this section of Civil Code section 1708.7, but do not allege facts supporting it. (See, Complaint, at ¶ 71.) Thus, the demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Fifth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress The fifth cause of action is based on Defendants' alleged 'harassing' conduct. (Complaint, at ¶ 80.) As discussed above, the Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to constitute harassment, stalking, assault and battery. Similarly, the Complaint also does not allege Defendants engaged in 'extreme and outrageous conduct (conduct so extreme as to exceed all bounds of decency in a civilized community) with the intent to cause, or with reckless disregard to the probability of causing, emotional distress.' (Berry v. Frazier (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1273.) Thus, the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Sixth Cause of Action – Intentional Interference with Contractual Relationship The demurrer to the sixth cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations is MOOT in light of the ruling on Defendants' special motion to strike.

Seventh Cause of Action – Defamation The demurrer to the seventh (plead as sixth) cause of action for defamation is MOOT in light of the ruling on Defendants' special motion to strike.

Conclusion For these reasons, the demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART AND MOOT IN PART.

Concluding Orders The sixth and seventh causes of action are dismissed. Defendants are ordered to prepare and submit a proposed judgment in accordance with any applicable laws and rules.

Plaintiffs are ordered to file and serve an amended complaint consistent with this ruling by November 30, 2023.

If the tentative ruling is confirmed without modification, the minute order will be the Court's final ruling.

Defendants are ordered to serve written notice of the Court's final ruling on all appearing parties by November 14, 2023.

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