Judge: Carolyn M. Caietti, Case: 37-2023-00012782-CU-DF-CTL, Date: 2023-08-25 Tentative Ruling
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
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HALL OF JUSTICE
TENTATIVE RULINGS - August 24, 2023
08/25/2023  10:30:00 AM  C-70 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
JUDICIAL OFFICER:Carolyn Caietti
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Civil - Unlimited  Defamation SLAPP / SLAPPback Motion Hearing 37-2023-00012782-CU-DF-CTL ROSHELL VS GREER STEPHAN [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Motion for SLAPP, 06/06/2023
Defendant Grimm Vranjes Greer Stephan & Bridgman LLP's unopposed Special Motion to Strike is GRANTED.
Plaintiff's unopposed request for judicial notice is granted and notice will be taken to the extent permitted. (Evid. Code, § 452(d).) Discussion A special motion to strike involves a two-step process. (Sheley v. Harrop (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1161.) First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by C.C.P. section 425.16. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) Second, if the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. (Ibid.) As an initial matter, the form FAC does not contain any factual allegations. Defendant maintains causes of action for slander, libel and defamation are alleged, but the copy in the Court's record does not include these causes of action. Even if the Court assumes causes of action for slander, libel and defamation are alleged, the motion will be granted.
First Step A claim is subject to an anti-SLAPP motion if the claim arises from the defendant's act in furtherance of the defendant's federal or state constitutional right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue and the plaintiff has not established a probability of prevailing on the claim. (C.C.P. § 425.16(b)(1).) Plaintiff did not file an opposition to this motion. (See, ROA 40 – Defendant's Declaration of No Opposition.) By failing to oppose the motion, Plaintiff impliedly concedes the causes of action asserted in the FAC against Defendant arise from its exercise of acts in furtherance of its right of petition or free speech, which includes 'any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law. (C.C.P., § 425.16(e)(2); see also, Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 620 (requiring the communication to be in connection with an issue under consideration or review).) Specifically, the allegations (at least through the exhibits attached since no factual allegations are made) arise from communications made in court documents filed in litigation as evidence in support Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS
2982118  33 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  ROSHELL VS GREER STEPHAN [IMAGED]  37-2023-00012782-CU-DF-CTL of Defendant's client's effort to obtain an injunction against Plaintiff. (FAC, at Ex. B, D, E, F and G.) The remaining judicial proceeding documents do not appear to be authored by Defendant and instead relate to a separate proceeding of Soto v. Roshell. (Ex. H.) The statements made in the police report attached as Exhibit C also constitute petitioning activity. First, it does not contain statements by Defendant. Even if there were, reports of criminal activity to law enforcement are generally protected activity under section 425.16(e)(1) and (e)(2), as communications made in connection with an official proceeding authorized by law, so long as the reports are not admittedly false. (See Chabak v. Monroy (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1512 [complaints about abuse to investigative authorities arise from the right to petition the government and are protected]; but see Lefebvre v. Lefebvre (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 696, 705 [uncontested allegation of false criminal report made for purpose of gaining litigation advantage not protected].) There is no allegation, evidence or argument supporting how the police report is false.
Thus, Defendant established the first step of the analysis.
Second Step The second step is a 'summary-judgment-like procedure.' (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) The burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. (Ibid.) The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. (Ibid.) Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. (Id. at p. 384-85.) The court accepts the plaintiff's evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant's showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 385.) Claims with the requisite 'minimal merit' may proceed. (Ibid.) Here, Plaintiff failed to establish a probability they will prevail on the claims asserted against the Defendant. Plaintiff also has not contested the application of the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b). Thus, Plaintiff did not meet their burden on the second step, requiring the motion be granted.
Concluding Orders For these reasons, the special motion to strike is GRANTED. The Court strikes Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint against Defendant Grimm Vranjes Greer Stephan & Bridgman LLP.
Defendant Grimm Vranjes Greer Stephan & Bridgman LLP is ordered to: (i) prepare and submit a proposed judgment in accordance with any applicable laws and rules of court; and (ii) serve written notice of this ruling by August 29, 2023.
This ruling is dispositive of the First Amended Complaint and the case. All future dates are vacated.
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