Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 20STCV33064, Date: 2023-03-20 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 20STCV33064    Hearing Date: March 20, 2023    Dept: 28

Defendant William Russell Funt’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On August 31, 2020, Plaintiff Eliza Salehani (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Edward Chayet (“Chayet”) and William Russell Funt (“Funt”) for negligence.

On November 4, 2020, Chayet filed a general denial and a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendant Funt for indemnity, apportionment of fault and declaratory relief. On February 25, 2021, Funt filed an answer.

On February 10, 2021, Funt filed an answer. On February 25, 2021, Funt filed a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendant Chayet for comparative indemnity. On March 2, 2021, Chayet filed an answer.

On June 20, 2022, Funt filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on January 11, 2023. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to March 20, 2023. On December 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On January 4, 2023, Funt filed a reply.

Trial is scheduled for July 10, 2023. 

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Funt requests the Court grant summary judgment on the basis that these are no triable issue as to any material facts.

Plaintiff requests the Court deny the motion.

OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff’s Objections:

Sustained: 2, 3, 8,

Overruled: 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

The common-law duty supplements statutory driving regulations: “[A driver is] under a duty, both by statute and common law, to operate his vehicle without negligence so as to abstain from injuring any other person or his property.” (Bewley v. Riggs (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 188, 194.) “The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are ‘(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint arises out of a three-car accident that occurred on December 19, 2019. (UMF 1.) Funt was traveling northbound, while Plaintiff was driving southbound; Plaintiff’s vehicle collided with a vehicle being driven by Chayet, who had just pulled out from the entrance of a parking lot on the west side of the street. (UMF 2-3.) Funt alleges that the collision between Plaintiff and Chayet caused Plaintiff’s vehicle to be pushed into the northbound lane, resulting in a collision between Plaintiff and Funt. (UMF 4.) Plaintiff’s complaint specifically notes that the “force of the collision [between Plaintiff and Chayet] pushed Plaintiff’s vehicle into oncoming traffic, where she was hit on the passenger side by Funt, who had not been able to stop his vehicle before impacting with Plaintiff’s vehicle.” (UMF 6.)

At the time of the incident, Funt was driving within the speed limit, was not inattentive, was not driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, was not using his cellphone, and was overall not distracted. (UMF 8.) Funt alleges that he did not have time to react to Plaintiff’s car entering the northbound lane. (UMF 9.) Funt testified at his deposition that he did not believe he could have avoided the subject accident; Chayet similarly testified that he did not believe Funt was responsible for the accident based on his observations. (UMF 14.)

In order to find someone liable for a negligence-based tort, a Plaintiff must show that said party 1) had a duty to Plaintiff; 2) breached said duty; 3) that breach was a substantial factor that; 4) caused damages to Plaintiff. Funt alleges that he did not breach a duty to Plaintiff, as he was not driving negligently, but rather did not have the means to avoid the collision. Funt also argues that there is no evidence as to causation, citing case law that there must be evidence beyond speculation. However, Funt offered no actual evidence or explanation and has failed to meet his burden as to this argument.

Plaintiff’s opposition argues that Funt did have time to attempt to avoid the collision; between the initial impact and the second impact, Funt had approximately 5 seconds to avoid hitting Plaintiff’s vehicle. (PAMF 8.) Despite this, Plaintiff did not observe Funt attempting any evasive maneuvers, honking his horn or attempting to stop. (PAMF 8-11). Plaintiff cites to Guyton v. City of Los Angeles (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 354, 362-363, which held that a driver’s duty of care includes attempting to avoid a collision; Guyton’s court explicitly found that four seconds was sufficient time for a driver to alter his course and avoid a collision when there were additional factors, such as open lanes of traffic in which a driver could alter his course. Funt’s moving papers do not provide information as to whether he had other avenues to avoid the collision, instead simply relying on the testimony of Defendants to assert he had no other option.

The Court finds that there is a dispute as to material fact. Parties disagree on the circumstances surrounding the accident and whether the collision could have been avoided. The evidence is insufficient to establish Funt cannot be liable, as a matter of law. The Court denies the motion.

CONCLUSION

Defendant William Russell Funt’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

            Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.