Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 20STCV38746, Date: 2023-05-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV38746    Hearing Date: May 24, 2023    Dept: 28

Defendant Saul Garcia’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On October 8, 2020, Plaintiff Frank Sparks (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Saul Garcia (“Defendant”) for motor vehicle negligence.

On January 18, 2022, Defendant filed an answer.

On July 25, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on March 30, 2023. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to May 24, 2023.

Trial is scheduled for July 14, 2023.

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Defendant requests the Court grant summary judgment.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the

pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff was injured when he was involved in a motor vehicle collision with Defendant’s vehicle. (UMF 1-2.) Defendant’s vehicle was stolen prior to the collision and was being driven by an unknown thief at the time of the incident. (UMF 4.) Prior to the theft, the truck was properly parked and locked at Defendant’s employee’s home; the employee had permission to use the truck. (UMF 9-10.) The keys were in Defendant’s employee’s possession at the time of theft through the time of the incident. (UMF 18.) The thief did not have permission or authorization to drive the subject vehicle. (UMF 5-6.) The state of the vehicle upon recovery indicated that the thief entered and hotwired the vehicle with a screwdriver. (UMF 15.) Defendant only learned that his vehicle had been stolen when he saw a report about the collision on the evening news. (UMF 3.)

Defendant argues that Defendant did not have a duty to protect Plaintiff from the criminal acts of a third-party. An individual is generally not obligated to control the conduct of a third party absent a special relationship. Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 65. More specifically, the owner of a motor vehicle has no duty to a person “injured by a thief’s operation of a stolen vehicle absent ’special circumstances’ affecting the foreseeability of the theft and the

thief’s negligent operation of the vehicle. Hosking v. San Pedro Marine, Inc. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 98, 102. Special circumstances may include parking a vehicle in front of a school or leaving it in the charge of an intoxicated passenger. Richards at 66. There exists no special circumstance here that would make Defendant liable for the acts of the third-party thief. Defendant lent the subject vehicle to an employee, so the employee could perform work tasks. Defendant had an established policy that employees were mandated to keep vehicle keys on their person when not in use. (UMF 17.) Defendant’s employee abided by that policy and properly locked the truck; he took the keys into his home with him and kept those keys even after the theft. There are no special circumstances that indicate Defendant should have foreseen both the theft and the negligent operation of the vehicle. Therefore, Defendant had no duty to Plaintiff.

Based on the above, the Court grants summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Saul Garcia’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Moving Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.