Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 20STCV47957, Date: 2023-04-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV47957    Hearing Date: April 14, 2023    Dept: 28

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On December 16, 2020, Plaintiff Carmen Beatriz Rivera (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority dba Metro (“LACMTA”) and Joaquin Medina (“Medina”) for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence.

On October 1, 2021, LACMTA filed its answer and a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Patricia Sarmiento (“Sarmiento”) for comparative indemnity and apportionment of fault, total equitable indemnity, declaratory relief, and negligence and property damage.

On December 13, 2022, LACMTA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on March 2, 2023. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to April 14, 2023. On March 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On March 23, 2023, LACMTA filed a reply.

Trial is scheduled for May 3, 2023.

PARTY’S REQUESTS

LACMTA requests the Court grant the Motion for Summary Judgment as there is no dispute of material facts.

Plaintiff requests the Court deny the motion.

OBJECTIONS

LACMTA’s Objections:

Sustained: 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 – 18, 21, 22, 24-34

Overruled: 1, 3, 6, 12, 19, 20, 23

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To

establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

“In considering the evidence submitted by the parties, the trial court does not ‘weigh the plaintiff's evidence or inferences against the defendants’ as though it were sitting as the trier of fact.’ However, ‘it must nevertheless determine what any evidence or inference could show or imply to a reasonable trier of fact.... In so doing, it does not decide on any finding of its own, but simply decides what finding such a trier of fact could make for itself.’ Where the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence, if any evidence or inference presented or drawn by the plaintiff shows or implies that the elements of the cause of action were more likely than not satisfied, summary judgment must be denied, because a reasonable trier of fact could find for the plaintiff. Otherwise, there is no triable issue of material fact, and summary judgment should be granted. (Miller v. Fortune Commerical Corp. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 214, 220-221; citation omitted.)

‘The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are “(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” ’ ” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 309, 911 P.2d 496].)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that a LACMTA bus, operated by Medina, collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle, resulting in injury to Plaintiff. Prior to the collision, the LACMTA bus was traveling eastbound on 1st Street, while Plaintiff’s vehicle was traveling southbound on Spring Street. (UMF 3, 6.) The two collided in the intersection between the two streets, with both parties contending that they had the green light when they entered the intersection. (UMF 5.) At the time of the incident, the weather was clear, it was light outside and the road way dry. (UMF 4.)

Both the cause of action for negligence and motor vehicle are based in negligence. Negligence has four elements: duty, breach, causation and damages. LACMTA argues that there is no breach of duty or causation, as the LACMTA bus did not run the red light, resulting in the collision.

In support of this, LACMTA presented the Court with photos and videos from the subject bus on the day of the incident. The photographs, Ex. B and Ex. C, show that the

eastbound/westbound traffic along 1st Street had a green light from 3:32:33 to 3:32:34. (UMF 5.) Ex. B also displays that the northbound/southbound traffic had a red light. (UMF 7.) The collision occurred at approximately 3:32:35, while the eastbound traffic light was still green. (UMF 10.) The eastbound light did not turn yellow until 3:32:55, approximately 20 seconds after the collision. (UMF 11.)

LACMTA has shown that, at all times relevant to this incident, the LACMTA bus had a green light and the right of way. (UMF 12.) LACMTA did not breach any duty by entering the subject intersection, and no breach of duty led to the collision. LACMTA has met its burden, which now shifts to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s opposition is based on the allegedly “high duty imposed on common carriers by California Code of Civil Procedure 2100 et. seq.” Plaintiff does not cite to any particular code, but does cite to CACI 920, a set of jury instructions that discuss a common carriers’ duty of safety towards their passengers. (Acosta v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 19, 27.) This duty of care only to a common carriers’ passengers. Plaintiff was not a passenger, but rather another driver, and thus this duty is irrelevant to the litigation.

Plaintiff further argues that the, even had the LACMTA driver had the right of way, the heightened duty of care imposes an obligation to look-out for speeding vehicles that are running red lights. This is based on the fact that the incident occurred in Los Angeles, where it is “not unusual, nor unexpected for vehicles to run the light.” No evidence is offered in support of that assertion. As discussed previously, the common carrier duty is only to a common carrier’s passengers, and thus is irrelevant.

Plaintiff’s only offered evidence in support of finding a dispute of material fact is Plaintiff’s declaration, in which she states that she entered the intersection when the light was green for southbound traffic. (Plaintiff’s Decl. ¶ 5.) She argues that the bus operator had a duty to allow her to pass through the intersection prior to driving through. Plaintiff offers no evidentiary support for this statement, merely asserting it as such in her declaration. However, there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s declaration contradicts any earlier deposition testimony or declaration from Plaintiff, which is generally the standard for a Court to conclude there is no substantial evidence of the existence of triable fact. (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21-22.) Therefore, the Court finds there is a dispute of material fact, as Plaintiff’s consistent recollection has been that she entered the intersection when the light was green. If

Plaintiff had entered the intersection when the light was green and the LACMTA driver then continued into the intersection before she safely exited, a jury may find the LACMTA driver acted negligently. The Court denies the motion.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.