Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 21STCV18828, Date: 2023-04-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV18828    Hearing Date: April 7, 2023    Dept: 28

Defendant Manu Dhingra’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND

On May 19, 2021, Plaintiff Brianna Deutsch (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Manu Dhingra (“Defendant”) for negligence.

On July 29, 2021, Defendant filed an answer and a Cross-Complaint against Cross Defendants Britt Elizondo (“Britt”) and Rene Elizondo (“Rene”) for express indemnity, equitable indemnity, contribution, apportionment and declaratory relief. On February 2, 2022, Cross-Defendants filed an answer.

On July 29, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard April 7, 2023. On March 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On April 3, 2023, Defendant filed a reply.

Trial is currently scheduled for May 11, 2023.

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Defendant requests the Court grant summary judgment.

Plaintiff requests the Court deny summary judgment.

OBJECTIONS

Defendant’s Objections are SUSTAINED.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)  

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.)

A land possessor does not have a duty to warn an invitee of obvious dangers but does have a duty to warn about dangerous conditions known to the possessor and those that might have been found by exercise of ordinary care. (Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 20, 27.) Obvious dangerous are those that which that an invitee will perceive “that which would be obvious to him through the ordinary use of his senses.” Id. A land possessor is not liable for damages caused “by a minor, trivial, or insignificant defect in property.” (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal. App. 4th 922, 927.)

DISCUSSION

Judicial Notice

The Court takes judicial notice of the pleadings requested under Evidence Code § 452(d). The Court will not take judicial notice of any of the other requested documents, as it is both unnecessary and improper.

MSJ

Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff, as a visitor of tenant Cross-Defendants of the subject property, was injured when a glass shower door fell from its frame and struck Plaintiff’s foot. (SSUF 3-4.)

For a premises owner to be liable for injuries suffered due to a defective condition on the premises, the premises owner either must have actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. Generally, this means either the condition existed long enough that the owner should have discovered it, or that the owner was informed of the dangerous condition.

There is no indication that Defendant was on actual or constructive notice as to the subject condition. According to Britt’s deposition, Britt did not routinely use the subject shower, and, last she observed it, approximately 1 year prior, it had functioned correctly and did not appear to have any issues. (SSUF 28-31.) She lived there multiple years without any complaint regarding the shower. Other visitors used the shower without ever commenting on any issues with the shower—some using it only a few weeks prior to the incident. (SSUF 40.) Britt stated that if appears to be loose or “anything like that,” she would have contacted Defendant. (SSUF 20.) Britt is not aware if Defendant was on notice as to the condition, indicating she did not contact Defendant herself. (SSUF 21.) Parties have been unable to identify the cause of the fall, indicating there is no clearly visible defect. (SSUF 41, 44.)

All facts seem to indicate that any defect was not visible to a reasonable person; there is no constructive notice, even had Defendant been obligated to perform independent inspections of the property. Defendant was also never actually informed of any defect and thus was not on actual notice as to the condition.

Plaintiff argues that parties are unable to confirm the door was defective because Defendant discarded the shower door assembly prior to Plaintiff’s ability to inspect the shower door. Defendant allegedly discarded of the shower door after it shattered in September 2022 while being cleaned. Plaintiff’s expert thus was unable to inspect the shower door and opine on whether there was a defective condition that Defendant should have been aware of. He did, however, inspect pictures of the door and find that it is likely that the overheard frame had become compromised in some manner, allowing the rollers to detach from the frame. (UMF 76.) This is based on the obligation of a landlord to inspect for matters which would have been disclosed by a reasonable inspection, which exceeds what an average tenant would visible observe.. (Mora v. Baker Commodities, Inc. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 771, 781-782.) However, Mora specifically is focused upon the obligations of a commercial landowner. No good case law specifically has addressed a landowner's obligation to inspect the renewal of a residential lease, and it would be unreasonable to impose such a duty on a month-to-month tenancy, as this tenancy turned into at a certain point. There is no case law to support that a residential landlord has an obligation to inspect the premises of a renewing tenant without any report or indication of a potential hazard. There is no allegation that the lease as written did not require an inspection prior to renewal. The Court does not find there was a duty to inspect the property prior to renewal that would have resulted in Defendant being on notice as to a defective condition.

Thus, the only argument potentially available is that Defendant was aware of the subject condition prior to the start of Britt’s tenancy; Britt’s tenancy started over 2.5 year prior to the incident. As pointed out by Plaintiff, without the subject door, there is no way to establish that there was no condition that Defendant should have been on notice regarding; Plaintiff’s expert opined, based on pictures taken at the time of the first and second accidents, that it was likely the frame was compromised. However, there is no evidence as to when this damage occurred. Given the lack of evidence concerning the state of door beyond statements made by Britt due to Defendant’s disposal, the Court denies the motion. The evidence does not show that Defendant definitively was not on notice as to the subject condition, as a portion of the evidence was destroyed prior to examination and there is no evidence indicating when any potential damage occurred. In the absence of such evidence, the Court denies the motion.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Manu Dhingra’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

            Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.