Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 21STCV38673, Date: 2023-10-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV38673    Hearing Date: January 23, 2024    Dept: 14

Case Background

 

Plaintiffs allege that various LA Sheriff’s Deputies opened fire on them and their home during the execution of a search warrant, killing one of them. This case is brought by the relatives of the decedent, as successors in interest and administrators of his estate, as well as in their own capacities. Plaintiffs in this case were also present at the home when and where the incident occurred.

 

On March 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for (1) Civil Rights Violations, (2) Assault and Battery, (3) False Imprisonment, (4) Negligence, (5) Wrongful Death, and (6) Survival Action against Defendants County of Los Angeles (“County”), Noe Garcia, David Pantoja, Daisy Rosales, Michael McMorrow, Michael Lopez, Juan Bendezu, Adonay Molina, Leonel Mejia, Pedro Valencia, Daniel Rodriguez and DOES 10-20, 22-50.

 

On March 16, 2023, Defendants County, Noe Garcia, Daisy Rosales, Michael Lopez, Juan Bendezu, Adonay Molina, Leonel Mejia, Pedro Valencia, filed their joint Answer to the original Complaint.

 

            On April 21, 2023, Plaintiff Miguel Herrera voluntarily dismissed his claims, with prejudice.

 

On August 11, 2023, this court construed Defendants collective motion for summary adjudication as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which it granted with leave to amend.

 

            On August 25, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) for (1) Violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, (2) Assault, (3) Battery, (4) Negligence, (5) Wrongful Death – Negligence, and (6) Wrongful Death – Battery against Defendants County, Noe Garcia, David Pantoja, Daisy Rosales, Michael McMorrow, Michael Lopez, Juan Bendezu, Adonay Molina, Leonel Mejia, Pedro Valencia, Daniel Rodriguez and DOES 10-20, 22-50.

 

On October 18, 2023, this court sustained Defendants’ unopposed demurrer to the FAC with leave to amend.

 

On October 25, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) for (1)-(2) Violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, (3)-(4) Assault, (5)-(6) Battery, (7)-(8) Negligence, and (9) Wrongful Death against Defendants County, Noe Garcia, David Pantoja, Daisy Rosales, Michael McMorrow, Michael Lopez, Juan Bendezu, Adonay Molina, Leonel Mejia, Pedro Valencia, Daniel Rodriguez and DOES 10-20, 22-50.

 

The first, third, and fifth causes of action are asserted by Plaintiff Arthur Herrera (acting as administrator of the Estate of Samuel Herrera Jr.) against Defendants County, David Pantoja, Daisy Rosales, Michael McMorrow, Michael Lopez, Juan Bendezu, Adonay Molina, and Leonel Mejia.

 

The second, fourth, and sixth causes of action is asserted by Plaintiff Jesus Herrera against Defendants County and Noe Garcia.

 

The seventh cause of action is asserted by Plaintiff Arthur Herrera (acting as administrator of the Estate of Samuel Herrera Jr.) against Defendants County, David Pantoja, Daisy Rosales, Michael McMorrow, Michael Lopez, Juan Bendezu, Adonay Molina, Leonel Mejia, Pedro Valencia, and Daniel Rodriguez.

 

The eighth cause of action is asserted by Plaintiff Jesus Herrera against Defendants County, David Pantoja, Daisy Rosales, Michael McMorrow, Michael Lopez, Juan Bendezu, Adonay Molina, Leonel Mejia, Pedro Valencia, Daniel Rodriguez, and Noe Garcia.

 

The ninth cause of action is asserted by Plaintiffs Jayden Herrera, Samuel Herrera III, and Aylene Roman (acting as administrator of the Estate of Samuel Herrera Jr.) against Defendants County, David Pantoja, Daisy Rosales, Michael McMorrow, Michael Lopez, Juan Bendezu, Adonay Molina, Leonel Mejia, Pedro Valencia, and Daniel Rodriguez.

 

            Jury trial is currently set for May 20, 2024.

 

Instant Request

 

            Defendants County, Noe Garcia, David Pantoja, Daisy Rosales, Daniel Rodriguez, Michael McMorrow, Michael Lopez Juan Bendezu, Adonay Molina, Leonel Mejia, and Pedro Valencia, now demur to the TAC on the ground that it is uncertain and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action.

 

Decision

 

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.

 

The demurrer is OVERRULED.

 

Discussion

 

As an initial matter, Defense has improperly combined what should have been multiple separate demurrers. The notice of demurrer challenges the entire complaint on behalf of Defendants Pedro Valencia and Daniel Rodriguez, on the grounds of immunity. (Notice p. 2:5-8). The notice challenges the entire complaint on behalf of Defendant Noe Garcia on the grounds that nothing was properly pled against him. (Id. p. 2:9-10). And the notice challenges the third and fourth causes of action on behalf of all remaining defendants, on the grounds that those claims are not properly pled against anyone. (Id. p. 2:11-12).

 

The supporting memorandum at first abandons the challenge to the assault claim (Demurrer p. 2:10-11) and then revives the challenge (Demurrer p. 8:26-9:9). The court will address the argument below. However, when separate parties make separate arguments about separate causes of action, they should bring separate demurrers. In this one instance, the court will overlook the defect in the interest of moving the case forward.

 

Immunity

 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Pedro Valencia (“Valencia”) was the person in charge of gathering information in advance of the execution of the search warrant, and of the execution itself. (TAC ¶¶ 21-28). Plaintiffs contend that while Valencia did not fire his weapon at the scene (TAC ¶ 62) was negligent in obtaining information about the premises and who else was living there, and that this in turn would have led to different tactics and a different outcome. (SAC ¶¶ 63, 71). The only causes of action asserted against Defendant Valencia are for negligence.

 

The TAC claims that Defendant Daniel Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) was part of the team that executed the warrant but did not fire his weapon. (TAC ¶ 62). The only causes of action asserted against Defendant Rodriguez are for negligence.

 

            Government Code § 821.6 provides that:

 

“A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.”

 

This provision is intended to protect government employees from “claims of injury based on tortious or wrongful prosecution.” See Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 921-922. The immunity is “narrow” and “applies only if the conduct that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s injuries was the institution or prosecution of an official proceeding.” Id. at 922.

 

            Defendants Valencia and Rodriguez argue that Section 821.6 should protect them here because they were conducting a police investigation, and police investigations are an essential precondition to the institution and prosecution of judicial proceedings. (Demurrer p. 3:17-24). However, in Leon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 923-924 and 929-931, the California Supreme Court clearly disapproved this argument. Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of his institution or prosecution of an official proceeding against them, they arise out of the execution of a warrant during the course of an investigation. As the Court itself said, “the two things are not the same and cannot plausibly be treated as though they were.” Leon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 923.

 

            Defendants Valencia and Rodriguez also rely on the case of Koussaya v. City of Stockton (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 909, which was not among the cases expressly disapproved by Leon. But Koussaya is different from this case in two significant ways: (1) it was decided at summary judgment, not demurrer, and (2) it did not involve Section 821.6, which is nowhere cited or discussed in the opinion.

 

            At this stage of the proceedings, the court cannot find that Section 821.6 immunizes Defendants Valencia and Rodriguez for the errors alleged in the complaint. While the court remains open to persuasion on an evidentiary motion such as summary adjudication, the clear language of Leon appears fatal to that defense.

 

Noe Garcia

 

            Defendant Noe Garcia (“Garcia”) argues that he cannot be held liable for shooting Plaintiff Jesus Herrera. He may be correct. But again, the issues he raises are factual questions, not suitable for resolution on demurrer.

 

            First, Defendant Garcia argues that his use of force was “objectively reasonable.” (Demurrer p. 7:1-3). That is a quintessential question of fact. The court cannot decide this issue at this point. Even the case on which Defendant Garcia chiefly relies, Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, was decided at summary judgment, not demurrer.

 

Assault

 

            Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot plead assault because they have also pled battery, and assault merges into battery. While the premise is true, the conclusion doesn’t follow. This is classic alternative pleading. Plaintiffs have pled that at eight individual defendants collectively fired no fewer than 40 shots. (TAC ¶ 62). It is not their contention that every defendant hit the mark. Plaintiffs will maintain the battery claims against the defendants who may be shown to have shot either Plaintiff Jesus Herrera or the decedent Samuel Herrera. They will maintain the assault claims against those who merely tried to shoot them.

 

Conclusion

 

            The parties have spent the last several months cleaning up the pleadings and focusing their theories. The work has been well done. It is now time to move on. At the present stage, it appears to the court that Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910 prevents the application of Government Code § 821.6 here. And the remainder of the issues raised by Defendants represent factual questions that require evidence to resolve. Therefore, the demurrer is OVERRULED.