Judge Cherol J. Nellon, Case Number: 22STCV17227, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 22STCV17227, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV17227 Hearing Date: November 7, 2024 Dept: 14

#12

Case Background

Landlord/Tenant case involving habitability issues and alleged improper lock-outs.

On May 25, 2022, Plaintiffs (or “Tenants”) filed their Complaint for (1)-(2) Breach of the Warranty of Habitability, (3) Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4, (4) Private Nuisance, (5) Unlawful Collection of Rent, (6) Failure to Pay Relocation Assistance, (7) Unfair Competition, (8) Negligence, (9) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, and (10) Violation of Civil Code § 789.3 against Defendants Karla Osorto (“Osorto” or “Landlord”) and DOES 1-50.

On July 20, 2022, Defendant Osorto filed her Answer.

On July 9, 2024, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in part.

On August 26, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC).

On September 30, 2024, Defendant filed a demurrer.

On October 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition.

Instant Pleading

Defendant demurs to the third, fourth, and eighth causes of action in the First Amended Complaint.

Decision

Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant is to ANSWER within 10 days of notice of the Court’s order.

Discussion

Defendant demurs to the third, fourth, and eighth causes of action on the grounds that the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to support them and that the FAC is uncertain.

1. Third Cause of Action – Violation of Civil Code, section 1942.4

Defendant first argues that the Complaint fails to state a cause of action for violation of Civ. Code, section 1942.4 because the defects in the notice of violation served on Defendant are not among the defects which would give rise to a cause of action under Civ. Code, section 1942.4. Defendant also argues the requests for attorney’s fees and costs under section 1942.4 should be stricken because the FAC fails to state a cause of action under that section.

Section 1942.4 states that a landlord may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit if (1) the dwelling is found to be uninhabitable under Civ. Code, section 1941.1, 17920.10, or 17920.3; (2) a public officer who is responsible for the enforcement of housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord of the landlord’s obligation to abate the nuisance or repair the conditions; (3) the conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice and the delay is without good cause; and, (4) the conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant.

Section 17920.3 provides various conditions which would constitute a substandard dwelling, including inadequate sanitation, improper fixtures, a lack of hot and cold running water, structural defects, and other defects pertaining to health and safety. Specifically, the section provides in relevant part that “any building or portion thereof…in which there exists any of the following listed conditions to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants thereof shall be deemed and hereby is declared to be a substandard building.” The section includes “all buildings or portions thereof occupied for living, sleeping, cooking, or dining purposes that were not designed or intended to be used for those occupancies” among the conditions which constitute a substandard dwelling. (Civ. Code, section 17920.3(n).)

Here, the FAC alleges that the subject property had been deemed and declared substandard due to illegal occupancy by the Los Angeles Building and Safety Department (LADBS). (FAC ¶¶10, 22.) Section 91.8902.14 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code defines Illegal Occupancy to include “all buildings or portions thereof occupied for living, sleeping, cooking, or dining purposes that were not designed or intended to be used for those occupancies.” (FAC ¶15.) The FAC now also alleges that the inspector who issued the notice of code violation in February 2022 determined that the building had “conditions to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety or welfare of the public or the occupants thereof.” (FAC ¶16.)

The new allegations in the FAC now state that an inspector found the subject property was a building which was used for living, sleeping, cooking, or dining despite not being designed for those occupancies. This is a condition enumerated under Civ. Code, section 17920.3(n). Additionally, the inspector found this condition existed to the extent that it endangered life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants, the same language included in 17920.3. It is reasonable to infer that the inspector found the building uninhabitable under Civ. Code, section 17920.3 because the language used in the notice includes a condition enumerated under that section and incorporates the exact language from that section. The FAC now adequately states that the inspector found the building uninhabitable under 17920.3.

Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED as to the third cause of action for violation of Civ. Code, section 1942.4.

2. Fourth Cause of Action – Nuisance

Defendant next alleges that the FAC fails to state a cause of action for nuisance because it fails to describe in detail how the interference caused any actual damage or significant harm.

“Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . is a nuisance.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 3479.)

“[T]he elements of an action for private nuisance [are, f]irst, the plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and enjoyment of its property. Second, the invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, i.e., it caused the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage. Third, the interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, it must also be unreasonable, i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land. [¶] Substantial damage and unreasonableness are to be judged by an objective standard.” (Today's IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1176.)

Whether the interference is substantial and unreasonable is a question of fact requiring determination of all the circumstances of the case. (See Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 263-64.) Where an action to enjoin a nuisance is based on the potential or possibility of future injury, at least some showing of the likelihood and magnitude of such an event must be made. (Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1213.)

Here, the FAC now alleges that the property had various defective conditions affecting habitability, including in relevant part, a lack of adequate heating and ventilation, a lack of fire and carbon monoxide alarms, defective electrical outlets, and a lack of safe and sanitary floor coverings. (FAC ¶¶14, 18.) As a result of these defects, Plaintiffs feared carbon monoxide poisoning, electrical fires from the defective electrical outlets, and tripping hazards from unsafe floor coverings. (FAC ¶25.) Additionally, Plaintiffs suffered a loss of sleep, discomfort, annoyance, and other conditions from the lack of ventilation and heating in their unit. (FAC ¶25.)

The allegations in the FAC now specifically states that the conditions in the subject property caused Plaintiffs to be fearful and physically uncomfortable. It is reasonable to infer that the conditions caused Plaintiffs actual damage because they suffered physical discomfort and lost their ability to enjoy the dwelling. Because the defects were so numerous, it is also reasonable to infer that the interference with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the property was unreasonable.

Although Defendant argues that the notice of violation only listed a single problem, that the property was a garage that had been illegally converted into a dwelling, this cause of action does not depend on findings from a public official. Aside from the violations in the LADBS notice, the FAC now also specifically alleges defects which existed on the property which interfered with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the property. Thus, the FAC adequately pleads a cause of action for nuisance.

Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED as to the fourth cause of action for nuisance.

3. Eighth Cause of Action – Negligence

Defendant finally demurs to the eighth cause of action for negligence. Defendant argues that the FAC fails to allege how the housing code violations cited by the LADBS led to Plaintiffs’ damages. However, the FAC also alleges that Defendant negligently and carelessly maintained and managed the subject property. (FAC ¶102.) As discussed above, the FAC alleges that conditions existed on the property which caused Plaintiffs fear and physical discomfort. Thus, the alleged negligent conduct encompasses more than just the code violations cited in the LADBS notice. The FAC adequately alleges how Defendant’s alleged negligent conduct led to Plaintiffs’ damages because it alleges the conditions on the property caused Plaintiffs fear and physical discomfort. The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the eighth cause of action for negligence.

Conclusion

Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant is to ANSWER within 10 days of notice of the Court’s order.