Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 22STCV39383, Date: 2024-04-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV39383    Hearing Date: April 2, 2024    Dept: 14

Loaiza v. Kaiser

Case Background

 

This is a medical malpractice case, though the exact nature of the alleged malpractice is unclear.

 

Complaint

 

On December 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Complaint for (1) Medical Malpractice and (2) Loss of Consortium against Defendants Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., Southern California Permanente Medical Group (collectively “Kaiser”), Excell Home Care Inc. (“Excell”), and DOES 1-100.

 

On July 28, 2023, Defendant Kaiser filed their Answer.

 

On September 22, 2023, Plaintiffs stipulated to arbitrate their claims against Defendant Kaiser.

 

On October 5, 2023, Defendant Excell filed their Answer.

 

Cross-Complaint

 

On October 5, 2023, Defendant Excell filed their Cross-Complaint for (1) Indemnification, (2)-(3) Declaratory Relief, (4) Contribution, and (5) Contractual Defense against Cross-Defendants Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and ROES 1-50.

 

On March 26, 2024, Cross-Complainant Excell voluntarily dismissed Cross-Defendant Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, without prejudice.

 

Trial Date

 

No trial date has yet been set.

 

Instant Motion

 

            Defendant Excell now moves this court for an order staying this case and compelling Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims, on the basis that the parties have entered into a binding arbitration agreement.

 

Decision

 

            The motion is DENIED.

 

Governing Standard

 

Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.2 states, in pertinent part, as follows:

 

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:

(a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or

(b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.

(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact . . . .

 

Code of Civil Procedure § 1295 states in part that:

 

(a) Any contract for medical services which contains a provision for arbitration of any dispute as to professional negligence of a health care provider shall have such provision as the first article of the contract and shall be expressed in the following language: “It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to whether any medical services rendered under this contract were unnecessary or unauthorized or were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will be determined by submission to arbitration as provided by California law, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process except as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings. Both parties to this contract, by entering into it, are giving up their constitutional right to have any such dispute decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead are accepting the use of arbitration.”

(b) Immediately before the signature line provided for the individual contracting for the medical services must appear the following in at least 10-point bold red type:

“NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT TRIAL. SEE ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CONTRACT.”

(e) Such a contract is not a contract of adhesion, nor unconscionable nor otherwise improper, where it complies with subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of this section.

 

California procedural rules govern the determination of a party's motion to compel arbitration, unless the parties clearly and unambiguously elect to use federal procedural rules or those of another state. See Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 C.4th 376, 394; Vivid Video, Inc. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 434; see also Peleg v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2012) 204 C.A.4th 1425, 1442. And even if the parties elect to use the rules of the Federal Arbitration Act, courts apply state law to determine whether the arbitration clause is binding and enforceable. McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 964. “Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co. (1960) 363 U.S. 574, 582. A party petitioning to compel arbitration has the burden of establishing the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate and the party opposing the petition has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to its defense. Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 356-57.

 

Discussion     

 

            It is undisputed that Plaintiff Alma Loaiza signed an agreement which states as follows:

 

“Governing Law and Arbitration. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California without reference to the conflict of law provisions thereof. Any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or related to this Agreement shall be resolved by binding arbitration by a single arbitrator in the County of Los Angeles, in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association then in effect. Judgment upon the arbitration award shall be final, binding and conclusive and may be entered in any court having jurisdiction. In agreeing to proceed by arbitration, each party waives and gives up any and all procedural and substantive rights otherwise available by law to file a civil action in the Superior Court of the State of California, or in any state or federal court; and neither party may bypass arbitration by filing a civil action in the Superior Court of the State of California, or in any state or federal court.” (Declaration of Nicole Fassonaki Exhibit A).

 

Plaintiffs argue that this contract does not comply with Section 1295(a)&(b), quoted above. They are correct.

 

            Defense argues on reply that the differences are “minor discrepancies” and that the agreement substantially complies. This is simply not accurate. The quoted text of the agreement does not remotely resemble the mandatory text set forth in Section 1295(a). Nor is it the first article of Plaintiff’s contract, as also required there. Finally, the contract makes no attempt at all to comply with the signature line requirements set forth in Section 1295(b).

 

Conclusion

 

            Because this agreement violates Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1295(a)-(b), it cannot be enforced. Therefore, the motion is DENIED.