Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 22STCV40991, Date: 2023-11-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV40991    Hearing Date: November 29, 2023    Dept: 14

Doe et al. v. Doe, et al.

Instant Motion

            Defendant Doe 4 now moves this court for an order quashing service of the summons and complaint on the grounds that the summons does not properly name them.

Decision

            The motion is DENIED. Defendant Doe 4 is to file a responsive pleading within 30 days.

Discussion

            Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1(i) requires that a plaintiff in a case of this nature cannot serve a defendant until they have followed the procedures laid out in Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1(g) and the court has made certain findings. Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1(l) further provides that a plaintiff must designate all defendants as “Doe” in all pleadings and papers until the plaintiff has followed the procedures laid out in Code of Civil Procedure §§ 340.1(m)-(n).

            It is undisputed that Plaintiffs in this case followed the procedures laid out in Subdivision 340.1(g), and this court made the requisite findings. It is also undisputed that Plaintiffs then served Defendant Doe 4 with a copy of the complaint and a summons notifying the recipient that they were being sued as Doe 4. Plaintiffs have not yet followed the procedures laid out in Code of Civil Procedure §§ 340.1(m)-(n), and therefore are expressly barred from designating Defendant Doe 4 by any other name.

            Code of Civil Procedure § 412.20(a)(2) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise required by statute” a summons must contain the names of the parties to the action. Defendant Doe 4 argues that, because a summons must contain the name of the Defendant, Plaintiffs cannot properly serve their summons until they can use the defendants’ true names. This would mean that Plaintiffs cannot properly serve a defendant until they follow both sets of statutory procedures contained in Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1. That is not the law.

            Defendant’s interpretation flies in the face of the structure of Section 340.1. Subdivision 340.1(i) expressly provides that not only the right but the “duty” to serve process attaches after the court finds that Plaintiffs have successfully met the first set of requirements. It makes no sense that there would then be another procedural hurdle before process could be served. The legislature clearly contemplated that defendants would be served, as Does, after Plaintiffs made their initial showing under Subdivision 340.1(g), and that litigation would then proceed anonymously unless and until Plaintiff could make the subsequent showing under Subdivisions 340.1(m)-(n).

            Coming at the problem from the other direction and assuming for a moment that Subdivision 412.20(a)(2) required the use of each party’s true name, that same subdivision expressly permits the serving party to make exceptions “as otherwise provided.” In Section 340.1, it is “otherwise provided.” And even if that exception did not exist, in a conflict between Section 412.20 and Section 340.1, the rules of statutory construction require that the court give precedence to the latter, as being the more specific statute. See Edais v. Superior Court (2023) 87 Cal.App.5^th 530, 542.

            Further, it is questionable whether Subdivision 412.20(a)(2) does indeed require that each party be identified by its “true” name. It is hardly unheard of that parties be permitted to proceed, and even sign sworn declarations, using pseudonyms, even without express statutory authorization like that contained in Section 340.1. See e.g. Doe v. Superior Court (Luster) (2011) 194 Cal.App.4^th 750; Doe v. Lincoln Unified School Dist. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4^th 758. The concern of the statute is not that everyone be named with absolute accuracy, it is that each party be sufficiently identified so that the person receiving the summons knows what is happening. See Lincoln Unified, supra, 188 Cal.App.4^th at 765-766; Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4^th 852, 857. The summons clearly indicates that the recipient is being sued as Doe 4, and must therefore defend itself against the allegations laid at the feet of Doe 4 in the operative complaint.

            Defense cites no authority in support of their position. They do refer the court to a minute order issued by Judge Yolanda Orozco, presiding in Department 31 over a different case. However, trial court minute orders are not citable, even as persuasive authority. See Budrow v. Dave & Buster’s of California, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4^th 875, 884-885. The court therefore declines to consider that order here.

Conclusion

            Subdivision 412.20(a)(2) does not require that the summons contain a party’s true name; case law makes clear that use of a pseudonym. And even were that not the case, Subdivision 412.20(a) contains an express exception for situations where a different statute prescribes a different procedure. This is one of those situations. Section 340.1 vests Plaintiffs with the right and duty to serve process after making an initial factual showing, but requires them to use Doe designations for all defendants unless and until Plaintiffs can make a second, different factual showing. This scheme clearly contemplates serving the defendants with process using the Doe designations.

            Therefore, the motion to quash is DENIED. Defendant Doe 4 is to file a responsive pleading within 30 days.