Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 23STC44389, Date: 2024-09-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STC44389 Hearing Date: September 24, 2024 Dept: 14
#10
Case Background
Plaintiff alleges that she was
raped by one of the doctors at the hospital where she worked. She further
alleges that when she reported the assault, she was transferred and her hours
were cut, while nothing at all happened to the doctor.
On December 22, 2021 Plaintiff
filed her Complaint for (1) Sexual Harassment, (2) Sexual Assault &
Battery, (3) Employment Discrimination, (4) Failure to Provide Reasonable
Accommodation, (5) Failure to Engage in a Timely Good Faith Interactive Process,
(6) Retaliation, (7) Failure to Prevent, (8) Defamation, and (9) Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) against Defendants White Memorial
Medical Center (“White Memorial”), Adventist Health California Medical Group,
Inc., Adventist Health Care Network, Inc., Adventist Health White Memorial,
Salman Khan (“Khan”); and DOES 1-80.
On July 26, 2023, the Court
granted White Memorial’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and struck
Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages because Plaintiff never filed a motion
for leave to bring a claim for punitive damages against it under Code Civ.
Proc., section 425.14.
On December 14, 2023, Plaintiff
filed a First Amended Complaint, which contains a demand for punitive damages.
On July 10, 2024, the Court granted
White Memorial’s motion for summary judgment in part.
On August 12, 2024, Defendant White
Memorial filed this motion for clarification of court order and for relief
under Code Civ. Proc., section 473.
On September 4, 2024, White
Memorial filed an opposition to the motion to amend the Complaint.
On September 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed an
opposition to the motion for clarification.
Instant Pleading
Plaintiff moves for leave to pursue her claim for
punitive damages against Defendant White Memorial.
Defendant White Memorial moves for clarification of the
Court’s July 10, 2024 motion granting summary judgment.
Decision
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to pursue her claim for
punitive damages against Defendant White Memorial is DENIED.
Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is stricken from
the FAC at the Court’s discretion under Code Civ. Proc., section 435.
Defendant White Memorial’s motion for clarification and
relief under Code Civ. Proc., section 473 is DENIED.
Discussion
1.
Motion for leave to make a claim for punitive damages
against a religious corporation.
Although styled as a motion for leave to amend the Complaint,
Plaintiff represents that there is nothing to amend and that she is merely
seeking leave of Court to pursue her claims for punitive damages against
Defendant White Memorial. The Court previously granted White Memorial’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings and struck the demand for punitive damages
because Plaintiff failed to file a motion under Code Civ. Proc., section 425.14
for leave to include a claim for punitive damages against a religious corporation.
By filing the FAC with a claim for punitive damages against White Memorial, a
religious corporation, Plaintiff again failed to file a motion under section
425.14. Plaintiff’s motion here is astern because the FAC has already been
filed. Nevertheless, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
make a claim for punitive damages under section 425.14.
A claim for punitive damages
against a religious corporation may not be included in a complaint or any other
pleading, unless a judge enters an order allowing an amended pleading to be
filed that includes such a claim. (Code Civ. Proc., section
425.14.) Such motion will be granted if the court finds, on the basis of
the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the plaintiff's evidence
meets the clear and convincing standard of proof under Civil Code section
3294. (Ibid.)
Civil
Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract
cases “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, section
3294(a).) Malice is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to
cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the
defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(1).) “[T]o establish malice, it is not
sufficient to show only that the defendant’s conduct was negligent, grossly
negligent or even reckless. There must be evidence that defendant acted
with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests
and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.” (Flyer’s Body
Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
1149, 1155.) Oppression is defined as “despicable” conduct that subjects
a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s
rights.” (Civ. Code, section 3294(c)(2).) Conduct is despicable
when it can be characterized as “so vile, base, contemptible, miserable,
wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by
ordinary decent people,” or “having the character of outrage frequently
associated with a crime.” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.) Whereas “malice” requires willful conduct,
“oppression” does not. (See Major v. Western Home Ins. Co. (2009)
169 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1225-1226.)
When ruling on a motion for leave per Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.14, the court need not make a factual determination or become
involved in any further weighing process beyond that necessarily involved in
deciding whether a prima facie case for punitive damages exists. (Rowe v. Superior Court (1993) 15
Cal.App.4th 1711, 1723 [“In making this judgment, the
trial court's consideration of the defendant's opposing affidavits does not
permit a weighing of them against the plaintiff's supporting evidence, but only
a determination that they do not, as a matter of law, defeat that evidence.”].)
“[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon
its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of
others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88
Cal.App.3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are legal entities which do not have
minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or
deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must
rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees. But the law does not
impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive
damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the
‘officer[s], director[s], or managing agent[s].’” (Cruz v. Home Base
(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [citation omitted].)
Here,
Plaintiff provides the following evidence in support of her claim for punitive
damages:
a.
Notes taken by an
investigator who interviewed witnesses who made complaints against Defendant
Khan (Exhibits 1-3, 5, 6.) The notes reflect that Khan yelled at and was rude
to other nurses.
b.
Transcripts from the
depositions of other nurses who corroborate that they made reports because Khan
yelled and was rude to them. (Exhibits 4, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15.)
c.
A record of incident reports.
(Exhibit 8.)
d.
The transcript of the
deposition of Jocelyn Cajanapo-Gantman, who testified that incident reports are
shared with managers in the employee health and nursing departments, with
clinical managers, and with risk managers. (Exh. 12.)
e.
The transcript of the
deposition of Rebecca Berberian, White Memorial’s Director of Risk Management.
Berberian oversees and reviews incident reports at the hospital. Berberian was
not involved in this matter because the medical staff office and human
resources took over after she received notification of Plaintiff’s incident
report. Berberian informed the Chief Operations Officer of Plaintiff’s incident
report. (Exh. 13.)
Plaintiff’s
evidence shows that other nurses made complaints about Khan related to his rude
behavior and that various managerial staff were aware of Plaintiff’s complaint
against Khan. The evidence is insufficient to show that White Memorial’s
officers, directors, or managing agents engaged in malicious conduct because
the evidence only shows that they were aware of Plaintiff’s complaint and other
complaints made about Khan.
Plaintiff
argues on reply that there is no such requirement that she must prove any
individuals named in her motion were directors or managing agents. However,
Plaintiff is required by Code Civ. Proc., section 425.14 to establish a prima
facie case for punitive damages against White Memorial. Because the imposition
of punitive damages against a corporate defendant must rest on the conduct of
its corporate leaders, Plaintiff was required to show that an officer,
director, or managing agent engaged in malicious or other qualifying conduct as
defined by Civ. Code, section 3294.
Because
there is no evidence that these managerial employees ratified Khan’s conduct, Plaintiff
fails to establish, with clear and convincing evidence, a prima facie case for
punitive damages against White Memorial as required by Code Civ. Proc., section 425.14.
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to include a claim for punitive
damages is DENIED because Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case for
punitive damages with clear and convincing evidence. The Court will act in its
discretion under Code Civ. Proc., section 436 to strike Plaintiff’s claim for
punitive damages from the FAC because it was improperly included without a
court order permitting the claim under section 425.14.
2.
Motion for Clarification
Defendant White Memorial moves for clarification of the
Court’s July 10, 2024 order granting summary judgment in part in favor of White
Memorial. Defendant argues clarification is warranted to confirm that the Court
did not find that White Memorial made a judicial admission or waiver with
respect to Defendant Khan’s employment or agency relationship with White
Memorial.
The Court’s July 10, 2024 order stated that there is a
triable issue of material fact as to Khan’s employment status and relationship
with Defendant White Memorial because Khan admitted to being an employee or
agent of White Memorial in a prior pleading. For this reason, the Court denied
White Memorial’s motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s first cause of
action. The order was not unclear or ambiguous and does not require
clarification. The Court declines to consider whether the statement made in a
previous pleading regarding Khan’s employment or agency status is a judicial
admission because there is no legal authority authorizing the Court to make
such a finding. White Memorial’s motion for clarification is DENIED.
Relief is not available under Code Civ. Proc., section 473
because that statute governs relief from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other
proceeding taken against the moving party. White Memorial moves for relief from
a portion of the Court’s analysis in an order partially granting summary
adjudication. The Court’s analysis is not a judgment, dismissal, order, or
proceeding taken against White Memorial. Therefore, White Memorial’s motion for
relief under section 473 is DENIED.
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to pursue her claim for
punitive damages against Defendant White Memorial is DENIED.
Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is stricken from
the FAC at the Court’s discretion under Code Civ. Proc., section 435.
Defendant White Memorial’s motion for clarification and
relief under Code Civ. Proc., section 473 is DENIED.