Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 23STCV00354, Date: 2023-10-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV00354 Hearing Date: October 12, 2023 Dept: 14
(1) Demurrer
Defendant Malle
now demurs to the Complaint on the grounds that it fails to state facts
sufficient to support any cause of action and is uncertain.
Decision
The
demurrer to the first, second, and fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED, with
10 days leave to amend.
The
demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.
First Cause of Action: Breach of Contract
“’A cause
of action for damages for breach of contract is comprised of the following
elements: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for
nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to
plaintiff.’ (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc.
(1990) 222 C.A.3d 1371, 1388).” Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 228.
“Further, the complaint must
indicate on its face whether the contract is written, oral, or implied by conduct. (Code
Civ.Proc., § 430.10, subd. (g).).” Otworth v. Southern Pac. Transportation
Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 458-459 (implicitly overruled on other
grounds as recognized by Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 401-402).
To plead a written contract, a
party must either (a) attach a copy of the contract to the complaint or (b)
plead all the material terms in a comprehensive and detailed manner. Heritage
Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 993.
Plaintiff pleads that the parties
had a support agreement. (FAC ¶ 11). She pleads that the agreement was “oral
and written.” (FAC ¶ 20). She does not attach or describe the writing, and
the rest of her pleading describes an implied contract, not an express one.
(FAC ¶¶ 14-18). Plaintiff has failed to properly identify what type of contract
existed between the parties in a way that would allow Defendant Malle to
intelligently respond.
Second Cause of Action: Breach of the Implied Covenant
Breach of
the implied covenant may be either a tort or a contract claim. See Careau
& Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d
1371, 1395. If it is pled in tort, it is a claim that the defendant
had an improper motive for breaching some express provision of the contract. If
it is pled in contract, it is a claim that the defendant did something was not (in and of itself) a violation of
their contract but which did prevent Plaintiff
from reaping the benefit of the contract.
To plead the claim as a tort,
Plaintiff must identify a legally recognized “special relationship” between the
parties. Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990)
222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1395. To plead
the claim in contract, Plaintiff must identify the conduct that frustrated the
purpose of the contract without breaching it. Id.
Plaintiff has not made clear whether
this claim is pled in tort or in contract. She has not identified a legally recognized
“special relationship” between herself and Defendant. Nor has she identified
any conduct which has deprived her of the benefit of the contract without breaching
the contract.
Third Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress
“The tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress is comprised
of three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the
intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional
distress; (2)
the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the
plaintiff's injuries were actually and proximately caused by the defendant's
outrageous conduct.” KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th
1023, 1028. Moreover, “[i]t is not enough that the conduct be intentional and
outrageous. It must be conduct directed
at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant
is aware.” Christensen v.
Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 (emphasis added).
The Defense
argument here is that Plaintiff’s claims of abuse are inconsistent with
Plaintiff’s claims of a lavish support arrangement, and that Plaintiff has
filed this action out of purely mercenary motives. These are classic factual
questions which cannot be resolved by the court at this stage.
Fourth Cause of Action: Ralph Act
Civil Code
§ 51.7, the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976, provides in relevant part as follows:
(b)(1) All persons within the
jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence, or
intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property
because of political affiliation, or on account of any characteristic listed or
defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51, or position in a labor
dispute, or because another person perceives them to have one or more of those
characteristics. The identification in this subdivision of particular bases of
discrimination is illustrative rather than restrictive.”
The Ralph Act is designed to punish hate crimes. The
elements of a Ralph Act claim are: (1) that defendant threatened or committed a
violent act against the plaintiff (2) motivated by their perception of
plaintiff’s membership in a protected category (3) causing harm to the
Plaintiff. Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 860, 880-881. The critical element of this claim is motive
or animus on the part of the defendant against the class of persons to which
the Plaintiff belongs. Id. at 881.
Plaintiff
has not clearly pled that Defendant’s motivation in his alleged abuse was an
animus against women.
Conclusion
Plaintiff
has not properly pled the type of contract she wishes to enforce. She has not specified
whether she wishes to plead breach of the implied covenant in tort or contract,
nor has she met the requirements to do either. Finally, she has failed to
properly allege that Defendant acted out of animus against a protected class.
Therefore, the
demurrer to the first, second, and fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED, with
10 days leave to amend.
(2) Motion to
Strike
Defendant
now moves this court for an order striking certain allegations from the second
cause of action in the complaint. Given the result above, the motion is TAKEN
OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT.