Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 23STCV03373, Date: 2023-05-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV03373    Hearing Date: May 18, 2023    Dept: 28

Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s Demurrer with Motion to Strike

Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On February 15, 2023, Plaintiff Jose Antonio Flores (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Lyft, Inc. (“Defendant”) for general negligence, negligent hiring, retention and supervision, common carrier negligent, negligent failure to warn, vicarious liability for assault with a deadly weapon, assault and battery, vicarious liability for false imprisonment, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, negligent infliction of emotional distress and breach of contract.

On April 24, 2023, Defendant filed a Demurrer with Motion to Strike to be heard on May 18, 2023.

Trial is scheduled for January 3, 2024.

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Defendant requests the Court sustain the demurrer as to the first, second, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth causes of action for failure to state a sufficient cause of action, and as they are unreasonable vague and uncertain.

Defendant also requests the Court strike the request for punitive damages.

LEGAL STANDARD

CCP § 430.10 states: “The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds: (a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading; (b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the

legal capacity to sue; (c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action; (d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties; (e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; (f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible; and (g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.”

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

“Negligence liability will be imposed on an employer if it ‘knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.” (Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139).

“The elements of fraud that will give rise to a tort action for deceit are: “ ‘(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.’ ” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 974.)

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” (CCP § 435(b)(1), italics added.) “A notice of motion to strike must be given within the time allowed to plead, and if a demurrer is interposed, concurrently therewith, and must be noticed for hearing and heard at the same time as the demurrer.” (CRC 3.1322(b), italic added.) “The defendant shall answer the amendments, or the complaint as amended, within 30 days after service thereof, or such other time as the court may direct, and judgment by default may be entered upon failure to answer, as in other cases.” (CCP § 471.5(a).)

“The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (CCP § 437(a).) The court looks to whether “the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Ivanoff, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th p. 725.) The court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.” (Id.) “The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code Section 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294 (a).) “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." (Coll. Hosp., Inc., supra, 8 Cal. 4th at 725 [examining Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)].)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that, while riding in a vehicle as a passenger through Defendant’s service, Defendant’s driver physically attacked Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was on notice as to some of Defendant’s drivers acting violently or harassing passengers. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant does not engage in sufficient background checks, nor does Defendant have any systems in place to ensure that Plaintiff was safe while riding in the vehicle.

Negligence Claims

A cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision and retention requires a Plaintiff plead that an employer knew or should have known that an employee created a particular risk or hazard. Plaintiff’s complaint makes a statement attesting that Defendant was on notice that some drivers were violent or harassed drivers but provides no facts to indicate that Defendant was on notice that this driver was potentially violent. Plaintiff’s complaint effectively posits that simply by hiring a driver, Defendant should have been on notice that the driver poses a particular risk or hazard, regardless of their experience or background. This is insufficient to meet the pleading

standard, as it must be a particular risk, tailored to the individual employee. Given the lack of factual allegations, Plaintiff failed to meet the pleading standards for this cause of action.

Similar issues arise with the negligent failure to warn claim. There are no allegations that Defendant should have been on notice that the subject driver was a risk. Without facts indicating that the driver was both a danger and Defendant should have known about said danger, Plaintiff has failed to plead a failure to warn cause of action.

Negligence requires a duty, breach, causation and damages. Plaintiffs clearly plead that Defendant has a duty based upon its duties as a transportation provider to its customers. Plaintiffs allege Defendant breached such duty in not taking proper steps to offset the risk of assault or attack from Defendant drivers on Defendant customers. Plaintiff identifies two major issues: the lack of sufficient background checks and lack of safety systems in the vehicle. However, Plaintiff does not actually argue how these alleged breaches of duty caused Plaintiff’s injuries. There is merely an allegation that “Defendant's [negligence] was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries.” The Court finds that this does not satisfy the pleading standards for this cause of action.

Negligent infliction of emotional distress also is improperly pled. As with negligence, there are no facts offered to show how the alleged breach of duty caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Additionally, the Court notes that negligent infliction of emotional distress is not considered to be a tort separate from negligence in California. Should Plaintiff choose to amend these claims, negligent infliction of emotional distress should be included in the cause of action for negligence.

Misrepresentation

A cause of action for misrepresentation, either negligent or intentional, requires a misrepresentation. Plaintiff’s complaint claims that Defendant made a misrepresentation that Defendant would provide Plaintiff with a safe ride to his destination. Plaintiff has not actually provided any facts in support of any representation made, much less a false one. The Court is unaware of what the alleged representation is, as Plaintiff offers no specifics. The Court sustains the demurrer as to the causes of action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation.

Breach of Contract

A claim for breach of contract requires that parties entered into a contract, that one party abided by the terms of the contract, while the other failed to act according to contract, resulting in damages to a plaintiff. Here, Plaintiff alleges that parties entered into a contract when Plaintiff entered into Defendant’s vehicle, in exchange for payment of a fee. Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not a party to the contract, as Plaintiff’s friend paid for the ride, and thus cannot bring such a claim. The Court disagrees, in part. A third party beneficiary is permitted to bring a cause of action for breach of contract if it is clear from the terms of the contract that a third-party is the intended beneficiary. Kalmanovitz v. Bitting (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 311, 314. However, Plaintiff’s complaint does not make it clear whether Plaintiff was an intended beneficiary. The Court sustains the demurrer to this cause of action, with leave to amend.

Motion to Strike

The Court finds the facts, as pled, do not give rise to punitive damages. Punitive damages require a showing of malice, oppression or fraud. Malice is either intent to cause injury to plaintiff OR despicable conduct which is carried on by defendant with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights of others. There are no allegations of intent to cause injury here, and there are no additional circumstances that give rise to ‘despicable conduct’. Generalized allegations of insufficient background check procedures do not rise to the level of despicable. The causes of action based in fraud are both subject to demurrer, and thus cannot lend to punitive damages. Finally, there is no indication of any allegations of oppression.

The Court strikes the request for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED, with 30 days leave to amend.

Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED, with 30 days leave to amend.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.