Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 23STCV18058, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV18058    Hearing Date: March 13, 2025    Dept: 14

#4

Case Background

This is a lemon law action.

On July 31, 2023, Plaintiff Riki Shafigi filed his Complaint against Defendant FCA US LLC.

On November 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement.

On February 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney fees.

On February 28, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition.

On March 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply.

Instant Pleading

Plaintiff moves for an award of attorney fees and costs.

Decision

Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED. The Court awards Plaintiff a reduced amount of $26,507.5 in attorney fees and $1,944 in costs.

Legal Standard

“In determining the amount of reasonable attorney fees to be awarded under a statutory attorney fees provision, the trial court begins by calculating the ‘lodestar’ amount…[t]he ‘lodestar’ is ‘the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.’ (Citation.) To determine the reasonable hourly rate, the court looks to the ‘hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.’ …Using the lodestar as the basis for the attorney fee award ‘anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of an attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.’” Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4^th 1379, 1393-1394.

“Some federal courts require that an attorney maintain and submit ‘contemporaneous, complete and standardized time records which accurately reflect the work done by each attorney’ in support of an application for attorney fees…[i]n California, an attorney need not submit contemporaneous time records in order to recover attorney fees…[t]estimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “[A]n award of attorney fees may be based on counsel's declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 1363, 1375.) “‘“[P]adding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.’” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4^th 550, 556.)

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.) The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services. The “ ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’ ” (Ibid.)” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4^th 1122, 1132.)

“[T]he contingent and deferred nature of the fee award in a civil rights or other case with statutory attorney fees requires that the fee be adjusted in some manner to reflect the fact that the fair market value of legal services provided on that basis is greater than the equivalent noncontingent hourly rate. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132–1133.) “ ‘A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.’” (Id. at p. 1133, quoting with approval from Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 473, 480.) The contingency adjustment may be made at the lodestar phase of the court's calculation or by applying a multiplier to the noncontingency lodestar calculation (but not both). (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1133–1134.)” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4^th 359, 394-395.)

Discussion

Plaintiff moves for attorney fees. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to fees as the prevailing party. The parties do not dispute costs. The parties dispute the reasonableness of the attorney fees requested.

Hourly Rate

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates should be reduced. Plaintiff requests an award of attorney fees for the work of two attorneys:

Defendant argues that the proposed hourly rates are too high compared to the rates recommended by the Real Rate Report, which states consumer goods litigation rates should be capped at $495 an hour. Plaintiff’s counsel Isaac Kohen testifies that he has 13 years of experience as an attorney. (Kohen Decl., ¶20.) Kohen has filed 500 lemon law actions since 2012. (Id., ¶15.) The associate on this case, Tamara Imber, has four years of experience as an attorney. (Id., ¶18.) Plaintiff retained his counsel on a contingency basis. (Id., ¶27.) Based on the Court’s experience and taking into account Counsels’ experience and contingency fee structure, the Court finds the proposed hourly rates are reasonable.

Unreasonable Entries

Defendant next disputes the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s counsel’s time entries:

1.     $3,412.50 (6.5 hours) billed by IK on 6/20/2023 in connection with research on National Highway Safety Transportation Administration’s (“NHTSA”) database “to review and analyze three hundred fifty-five (355) Technical Service Bulletins (“TSB”), and/or Engineering and Safety Investigations, six hundred nine (609) Customer Complaint…Review, analyze and summaries recalls/TSB relating to Vehicle…”

Defendant disputes this entry because it is unclear why such a large number of TSBs needed to be reviewed. However, it is reasonable that Plaintiffs’ counsel reviewed this information to determine whether Defendant was aware of defects in the subject vehicle. The time will not be taxed.

2.     $262.00 (0.5 hours) billed by IK on 9/7/2023 for review of FCA US’ Answer to the Complaint. Id. at page 2.

$262.00 (0.5 hours) billed by IK on 11/23/2023 for drafting “Plaintiff’s Case Management Statement.”

$787.5 (1.5 hours) billed on 10/29/2024 by IK in connection with review of unidentified “evidentiary documents in preparation of trial.” Id.

Defendant disputes these entries because the time is excessive. Additionally, the Answer was simple and identical to other answers filed in other cases. However, the time billed is already short and appears reasonable. The time will not be taxed.

3.     Total of $2,625.00 (5 hours) billed on 5/10/2024 by IK in connection with preparation of initial discovery requests propounded to FCA US.

Defendant disputes this entry because Defendant has propounded identical requests in other matters. However, it is reasonable that Plaintiff’s counsel chose to review the requests and prepare new responses for this case. The time will not be taxed.

4.     Defendant disputes time billed in preparing for this motion, arguing the time billed is excessive.

Total of $4,462.00 (8.5 hours) billed by IK on 2/4/2025-2/5/2025 to draft the Motion & supporting papers and for preparing the timesheets.

Total of $3,675.00 (7 hours) billed as “Estimated” time to review the Opposition, draft a reply brief, attend the hearing on the Motion and “Draft memorandum of Costs (if necessary).”

The Court agrees that the time billed here was excessive. This was a routine fee motion for a case which settled quickly. The Court will tax 10 hours from the time billed for the preparation this motion and the reply.

Multiplier

Plaintiff requests a multiplier of 1.1 on the fees. The factors for consideration in a multiplier are “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4^th at 1132.)

The award already takes into account the fact that Plaintiffs’ counsel worked on contingency, as required by Ketchum. (Id. at p. 1133.) The other factors do not call for a multiplier here. This was a simple lemon law case which settled quickly. It was not novel or difficult. No multiplier is appropriate here.

Total

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED. The Court awards Plaintiff a reduced amount of $26,507.5 in attorney fees and $1,944 in costs.