Judge Cherol J. Nellon, Case Number: 23STCV18738, Date: 2025-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 23STCV18738, Date: 2025-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV18738 Hearing Date: January 30, 2025 Dept: 14

#10

Case Background

This is an action for wrongful death, negligent supervision, breach of fiduciary duty, elder abuse, negligence, and violation of the residents’ bill of rights. Plaintiffs allege Decedent Kevin Marine died at Defendants’ nursing facility after he was stabbed by another nursing home resident, John Greystroke, who was allowed to leave the facility unsupervised and stole a knife.

On August 8, 2023, Plaintiffs Justine, Lisa, Patrick, and Kristi Marine, and the Estate of Kevin Anthony Marine filed their Complaint against Defendants Crenshaw Nursing Home, LLC (Crenshaw) and Longwood Management, LLC (Longwood).

On July 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this motion to compel Defendants’ further responses to form interrogatories.

On July 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC).

On October 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC).

On November 12, 2024, Defendants, Crenshaw Nursing Home, LLC, Longwood Management, LLC, and William Elliot (Moving Defendants) filed their demurrer and motion to strike.

On November 26, 2024, Defendant Southern California Healthcare System, Inc. (Hospital) filed its demurrer.

On December 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition.

On December 31, 2024, Moving Defendants filed a reply.

On January 14, 2024, Hospital filed a notice of bankruptcy petition and automatic stay.

Instant Pleading

Moving Defendants demur to and move to strike portions of the SAC.

Hospital demurs to the thirteenth cause of action for wrongful death.

Decision

Moving Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED. Moving Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED. Moving Defendants must file an answer within 15 days of this order.

Hospital’s demurrer is continued to March 17, 2025.

Judicial Notice

Plaintiffs request judicial notice of the original Complaint. The request is GRANTED.

Discussion

A. Demurrer filed by Defendant

Defendant filed a notice of stay of proceedings due to an automatic stay caused by its bankruptcy filing. The filing of a bankruptcy proceeding automatically stays all state and federal proceedings outside of the bankruptcy court against the debtor and the debtor’s property. (11 U.S.C., section 362(a).) Here, this matter is stayed until the automatic stay is lifted. The demurrer is continued to March 17, 2025.

B. Motions filed by Crenshaw Nursing Home, LLC, Longwood Management, LLC, and William Elliot

Moving Defendants demur to and move to strike Plaintiffs’ SAC on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to name an indispensable party, John Greystroke.

Code Civ. Proc., section 389 governs joinder of parties, and there are two types of parties to be joined: “necessary” and “indispensable”. Code Civ. Proc., section 389(a) sets forth the requirements for determining a necessary party: “A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impeded his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the person already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.”

A party found “necessary” pursuant to subdivision (a) may then be found “indispensable” pursuant to subdivision (b). (County of Imperial v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 13, 26. A determination that a party is necessary is the predicate for a determination of whether the party is indispensable. (Deltakeeper v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1100.

Code Civ. Proc., section 389(b) provides: “If a person as described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed without prejudice, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: (1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; (2) the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; (4) whether the plaintiff or crosscomplainant will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.”

A necessary party is regarded as indispensable if the court determines, in equity and good conscience, that the action must be dismissed in the party’s absence in light of, inter alia, whether a judgment rendered in the party’s absence will be adequate. (TG Oceanside, L.P. v. City of Oceanside (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1365-66.) The controlling test for whether a necessary party is also indispensable is whether “the plaintiff seeks some type of affirmative relief which, if granted, would injure or affect the interest of a third person not joined. (Save Our Bay v. San Diego United Port District (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 686, 692. In other words, a third party is indispensable if his or her rights must necessarily be affected by the judgment. (Id.) Each of the four factors in subdivision (b) must be considered, but “no factor is determinative or necessarily more persuasive than another.” (Imperial, supra, 152 Cal.App. 4th at 35.)

“Joinder is required only when the absentee's nonjoinder precludes the court from rendering complete justice among those already joined… the term complete relief refers only ‘to relief as between the persons already parties, and not as between a party and the absent person whose joinder is sought.” (Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 785, 787.)

Joint tortfeasors are not required to be joined in a case as necessary parties. (Countrywide, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at 797.) Joint tortfeasors may be necessary where the absent party emerges as an active participant in the allegations made in the complaint that are “‘critical to the disposition of the important issues in the litigation. (Dreamweaver Andalusians, LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1175.) However, the possibility that a joint tortfeasor may lose a subsequent suit for contribution against another joint tortfeasor is not the kind of liability contemplated by Code Civ. Proc., section 389(b) or its federal counterpart. (Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at 797.) Joint tortfeasors are protected from another tortfeasor’s absence in the original complaint because they are free to cross-complain against any unnamed joint tortfeasors. (Id.)

Here, the SAC alleges that when John Greystroke, the nursing home resident who stabbed Decedent, was admitted to Crenshaw’s facility, Crenshaw knew of his history of mental health issues and should have known that he was a danger to himself and others. (SAC ¶21.) The hospital that referred Greystroke to Crenshaw gave doctor’s orders to Crenshaw that Greystroke should be prescribed antipsychotic medication. (SAC ¶22.) Crenshaw’s staff failed to administer the medication. (Id.) In January 2023, Crenshaw’s staff accompanied Greystroke to a convenience store and failed to supervise him. (SAC ¶¶24-25.) Crenshaw staff failed to supervise Greystroke, who stole a knife from the store and later stabbed Decedent. (SAC ¶¶26-28.) Plaintiffs allege that Crenshaw failed to take appropriate steps to protect nursing home residents by failing to follow Greystroke’s care plan and recklessly allowing Greystroke to obtain the knife. (SAC ¶¶26, 33.)

There is no dispute that Greystroke is a necessary party because the parties agree that Greystroke stabbed Decedent and actively participated in causing Decedent’s death. However, as Plaintiffs point out, joint tortfeasors need not be joined in a case because the defendants already named in an action are free to seek contribution or indemnity against any unnamed joint tortfeasors via cross-complaint. Here, the Complaint alleges that Moving Defendants caused Decedent’s death by failing to protect Decedent from Greystroke. Because Moving Defendants and Greystroke are joint tortfeasors, the Court may award Decedent complete relief without Greystroke’s joinder. Moving Defendants and other parties named in this action would not be prejudiced by Greystroke’s absence because they are free to seek indemnity or contribution against Greystroke via cross-complaint. The remaining factors enumerated in Code Civ. Proc., section 389(b) do not weigh significantly in favor of or against a finding that Greystroke is an indispensable party. On balance, the factors weigh against a finding that Greystroke is an indispensable party.

Moving Defendants argue that Greystroke’s absence would result in an inadequate judgment or affect Greystroke’s interests. Moving Defendants reiterate these arguments in their reply. However, there is no authority to support the argument that Plaintiffs cannot obtain full relief from the joint tortfeasors already named in this action. Additionally, Greystroke’s rights are unaffected by this action because he has not been named. Should Moving Defendants seek indemnity or contribution against Greystroke, he is free to defend his interests then.

The factors thus weigh against a finding that Greystroke is an indispensable party. Moving Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED. Moving Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED.

Conclusion

Moving Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED. Moving Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED. Moving Defendants must file an answer within 15 days of this order.

Hospital’s demurrer is continued to March 17, 2025.