Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 23STCV2667, Date: 2024-03-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV2667    Hearing Date: March 7, 2024    Dept: 14

Baltzer v. Equity Residential Management

Case Background

Plaintiffs submitted an application to rent an apartment at a complex managed by Defendant. As part of the application process, they agreed to allow Defendant to run a credit check. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant used the information provided to perform a complete background and general character investigation, and that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with the results of the investigation, in violation of a state statute known as the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (“ICRAA”).

            On June 5, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for (1) Violations of ICRAA, (2) Invasion of Privacy, and (3) Declaratory Relief against Defendants Equity Residential Management, Inc. (“Equity Residential”) and DOES 1-10.

            On July 20, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an “Amendment to Complaint” substituting Defendant Transunion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc. (“Transunion”) in lieu of DOE 1.

            No trial date has yet been set.

(1)        Equity Residential Demurrer

            Defendant Equity Residential now demurs to the second and third causes of action, on the grounds that Plaintiffs have failed to state sufficient facts to support either claim.

Decision

            Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice, filed August 18, 2023, is DENIED. Trial court rulings in other cases are not relevant to the facts of this case and cannot be cited as precedent. See Budrow v. Dave & Buster’s of California, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4^th 875, 884-885.

            The demurrer is SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.

Second Cause of Action: Invasion of Privacy

            “The elements of a common law invasion of privacy claim are [1] intrusion into a private place, conversation, or matter, [2] in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Mezger v. Bick (2021) 66 Cal.App.5^th 76, 86.

            The first element is only satisfied if the defendant has intruded on a “legally recognized privacy interest.” Id. at 87. The presence of such an interest is a matter of law for the court to decide. Id. However, the second element presents “mixed questions” of law and fact. Id.

            Plaintiff has not attempted to meet or grapple with these elements. Only one paragraph in the complaint (No. 63) is devoted to this cause of action, and that paragraph simply repeats the charge that Defendants have violated ICRAA. The opposition argues simply that a violation of ICRAA, by definition, constitutes an actionable invasion of privacy. But even if the court accepted Plaintiff’s argument, the result is a wholly duplicative cause of action, and the claim would still be subject to challenge on demurrer. See Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135

Third Cause of Action: Declaratory Relief

            The analysis of a declaratory relief claim proceeds in two stages. First, the court must determine if the controversy presented is sufficiently ripe to present an actual controversy within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure § 1060. Artus v. Gramercy Towers Condominium Association (2018) 19 Cal.App.5^th 923, 930.  Second, the court must determine whether the actual controversy merits declaratory relief as necessary and proper under Section 1061. Id.

If no actual controversy exists, the inquiry is over and the second step is irrelevant. Communities for a Better Environment v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (2017) 19 Cal.App.5^th 725, 739 fn.8. If the controversy presented is ripe, then the court must decide, in its discretion, “[w]hether such actual controversy merits declaratory relief as necessary and proper (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061).” Steinberg v. Chiang (2014) 223 Cal.App.4^th 338, 343. Declaratory relief will not be necessary or proper when the rights of the complaining party have crystallized into a cause of action for past wrongs, all relationship between the parties has ceased and there is no conduct of the parties subject to regulation by the Court. Osseous Technologies of America v. Discovery Ortho Partners (2010) 191 Cal.App.4^th 357, 367.

            Plaintiffs’ claim on this point appears to be that there is an ongoing controversy because the violation is likely to happen again. In an analog of the “capable of repetition yet evading review” principle of federal standing, the Defendants require a renewal of leases and applications every year, but refuse to change their forms to comply with ICRAA. (Complaint ¶¶ 65-68). Plainitffs are seeking a “judicial declaration that runs with the land” to “prevent…continued violations.” (Complaint ¶ 68).

            What Plaintiffs want is not a declaration but an injunction. ICRAA is already painstakingly clear about the requirements to be followed. Declaratory relief exists to allow the court to settle disputed questions of legal interpretation, not as a means for the court to compel compliance with a law which is already clear. That is what injunctions are for. Of course, an injunction is not an independent cause of action as declaratory relief is. Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5^th 719, 734. An injunction must attach to some cause of action. The suggestion that such a request could attach to the ICRAA claim is discussed below.

Conclusion

            Plaintiffs have failed to properly plead a common law claim for invasion of privacy. And they have failed to plead a claim for declarative relief that gives the court a clear picture of what it is supposed to declare, or what controversy of legal interpretation it is being asked to resolve. Therefore, the demurrer to the second and third causes of action is SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.

(2)        Transunion Demurrer

            Defendant Transunion now demurs to the entire complaint on the grounds that Plaintiffs have failed to state sufficient facts to support any claim against them.

Decision

            The demurrer is SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.

Discussion

            Defendant Transunion was added to this case by way of a DOE Amendment. For that reason, the Complaint contains no allegations directed specifically against them, and no description of their alleged wrongdoing. They may fairly wonder what they are supposed to respond to. Plaintiffs should amend their complaint to describe the facts that bring Defendant Transunion into this case.

(3)        Equity Residential Motion to Strike

            Defendant Equity Residential now moves this court for orders striking Plaintiffs’ requests for punitive damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.

Decision

            The motion is DENIED.

Discussion

            Given the ruling on the demurrer, above, the request to strike the prayer for declaratory relief is MOOT.

            Code of Civil Procedure § 1786.50(b) permits the recovery of punitive damages in an ICRAA case if “the violation was grossly negligent or willful.” What Section 1786.50(b) does not do is condition the recovery of punitive damages on satisfying Civil Code § 3294. In fact, Section 1786.50 does not even mention Section 3294. Nothing in the language of Section 3294 requires that its provisions be met before punitive damages can be awarded under any other statute. Civil Code § 3294 is simply one way – albeit by far the most common way – to obtain punitive damages. Code of Civil Procedure § 1786.50(b) is another.

            Moving to the final issue, neither party cites any binding authority on the availability of injunctive relief as a remedy in an ICRAA claim. Defendants point out that no express authorization for such a remedy is found in ICRAA, and suggest in the reply that there is no case law to support such a remedy either. But in the opening memorandum, Defendant themselves cited Poinsignon v. Imperva, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 WL 1709942 at *4-5, which held that injunctive relief was available to an ICRAA plaintiff, so long as the ICRAA claim was well-pled. California law describes an injunction as an equitable remedy which may be sought by a person aggrieved by a wrongful act. See Connerly v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4^th 739, 748. There is no particular reason to think that ICRAA constitutes an exception to that general rule.

(4)        Transunion Motion to Strike

            Given the outcome on the demurrers above, the motion to strike filed by Defendant Transunion is TAKEN OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT.