Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 23STCV30112, Date: 2024-06-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV30112 Hearing Date: June 11, 2024 Dept: 14
#10
Case Background
Plaintiffs allege they live in an
illegal dwelling unit (the Unit) at the rear of the property located at 3501
Fletcher Dr., Los Angeles (the Property). (Compl., ¶¶ 12-13.) Plaintiffs
Barrera and Bernal rented the Property from Defendants for $2,500.00 monthly
beginning in 2018. (Id., ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs Castaneda, Yanes, and
Nunez are plaintiff Barrera’s children. Plaintiff Campos also dwells on the
Property; his precise relationship to his co-plaintiffs is unclear from the
Complaint.
The Unit “lacks the basic
necessities and is in woefully substandard condition.” (Id., ¶ 15
[sic].) In January 2023, the Department of Building and Safety issued a
Substandard Order for the Unit – colloquially a “red-tag” – requiring
Defendants to “discontinue use of the dwelling and restore it to its original
construction ... [and] secure the building permits, inspections, and bring the
dwelling up to code or to discontinue its use as a residential dwelling.” (Id.,
¶¶ 15-16.) Defendants did not comply with the Order. (Id., ¶¶ 22, 24.)
Instead, Defendants served Plaintiffs with Pay-or-Quit notices based on unpaid
COVID-19 rental debt, then sued them for unlawful detainer. (Id., ¶¶ 22-23.)
Plaintiffs Sandybelle Barrera, Reyna Bernal, Silvestre Campos, Jisami
Castaneda, Zoey Yanes, and Mathew Nunez (the latter two via Barrera as guardian
ad litem) filed their complaint on December 11, 2023. The complaint names
defendants Elias Camarena, in his individual capacity, Elias and Maria Camarena
separately as co-Trustees of the Elias and Maria Camarena Trust dated November
11, 2022, and Does 1-10. The complaint alleges causes of action for:
1. Tortious
Breach of the Warranty of Habitability;
2. Breach
of the Statutory Warranty of Habitability;
3. Breach
of the Contractual Implied Warranty of Habitability;
4. Private
Nuisance;
5. Breach
of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment;
6. Declaratory
Relief;
7. Failure
to Pay Relocation Assistance; and
8. Unlawful
Business Practices.
Instant Motion
On April 8
and April 12, 2024, respectively, Defendants moved to strike and then demurred
to Plaintiffs’ complaint.
On May 29,
2024, Plaintiffs filed their oppositions.
Decision
The
demurrer to the first through sixth and eighth causes of action is OVERRULED.
The
demurrer to the seventh cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
The motion
to strike is DENIED as moot.
Governing
Standards
Demurrer
Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of
a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer
for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10; Young v.
Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.)
When considering a demurrer, a court reads the allegations stated in
the challenged pleading liberally and in context, and “treat[s] the demurrer as
admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions
or conclusions of fact or law.” (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584,
591.) Put differently: for purposes of demurrer, the court treats all facts
alleged – but only the facts alleged – in the complaint as true. (Picton
v. Anderson Union High School District (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.) “The only issue
involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands,
unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Motion to Strike
Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings
that are not challengeable by demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for
damages. (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435, 436, and 437.) The proper procedure to
attack false allegations in a pleading is a motion to strike. (Id. § 436
(a).) In granting a motion to strike made under Code of Civil Procedure section
435, “[t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 [notice of
motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in its discretion,
and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Id. § 436 (a).) Irrelevant
matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the claim or
those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. (Id.,
§ 431.10.) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not
drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an
order of the court.” (Id. § 436 (b).)
Meet
and Confer
A party demurring to or moving to
strike portions of a pleading must first meet and confer with its opponent,
telephonically or in person, to determine if the deficiencies can be corrected.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41 [demurrer], § 435.5 [motion to strike].)
Defendants’ counsel signed a
declaration stating he met and conferred with Plaintiffs’ counsel on April 2,
2024. The declaration does not specify whether Counsel conferred telephonically
or in person. Nonetheless, the Court is satisfied that the parties complied
with sections 430.41 and 435.5.
Discussion - Demurrer
Defendants
argue the entire Complaint is demurrable on four grounds (although they
enumerate six): first, that the complaint is uncertain because all its
allegations are made upon information and belief; second, that the
complaint is uncertain because Plaintiffs allege both an oral and a written
agreement, so the form of the parties’ agreement cannot be ascertained; third,
that “Plaintiffs fail to state the date and/or time the alleged facts occurred”
(Dem., 2:21-22); and fourth, that “Plaintiffs are not entitled to seek
relief jointly” (Dem., 2:13-14).
Defendants
demur to each separate cause of action on the grounds that it fails to state a
cause of action and is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible.
Defendants
also demur specifically to the seventh cause of action (relocation assistance)
because “it cannot be ascertained from the allegations how or in what manner
Defendant ... can be liable” (Dem., 4:16-17), and to the eighth cause of action
(business practices) because it fails to satisfy heightened particularity
standards.
Demurrer
to Entire Complaint
None of the
arguments directed to the entire complaint are persuasive.
Defendants cite no authority for
their proposition that allegations cannot be stated upon information and belief.
They offer only a conclusory and irrelevant citation to Code of Civil Procedure
section 128.7. Section 128.7 requires that a pleader certify her allegations
have factual support. But it is well-established a pleader may certify that
allegations have evidentiary support even when they are stated upon information
and belief. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7(b)(3).)
As for the form of the contract: the
alleged oral and written contracts are not mutually exclusive. Either way, the
form of the contract can be ascertained in discovery. The important thing is
that Plaintiffs plead the contract’s terms or legal effect. (See Construction
Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189,
199.) They have done so.
Plaintiffs’ dates and times are
sufficiently specific. Where necessary, Plaintiffs identify the period of time
during which for violations existed. Moreover, the dates of the lease, the DBS
citation, and the alleged unlawful eviction attempts are specified, with
reasonable particularity.
Finally, Defendants make no
reasoned argument based on misjoinder. They only cite law and state
conclusions.
First, Second, and Third Causes of Action
for Breaches of Habitability
Defendants characterize the first
three of Plaintiffs’ claims all as a single cause of action for “habitability”
and recite five common-law elements for that cause of action. (Dem., 5:6-14.)
As an initial matter, the Court
agrees with Plaintiffs that tortious breach, breach of contract, and violation
of statute are three separate causes of action and theories of relief. These
are not duplicative. However, because Defendants treat all these claims as a
breach of the implied contractual warranty of habitability, the Court applies
that rubric to its analysis.
Defendants misstate the elements of
that cause of action. The elements of a cause of action for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability “are [1] the existence of a material defective
condition affecting the premises' habitability, [2] notice to the landlord of
the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant's discovery of the
condition, [3] the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the
deficiency, and [4] resulting damages.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing,
LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)
As to the first element, Plaintiffs
have alleged ultimate facts. They have also alleged the Property was by the
City cited as unfit for habitation, a wholesale breach of the warranty. As to
the second and third, Plaintiffs pled they leased the Property from Defendants,
so they pled Defendants were their landlords. Plaintiffs pled the City cited
Defendants for substandard conditions, so they pled Defendants had notice.
Plaintiffs allege DBS cited Defendants and gave them two months to cure
defects, and they did not. All elements are pled.
As to Defendants’ last few
arguments: Plaintiffs simply do not have to attach a copy of their purported
contract. (See Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins.
Co., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 199.) And Defendants’ assertion that
Plaintiffs must plead “the condition was unknown to the tenant at the time of
occupancy” simply invents an element of the cause of action that does not
exist.
The demurrer to these causes of
action is overruled.
Fourth Cause of Action for
Private Nuisance
In order to
make a prima facie claim for nuisance, “[f]irst, the plaintiff must prove an
interference with his use and enjoyment of his property. [Citation.] Second,
‘the invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the use and enjoyment of the land
[must be] substantial, i.e., that it cause[s] the plaintiff to suffer
“substantial actual damage.” ’ [Citation.] Third, ‘ “[t]he interference with
the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be
unreasonable” [citation], i.e., it must be “of such a nature, duration or
amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of
the land.” ’ ” (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 248, 262-263.)
“The requirements of substantial
damage and unreasonableness are not inconsequential.” (Id. at
p. 263, italics in original.) Descriptions of the standard are numerous and
nonspecific: as “significant harm”, “harm of importance”, a “real and
appreciable invasion of the plaintiffs’ interests,” “definitely offensive,
seriously annoying or intolerable,” conduct by which “normal persons in that
locality would … be substantially annoyed or disturbed”, and so on. (San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 938,
citations omitted.)
Here,
Plaintiffs allege Defendants rented them a substandard property, illegally,
without obtaining proper permits, and when a government agency called them on
it, they tried to evict their tenants illegally and recover unpaid rent.
Defendants’
failure to take action to correct the Unit’s illegality after the DBS citation
is outrageous and unreasonable. Their attempt thereafter to evict their tenants
(and recover unpaid rent for an illegal unit) is equally so.
The
demurrer is overruled.
Fifth
Cause of Action for Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
An action for breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment resembles breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th
578, 588-590.) Just as a party not in breach may stand on a contract and sue
for damages, a tenant suffering breach of quiet enjoyment may remain in place
and sue their landlord for breach of the implied covenant, which is a breach of
a promise contained in their lease. (Ibid.) The elements track with a
breach of contract or covenant case: (1) a lease; (2) the tenant’s performance
or excuse; (3) the landlord’s substantial interference with the tenant’s
beneficial use and enjoyment; and (4) some injury to the tenant’s rights under
the lease – generally, the failure to obtain the full value bargained for when
the tenant paid rent to occupy the premises without disturbance. (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs allege a lease and they
allege their payment or excuse from payment of rent. Plaintiffs allege
Defendants not only permitted uninhabitable conditions to persist, but they
permitted the Property to be red-tagged and tried to evict Plaintiffs and
reclaim unpaid rent rather than returning the Property to habitable condition.
This amounts to a substantial interference. Plaintiffs’ rights were injured
when they were not delivered a habitable premises and when Defendants tried to
evicted them.
The demurrer is overruled.
Sixth Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief
“To qualify for declaratory relief under section 1060, [a party must
show] their action … present[s] two essential elements: ‘(1) a proper subject
of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable
questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party.’ [Citation.] ‘The
“actual controversy” language in ... section 1060 encompasses a probable future
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties.’ [Citation.]
It does not embrace controversies that are ‘conjectural, anticipated to occur
in the future, or an attempt to obtain an advisory opinion from the court.’ [Citation.]”
(Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6
Cal.App.5th 527, 546.)
Claims of ongoing breach, when a contractual relationship continues
between the parties, are appropriate for declaratory relief. “One of the
purposes of a declaratory relief judgment is to hold the parties steadfast to
the definite provisions of a contract by a reasonable interpretation of its
terms justifying a decree that will make definite the true intent of the
parties to perform even upon the happening of a condition.” (Moklofsky v.
Moklofsky (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 585, 587.)
Plaintiffs allege they are still tenants at the Property. If the
parties continue to dispute Plaintiffs’ obligations to pay rent and Defendants’
obligations to pay relocation, then there is an actual, ongoing controversy
about their contractual and legal obligations to each other.
The
demurrer is overruled.
Seventh
Cause of Action for Failure to Pay Relocation Assistance
Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient
facts to constitute their seventh cause of action.
The elements of failure to pay
relocation after a red-tag are scattered through several sections of the Los
Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC).
LAMC § 163.02(A) states:
“Any tenant who is displaced or
subject to displacement from a residential rental unit as result of an order to
vacate or any order requiring the vacation of the residential unit by the
Enforcement Agency due to a violation so extensive and of such a nature that
the immediate health and safety of the residents is endangered, shall be
entitled to relocation benefits payable by the landlord in the amounts
prescribed in Section 163.05. The Enforcement Agency shall determine the
eligibility of tenants for benefits paid pursuant to this article.”
LAMC §
163.04(A) states:
“The relocation benefits required by this article shall be
paid by the landlord to the tenant within ten days after the date that the
order to vacate is first mailed to the landlord and posted on the premises, or
at least 20 days prior to the vacation date set forth in the order to vacate,
whichever occurs later.”
LAMC § 163.06(A) states:
“If the landlord fails, neglects or refuses to make timely
payments to a tenant pursuant to an order to pay relocation benefits, except in
the situations described in Sections 163.02 B. or 163.02 C., and if the tenant
does not receive relocation payments from the City, the landlord shall be
liable to the tenant in a civil action for an amount equal to one and one-half
times the relocation benefits payable pursuant to Section 163.05. The tenant
shall also be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as
determined by a court.”
Plaintiffs only recite the relevant
sections of the LAMC in the Complaint. They do not plead facts that satisfy the
elements of their claim. For example, that Plaintiffs have not alleged they
received a notice to vacate, such that LAMC section 163.04 would be triggered. Reasonable
particularity requires that Defendants be able to ascertain when they
were allegedly obligated to pay the relocation in question.
In their opposition, Plaintiffs attempt
to characterize the operative “notice to vacate” as the eviction notice
Defendants served on May 5, 2023. But the complaint suggests Defendants
manufactured a for-cause eviction based on nonpayment, which would not entitle
Plaintiffs to relocation and is not the same sort of red-tag notice
contemplated in LAMC section 163.00 et seq.
The demurrer is sustained with
leave to amend.
Eighth Cause of Action for
Unfair Business Practices
Plaintiffs bring their last claim
under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Business and Professions Code
section 17200 et seq. The UCL “bars ‘unfair competition’ and defines the term
as a ‘business act or practice’ that is (1) ‘fraudulent,’ (2) ‘unlawful,’ or
(3) ‘unfair.’ … Each is its own independent ground for liability under the
[UCL], but their underlying purpose ‘is to protect both consumers and
competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and
services’ … .” (Shaeffer v. Califia Farms, LLC (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
1125, 1135, citations omitted.) “[T]he UCL is a chameleon. … Depending on which
prong is involved, a UCL claim may most closely resemble, in terms of the right
asserted, an action for misrepresentation …, misappropriation …, price fixing
…, interference with prospective economic advantage …, or any of countless
other common law and statutory claims. ” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions,
Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1196.)
Under its unlawful prong,
the UCL “ ‘ “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful
practices’ that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” (Cel-Tech
Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20
Cal.4th 163, 180.) “The Legislature intended this ‘sweeping language’ to
include ‘ “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at
the same time is forbidden by law.” ’ ” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992)
2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266.) The practice in question must, however, be unlawful,
in the sense that plaintiffs can point to another specific law that has been
violated and thereby actionable under the UCL. (See De La Torre v. CashCall,
Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 966, 980 [unconscionable loan “independently
actionable” under UCL because it violates the California Financing Law].)
Plaintiffs have alleged a host of
illegal practices and identified all of them in their complaint. They have
stated a claim. And contrary to Defendant’s argument in their moving papers,
Plaintiffs have pled it with particularity.
Discussion – Motion to Strike
The
demurrer having been sustained with leave to amend, the Court denies
Defendants’ motion to strike as moot.
(For the
sake of avoiding unnecessary motion practice, the Court notes – without ruling
– that it is inclined to agree with Defendants’ argument regarding punitive
damages, as applied to the complaint in its current form.)
Conclusion
The
demurrer to the first through sixth and eighth causes of action is OVERRULED.
The
demurrer to the seventh cause of action is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend.
The motion
to strike is DENIED as moot.